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Abstract 
 
Remotely piloted aircraft and the people that control them are changing how the US 
military operates aircraft and those who fly, yet few know what “drone” operators actually do, 
why they do what they do, or how they shape and reflect remote air warfare and human-machine 
relationships.  What do the remote operators and intelligence personnel know during missions to 
“protect and avenge” coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and how do they go about knowing 
what they know? In an ethnographic and historical analysis of the Air Force’s preeminent 
weapon system for the counterinsurgencies in the two countries, this study describes how social, 
technical, and cognitive factors mutually constitute remote air operations in war. Armed with 
perspectives and methods developed in the fields of the history of technology, sociology of 
technology, and cognitive anthropology, the author, an Air Force fighter pilot, describes how 
distributed crews represent, transform, and propagate information to find and kill targets and 
traces the observed human and machine interactions to policy assumptions, professional 
identities, employment concepts, and technical tools.  In doing so, he shows how the people, 
practices, and machines associated with remotely piloted aircraft have been oriented to and 
conditioned by trust in automation, experience, skill, and social interactions and how they have 
influenced and reflected the evolving operational environment, encompassing organizations, and 
communities of practice. 
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Introduction 
Surprisingly few people have penetrated from the outside the inner workings of 
science and technology, and then got out of it to explain to the outsider how it all 
works.  
Bruno Latour, Science in Action 
Since the US Air Force (USAF) activated the first RQ-1 Predator squadron in 1995, how 
the service organizes, trains, and equips units to fly remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) has changed 
dramatically, yet rich descriptions of the history and practice of remote air warfare are almost 
nonexistent.1
There is a dearth of rich descriptions of RPA operations, but the deficiency is not due to a 
scarcity of the weapons or indifference to their use in contemporary conflicts.  When the United 
States invaded Iraq in 2003, only a few Predators flew over Iraq and Afghanistan in support of 
the Global War on Terrorism.  By 2010, however, the US military had procured several thousand 
RPA ranging in size from tiny model airplanes to small airliners, and several dozen Predators 
and Reapers flew in orbits over the Middle East and Central Asia for 24 hours a day, 7 days a 
week.  One of the most prominent and vocal critics of “the war of the machines” and the 
proliferation of robots and RPA on and above the battlefield is Peter W. Singer of the Brookings 
Institution.
  Despite years of experience and the importance of the weapons in conflicts after 
the end of the Cold War, no one has succeeded in describing the people, machines, and 
procedures used to employ aircraft remotely, and few put the operation of RPA in social and 
historical context.  Through ethnographic and historical research of the MQ-9 Reaper, this study 
describes how operators and intelligence personnel for the larger version of Predator identify and 
kill enemy combatants from halfway around the world, explains why human and machine 
elements of the system do what they do, and examines the complex relationships among humans, 
remote presence, and automation in air warfare. 
2
                                                 
1 Remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) are systems that consist of at least one ground control station, communications 
equipment, and an unoccupied and reusable aircraft that sustain flight through onboard propulsion and aerodynamic 
lift.  The term RPA is synonymous with the terms “remotely piloted vehicle” (RPV), “unmanned aerial vehicle” 
(UAV), “remotely operated aircraft,” and “unmanned aircraft system” (UAS).  Lighter-than-air aircraft, ballistic 
missiles, and standoff missiles are not RPA.       
  In Wired for War, the acclaimed author of Corporate Warriors and Children at War 
asserts that robotic systems like Predator are ushering in a “historic revolution in warfare” and 
2 P. W. Singer, “War of the Machines,” Scientific American 303, no. 1 (July 2010): 56-63. 
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are “the most important weapons development since the atomic bomb.”3  Evoking images from 
the films The Terminator and The Matrix, Singer argues that the evolution of Predator, the 
improvements to Reaper, and “the inexorable growth in computing power” portend an “ever 
growing intelligence and autonomy” of the weapons and a daunting shift in responsibility from 
humans to machines in warfare.4
For scholars and a public informed more by science fiction movies than detailed 
observations of remote air operations, the proliferation of “drones” and the separation of 
combatants from the battlefield are synonymous with the removal of human decision-making 
from military conflicts and the sterilization of warfare.  Singer and the popular press use the term 
“drone” instead of the descriptors “unmanned” and “remotely operated” because they believe the 
military invokes the latter terms “to avoid Hollywood-fueled visions of machines that are 
plotting our demise.”
 
5  Often Singer and others depict drone operators as disgruntled pilots 
locked in metal containers who “seem like they are just playing video games” with only the 
power to veto the actions of the machines under their control.6
Scholars, policymakers, and engineers offer advice, set policies, and redesign systems 
without knowing how RPA pilots, sensor operators, and intelligence personnel employ the 
weapons in combat, and the discrepancy is something Predator and Reaper operators fear and 
openly discuss.
  The term “drone” was unpopular 
among Predator and Reaper pilots, however, because drones were a type of RPA the USAF used 
for target practice, and many Predator operators had a patch they wore on their flight suits that 
said, “We’re not drones…we shoot back.”  Unfortunately, Predator operators, scholars, and 
reporters have not described what Predator crewmembers do when they “shoot back” and Singer 
does not explain how bombing insurgents from an F-16 Fighting Falcon at 20,000 feet in 
Afghanistan is different from killing the same insurgents from a ground control station at Creech 
Air Force Base in Nevada.  No one has described what RPA operators actually do or how remote 
air warfare has evolved.   
7
                                                 
3 P. W. Singer, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century (New York: Penguin Press, 
2009), 10, 430; P. W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2003); P. W. Singer, Children at War (New York: Pantheon Books, 2005). 
  In a periodical written and published by RPA operators, the chief pilot for the 
4 Singer, “War of the Machines,” 59. 
5 Ibid., 57. 
6 Ibid., 62. 
7 I use the terms “RPA operator”, “Predator operator”, and “Reaper operator” to denote the pilot and sensor operator 
who operate the systems from a ground control station.  The term “RPA crew”, “Predator crew”, and “Reaper crew” 
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development of Predator and Reaper weapons and tactics lamented “how little people actually 
know and understand about UAVs and how we employ them.”8  He was especially concerned 
about how many in the Department of Defense told him “flying your UAV is like a big video 
game” and that “the X-Box generation is perfectly suited” for the aircraft.9  The author implored 
his peers to set the record straight when people called their job a “glorified video game” because 
“we will never make killing people and breaking things in defense of this nation a game” and 
“playing X-Box does not prepare someone for the deadly serious business of supporting troops 
on the ground in a combat zone.”10
Unfortunately, events in 2010 seem to justify the concerns of RPA operators who feel 
their actions are misunderstood and the alarms of defense scholars who think robots could make 
conflicts easier to start and harder to control.  One winter morning in an Afghan village, a 
coalition of US Special Operations Forces and Afghan security personnel were clearing a bazaar 
of weapons and explosives when a Predator crew spotted a convoy of two sport-utility vehicles, a 
pickup truck, and more than 30 people headed toward the town.  The appearance of the group 
matched intelligence information about enemy reinforcements, and the leader of the Special 
Forces team called in a pair of helicopters to destroy the threat with missiles and rockets.  When 
the helicopter pilots wheeled around for a second attack of the convoy, however, they noticed a 
“flash of color” from the clothing of occupants in the vehicles, thought the colors indicated the 
presence of women, and stopped the attack.
   
11
                                                                                                                                                             
include the pilot, sensor operator, and mission coordinator for a mission.  The mission coordinator was an 
intelligence specialist connected to the pilot and sensor operator with an intercom and other communication devices.   
  Tragically, the targeted individuals were not 
Taliban insurgents trying to outflank the Americans.  The travelers were on a journey to 
Kandahar for supplies and medical treatment, and the attack killed 23 and injured 12 innocent 
civilians.  Three of the injured were women or children.  An investigation of the incident, led by 
a Major General in the US Army, blamed the civilian casualties on the “inaccurate and 
unprofessional reporting” of the Predator crew who “ignored or downplayed information that the 
convoy was anything other than an attacking force” and “deprived the ground force commander 
8 Joseph Campo, “The Eyes and the Claws” (757th Operational Support Squadron, July 2006). 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 For the most detailed description of the incident, see Sean D. Naylor, “Army seeks answers for Afghan civilian 
deaths: ‘Miscommunication’ may have led to more than 15 civilian deaths,” Army Times, March 10, 2010, 
http://www.armytimes.com/news/2010/03/army_mcchrystal_030910w/. 
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of vital information.”12  In response to the investigation’s findings, the commander of US and 
NATO forces in Afghanistan recommended that the USAF address the unprofessional 
performance of the crew and codify the tactics, techniques, and procedures of personnel who 
identify and target combatants with RPA.13
Counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan often depend upon the 
performance of RPA crews and the insight provided by them, yet the practices of RPA pilots, 
sensor operators, and intelligence personnel are largely unknown and the qualities of 
professional and skilled RPA crewmembers are under debate.  The summer before the 2010 
tragedy in Afghanistan, the Air Force Research Institute hosted a “Future Operator Symposium” 
to address the changing identity of USAF “airmen” and asked a diverse group of service 
professionals to define the term “Air Force operator” and to recommend strategies to organize, 
train, and equip them.
   
14  In 2009, the USAF trained more RPA pilots and sensor operators than 
crewmembers for bomber and fighter aircraft combined, and over the previous twelve months, 
Predators and Reapers amassed over 50,000 hours of flight time over Iraq and Afghanistan, more 
hours than the USAF accumulated in the first decade of the aircraft’s existence.15
                                                 
12 David Zucchino, “US Report faults Air Force drone crew, ground commanders in Afghan civilian deaths,” Los 
Angeles Times, May 29, 2010, sec. World, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/may/29/world/la-fg-afghan-drone-
20100531; A report of the full investigation is classified, but the Headquarters for US Forces-Afghanistan published 
a redacted version of the report’s executive summary.  United States Forces-Afghanistan Headquarters, “US 
Releases Uruzgan Investigation Findings,” International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Press Release, May 28, 
2010, http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/isaf-releases/u.s.-releases-uruzgan-investigation-findings.html; Timothy 
McHale, “Executive Summary for Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation, 21 February 2010 Civilian-Casualty 
Incident in Uruzgan Province” (Headquarters, United States Forces-Afghanistan, May 2010), 
http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/April2010-
Dari/May2010Revised/Uruzgan%20investigation%20findings.pdf. 
  Participants at 
the conference wondered if the USAF’s expanding RPA squadrons were bastions of combat 
warriors on the cutting-edge of warfare or if they were “an asylum for the mediocre.”  They also 
questioned whether RPA operators were really pilots.  Was the joystick they used to control the 
aircraft a “morale stick” to help them feel like pilots?  Despite concerns about the future of the 
13 Stanley A. McChrystal, “Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation, 21 February 2010 US Air-to-Ground Engagement 
in the Vicinity of Shahidi Hassas, Uruzgan Province, Afghanistan” (Headquarters, United States Forces-
Afghanistan, May 2010), http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/April2010-
Dari/May2010Revised/Uruzgan%20investigation%20findings.pdf; The commander also issued four letters of 
reprimand for brigade and battalion commanders associated with the incident in addition to letters of admonishment 
for two junior officers.  Zucchino, “US Report faults Air Force drone crew, ground commanders in Afghan civilian 
deaths.” 
14 Air Force Research Institute, “Future Operators Symposium”, July 21, 2009, 
http://afri.au.af.mil/conferences/Future_Operator/index html. 
15 Lawrence Spinetta, “Letters - Air Force Community - Air Force Times: The Coming UAS Revolution”, August 
10, 2009, http://www.airforcetimes.com/community/opinion/airforce_opinion_letters_081009/. 
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USAF operator, the dependence of ground forces on the presence and support of remotely 
operated aircraft, and the growing number of personnel required to operate them, questions 
remain: what do RPA operators do and why?      
Literature Review 
Detailed descriptions of how military men and women fly RPA are almost nonexistent 
despite a checkered accident record and interest in increasing the safety, efficiency, and 
effectiveness of RPA operations.16  Symposium participants, policymakers, military 
professionals, and members of the press debate and write about the implications of remote air 
warfare, but they rarely describe how RPA pilots, sensor operators, and intelligence personnel 
conduct missions with the aircraft.  RPA pilots tend to focus discussions on the importance of 
keeping humans “in the loop” and on the exploits of unoccupied aircraft in battle.17  
Policymakers highlight the institutional challenges of the growing demand for RPA and the 
unrealized potential of automation, not the actions of human operators.18  The popular press 
often describes the setting of remote operations in rich detail and is infatuated with the ability of 
operators to kill on battlefields from thousands of miles away, but reporters and newspaper 
editors continue to call RPA “drones” and perpetuate a view of RPA operators as detached 
observers of automated machines and not active participants in war.19
                                                 
16 In 2006, Dr. Nancy Cooke claimed the mishap rate for RPA was 100 times that of occupied aircraft.  Nancy J. 
Cooke et al., Human Factors of Remotely Operated Vehicles, Volume 7, 1st ed. (JAI Press, 2006); The safety record 
of RPA has improved dramatically over the last five years with the accident rate of Predator falling by more than 
half to levels commensurate with the first decade of experience with other aircraft like the F-16 Fighting Falcon.  
Robert P. Herz, “Assessing the Influence of Human Factors and Experience on Predator Mishaps” (Dissertation, 
Northcentral University, 2008), 92. 
  Aircraft engineers and 
17 Operators “in the loop” have the ability to observe and influence a controlled process.  RPA pilots at the Future 
Operator Symposium equated the phrase “in the loop” with the ability of the pilot to precisely control an aircraft 
when desired.  Systems with humans “out of the loop” are under automatic control and use mechanical or electronic 
devices to observe, decide, and act instead of a human.  Thomas B Sheridan, Telerobotics, Automation, and Human 
Supervisory Control (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), 3.  The terms “occupied aircraft” and “unoccupied 
aircraft” are synonymous with the more popular terms “manned aircraft” and “unmanned aircraft.”  I use the former 
terms throughout this study because many of the aircraft flown in the contemporary USAF have humans in them that 
are not men. 
18 The Air Force’s “Unmanned Aircraft System Flight Plan” captures best the perspective of policymakers in the 
service at the time of this study.  Prior to 2009, the number of RPA missions and hours flown over Iraq and 
Afghanistan had doubled every two years and the service needed 160 personnel to support just a single mission.  
The plan assumed automation had the potential to reduce “cost, forward footprint, and risk.”  Michael B. Donley and 
Norton A. Schwartz, United States Air Force Unmanned Aircraft Systems Flight Plan 2009-2047 (Washington DC: 
Headquarters, United States Air Force, May 18, 2009), 14, 30, 33. 
19 One of many examples is David Zucchino, “Drone pilots have a front-row seat on war, from half a world away,” 
Los Angeles Times, February 21, 2010, sec. World, http://www.latimes.com/news/nation-and-world/la-fg-drone-
crews21-2010feb21,0,5789185,full.story; Responses from the popular press after the Uruzgan incident described 
above were: Dexter Filkins, “Operators of Drones Are Faulted in Afghan Deaths,” The New York Times, May 29, 
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industry representatives tend to emphasize the unique capabilities of specific aircraft designs, not 
how operators fly them, and human-factors engineers stress how more laboratory research and 
improvements to the displays and interfaces could increase pilot performance and situational 
awareness.20
A review of the literature of RPA highlights the potential benefit of research focused on 
human-machine interaction from an ethnographic and historical perspective.  Some of the best 
descriptions of the history of RPA in the military are from political scientists, who either 
compare the development of the weapons to prevailing theories of innovation or analyze the 
difficulties of implementing the systems due to abbreviated or aborted acquisition processes.
  Missing from public discussions are the details of remote air operations in current 
conflicts and the role of social networks, organizational culture, and professional practices in the 
evolution and history of RPA.  The public cannot have informed discussions about these topics 
without empirical observations and descriptions of how RPA operators actually fly and employ 
the aircraft.   
21  
Political scientists who study the topic often elucidate the importance of fundamental 
technologies in the development of remotely operated systems but rarely do they penetrate the 
“black box” of the artifacts themselves or describe the complex interaction of people and things 
that the technological objects represent.22
                                                                                                                                                             
2010, sec. World, http://www nytimes.com/2010/05/30/world/asia/30drone.html; Zucchino, “US Report faults Air 
Force drone crew, ground commanders in Afghan civilian deaths.” 
  The authors also treat culture as an independent 
variable, and they often make broad generalizations of why the services either succeeded or 
failed in the employment of RPAs as weapons of war.  In contrast, aviation safety reports 
incorporate rich descriptions of RPA operations and practices, but the reports are understandably 
normative, emphasize approved methods of operating RPA, and encourage the standardization of 
20 All of these views were on display in a seminar on “UAS Operations from a Human Factors Perspective” at the 
2009 Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI) conference. “AUVSI’s Unmanned 
Systems North America 2009 Conference Program”, August 10, 2009, 
http://symposium.auvsi.org/attendees/conferenceprogram.php#Plenary. 
21 The most comprehensive historical analysis of RPA in the Department of Defense is Thomas Erhard’s 723-page 
dissertation.  Thomas P. Ehrhard, “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in the United States Armed Services: A Comparative 
Study of Weapon System Innovation” (Dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 2000); Other informative studies of 
RPA from political scientists include Jon J. Rosenwasser, “Governance Structure and Weapon Innovation: The Case 
of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles” (Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (Tufts University), 2004); Michael R. 
Thirtle, Robert V. Johnson, and John L. Birkler, The Predator ACTD: A Case Study for Transition Planning for the 
Formal Acquisition Process (RAND Corporation, 1997); John H. Davis, “Theater Airborne Reconnaissance: A 
Peripheral Military Mission’s Innovation” (Dissertation, George Washington University, 2007). 
22 “Black box” in this case refers to an analysis of a system or subsystem that consists of only the inputs and outputs 
of the device.  Bruno Latour, Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 2. 
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systems and training to balance safety, performance, and cost.  All safety reports in the USAF 
are also limited to only narrative descriptions of the accidents and include “privileged” 
information not releasable to the public.23
The majority of literature on RPA comes from researchers in government or academic 
laboratories with backgrounds in human factors, cognitive engineering, and applied psychology.  
One of the more influential research organizations is the Air Force Research Laboratory, which 
sponsored several studies of RPA operations, including research on shift-work and fatigue, 
medical requirements, and deficiencies in human-system integration within the USAF 
community.  An initiative of the laboratory is to redesign operator tasks and jobs, and it is 
notable that researchers in the laboratory acknowledge that RPA operators and engineers have 
evolved from the traditional “one crew-aircraft-mission paradigm” and that the control of RPA 
can migrate between operators “across temporal, physical, and functional domains.”
   
24  
Researchers at MIT’s Humans and Autonomy Lab and Arizona State University’s Cognitive 
Engineering Research Institute also recognize the evolving and complex characteristics of RPA, 
but most of their laboratory research focuses on interface design and the development of 
techniques to control multiple aircraft at the same time.25  Intent on improving methods to 
control RPA for well-defined tasks, the human factors community tends to develop categories of 
operator tasks and competencies the researchers derive from focus groups, industry conferences, 
and academic symposiums rather than from observations of human-machine behavior in the 
context of real-time operations.26
                                                 
23 Air Force Instruction 91-204, Safety Investigations and Reports, 2008, para. 3.3.1. 
   
24 A. P. Tvaryanas, Human Factors Considerations in Migration of Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Operator 
Control (311th Performance Enhancement Directorate, February 2006), 13. 
25 Examples include M. L. Cummings et al., “Automation Architecture for Single Operator Multiple UAV 
Command and Control,” The International Command and Control Journal 1, no. 2 (2007): 1-24; M. L. Cummings 
and P. J. Mitchell, “Operator Scheduling Strategies in Supervisory Control of Multiple UAVs,” Aerospace Science 
and Technology 11 (2007): 339-348; Cooke et al., Human Factors of Remotely Operated Vehicles, Volume 7; 
Cummings acknowledges limitations of Cognitive Work Analysis (CWA) and its framework for analyzing social 
constraints in the design of systems for dynamic and time-critical tasks.  M. L. Cummings, “Can CWA Inform the 
Design of Networked Intelligent Systems?,” in Moving Autonomy Forward Conference, 2006. 
26 For example, researchers from the Air Force Research Laboratory used guided discussions, expert interviews, and 
surveys to determine the “major accomplishments” and Mission Essential CompetenciesSM for RPA operators and 
for crewmembers of other USAF aircraft and weapon systems.  Air Combat Command used shortfalls in the 
“accomplishments” and “competencies” of the operators to justify and tailor training practices.  The laboratory did 
not allow distribution of the studies to the public, and I do not use them as sources for this study.  G. Eaton, S. 
Kalita, and J. Nagy, USAF Unmanned Aircraft Systems Performance Analyses: Predator Pilot Front End Analysis 
Report (Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH: Survivability/Vulnerability Information Analysis Center, May 26, 
2006); J. Nagy, K. Muse, and G. Eaton, USAF Unmanned Aircraft Systems Performance Analyses: Predator Sensor 
Operator Front End Analysis Report (Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH: Survivability/Vulnerability 
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Human factors and cognitive systems engineers also rarely explore how social and 
cultural factors relate to the organization of system behavior or how the nature of cognitive tasks 
evolves over time and setting.  One exception is Thomas Sheridan, who with others at the 
Human-Machine Systems Laboratory at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology formulated a 
nuanced understanding of automation and human-machine relationships.  Sheridan and others 
developed the concept of “levels of automation” and applied the framework to the idea of 
“supervisory control” where humans and machines trade and share graduated levels of control 
that can transform the nature of human activity from an emphasis on sensor-motor tasks to the 
cognitive tasks of perceiving, planning, evaluating, deciding, and learning.27  Sheridan’s 
perspective of the human-machine relationship is difficult to apply holistically to systems of 
people and machines interacting and exchanging multiple levels of control simultaneously in 
real-time, however, and he only addresses broadly the social implications of automation in 
remotely operated systems.  Other exceptions include Nadine Sarter, David Woods, and other 
cognitive system engineers who have shown how group, professional, and institutional contexts 
can constrain and shape behavior and how different environments can lead to different cognitive 
work.28  Ethnographic research methods are “new methods” in cognitive engineering, however, 
and ethnographic descriptions of socio-technical systems are rare, especially in the aviation 
domain.29
                                                                                                                                                             
Information Analysis Center, August 18, 2006); George M. Alliger et al., Understanding Mission Essential 
Competencies as a Work Analysis Method (Air Force Research Laboratory, Human Effectiveness Directorate, 
August 2007); Warfighter Readiness Research Division, Summary Technical Report: Development of Reaper 
Mission Essential Competencies (Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH: Air Force Research Laboratory, 711th 
Human Performance Wing, August 2009); Warfighter Readiness Research Division, Summary Technical Report: 
Development of Predator Mission Essential Competencies (Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH: Air Force 
Research Laboratory, 711th Human Performance Wing, August 2009). 
  Cognitive systems engineers are also concerned primarily about system design, not 
about how professional identities and subjectivities have evolved over time.  To cognitive 
27 Sheridan, Telerobotics, Automation, and Human Supervisory Control; Thomas B Sheridan, Humans and 
Automation: System Design and Research Issues (New York: J. Wiley & Sons, 2002); Thomas B Sheridan and 
William Lawrence Verplank, Human and Computer Control of Undersea Teleoperators (Cambridge, MA: Man-
Machine Laboratory, Department of Mechanical Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1978); R. 
Parasuraman, T.B. Sheridan, and C.D. Wickens, “A Model for Types and Levels of Human Interaction with 
Automation,” Systems, Man and Cybernetics, Part A: Systems and Humans, IEEE Transactions on 30, no. 3 (May 
2000): 286-297. 
28 For a historical and methodological description of cognitive systems engineering, see Robert R. Hoffman and 
Laura G. Militello, Perspectives on Cognitive Task Analysis: Historical Origins and Modern Communities of 
Practice, 1st ed. (Psychology Press, 2009), 93-124. 
29 Nadine B. Sarter and René Amalberti, eds., Cognitive Engineering in the Aviation Domain (Mahwah, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2000), 6.  Despite the editors’ assertion that research in cognitive engineering relies 
heavily upon naturalistic observations and ethnographic research methods, hardly any of the contributors to the 
volume explain how they applied the methods to their studies. 
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systems engineers, people and their ideologies are constant and interchangeable units, yet it is 
critical to understand how the people and context of work have changed over the course of 
activity and across the history of practice in order to develop a richer understanding of the 
workplace and to design innovative solutions to systemic problems. 
Theoretical Background and Framework of Study 
Missing from studies of humans and automation in remote air warfare are the roles of 
social networks, organizational culture, and professional practices of engineers and operators in 
the evolution and history of remote flight.  These issues are difficult to understand without 
empirical observations and descriptions of how RPA operators actually fly aircraft.  This study 
uses a framework for the observation and description of RPA operations that builds upon 
Sheridan’s ideas of supervisory control and combines philosophical approaches and ethnographic 
methods from the sociology of science and technology, history of technology, situated cognition, 
and cognitive ethnography.  Concepts and methodologies inspired by these fields enables the 
study to characterize the relationships among the humans, automated technologies, and practices 
of the RPA community and to trace the nature of those relationships to aspects of the security 
environment, operational priorities, design practices, and other social and technical factors.  
One of the first fields to study specific episodes of technical practice is the sociology of 
science and technology, which attempts to answer the questions: “What is the social history of 
truth?” and “What are the contingency of ways in which technology is developed and 
accepted?”30  David Bloor founded the sociology of scientific knowledge and the “strong 
program” in reaction to Robert Merton and other sociologists who looked at only the ethos of 
scientific communities and not the substance of scientific facts themselves.31  Proponents of the 
approach implored social scientists to investigate all knowledge formulation, even mathematics 
and logical thinking, and to compare empirical findings with theoretical models of knowledge 
formulation.  When viewed under the strong program, scientific knowledge does not contain any 
special nature of rationality, validity, truth, or objectivity, and its investigators study the creation 
of knowledge with sociological scrutiny and without assumptions of rationality.32
                                                 
30 For a compact description of the field of science and technology studies and it varieties see Charis Thompson, 
Making Parents: The Ontological Choreography of Reproductive Technologies (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 
31-53. 
   
31 Robert K. Merton, On Social Structure and Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). 
32 David Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1991). 
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Sociologists Trevor Pinch and Wiebe Bijker extended elements of Bloor’s strong 
program from scientific practice to technology itself.33  They coined the term “social construction 
of technology” and the anthropological approach to studying technological development, 
otherwise known as the sociology of technology.  The field brings together the work of 
sociologists and historians of technology and describes how facts and technical objects are social 
constructs.  Its practitioners argue technological systems are transient products of human effort, 
negotiation, and conflict, and they challenge investigators to trace the processes through which 
technologies incorporate technical, social, economic, and political elements to understand the 
nature of technological systems.  Sociologists of technology often use ethnographic methods to 
study “forms of life” and to study how actors within technological systems give meaning to their 
actions.34
Important contributors to the field of the sociology of technology are historians of science 
and technology, and historical studies of scientific and technological practices have helped 
produce numerous theoretical innovations in the field.  Some of the fundamental questions 
historians of science and technology answer are: “What are the origins of science and 
technology?,”  “Who are the actors, what were their circumstances, and why was the 
technological innovation made by these people and not others?”, “ Why was the innovation 
possible at this time and place rather than another time and place?”, and “ Who benefitted and 
who suffered?”
  Anthropological methods allow sociologists of science and technology to examine 
professional cultures without assuming science reflects true nature and give investigators the 
tools to examine tacit knowledge and to explore how technologies emerge from standards, 
practices, and shared bodies of knowledge over time. 
35
                                                 
33 Wiebe Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, and Trevor Pinch, The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New 
Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1989). 
  Historians of science and technology describe how mechanical objects, 
practices, and surrounding organizations of people, things, and ideas reflect and shape the 
societies in which they are developed.  By studying the practices of scientists, engineers, and 
operators and by describing the inner workings of the technologies they construct and use, 
historians open the “black box” of technology and describe the process of knowledge 
formulation.   
34 Robert E. Kohler, Lords of the Fly: Drosophila Genetics and the Experimental Life, 1st ed. (Chicago: University 
Of Chicago Press, 1994). 
35 Merritt Roe Smith and Leo Marx, eds., Does Technology Drive History?: The Dilemma of Technological 
Determinism (MIT Press, 1994). 
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Common themes and theoretical insight from the community of historians include rich 
descriptions of how scientists, engineers, and operators of socio-technical systems gain 
credibility, trust, authority, and power.  A prominent example of a historical study of a socio-
technical system is Donald MacKensie’s Inventing Accuracy, which brings to light the 
confluence of forces, both physical and social, that gave rise to a self-contained system of missile 
navigation.36  Another example is David Mindell’s Digital Apollo, which finds that the 
construction of America’s lunar program was not just the manifestation of political objectives, 
bureaucratic imperatives, and technical requirements.37
In many ways, the methods and ideas used to study the history and sociology of 
technology are similar to those to employed to practice actor network theory and to study 
situated cognition, which were philosophies developed in reaction to sociologists and 
anthropologists who focused exclusively on cognition and knowledge formulation as 
disconnected from the material surroundings and context of behavior.  In The Pasteurization of 
France and Science in Action, Bruno Latour criticizes researchers who separate science, 
technology, and society and those who assume science is knowledge and technology is what 
society does with knowledge.  Latour makes an analogy between the study of “technoscience” 
and the study of war, where both examine political conflict and how actions never conform to 
previously prescribed plans.  Latour called his philosophy “actor network theory,” which 
  By weaving insight from telemetry data, 
mission transcripts, technical manuals, and interviews of engineers, managers, academics, and 
astronauts, Mindell shows how the employment of piloting skill and judgment during the lunar 
landings was the product of a philosophy that both reflected and shaped the objectives of the 
program and the machines that made America’s journey in space possible.  The methods 
MacKensie, Mindell, and other historians of science and technology use to describe technical 
work and the contents of the technologies themselves include the use of primary sources to 
construct detailed descriptions of how practice, identity, and machines evolve together and shape 
one another.  Historians of science and technology do not assume an autonomous logic to 
technological development, and their approach requires immersion in the field of study to situate 
the people, objects, methods, and philosophies of their empirical studies in the time and place of 
the actors. 
                                                 
36 Donald A. Mackenzie, Inventing Accuracy: An Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance, Inside 
technology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990). 
37 David A Mindell, Digital Apollo: Human and Machine in Spaceflight (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2008). 
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answers the questions “How do networks of people and things make knowledge, technology, and 
social categories of identity and society?” and “How are these assemblages created?”, and “How 
have they evolved?”  Practitioners of actor network theory see knowledge and power as one 
entity and study the relation of power established among networks of “actants,” which include 
both people and things.38
Latour formulated much of his perspective on science and technology in action at the 
University of California, San Diego, where Edward Hutchins and other cognitive anthropologists 
developed the concept of situated cognition.  Cognitive anthropologists view cognition and 
culture as patterns and regularities of behavior that emerge from cognitive processes and actions 
stretched over the mind, body, activity, and setting.
   
39
Early in his academic career, Hutchins studied the classic subject of anthropology: the 
people of Papua New Guinea.  He employed the classic anthropological methods of participant 
observation and ethnographic interviews to understand and model how the indigenous peoples 
exchanged ownership of small parcels of land in a large patchwork of community gardens.
  Like Latour, they acknowledge the 
importance of the active participation of material objects in culture and the process of 
computation, but proponents of situated cognition make distinctions between the natural and 
social while Latour does not.  The fundamental questions cognitive anthropologists attempt to 
answer are “What is the correct balance between internal and external structure in causal 
behavior?” and “What is the relationship between what is in the mind and what the mind is in?”  
Situated cognition is a theoretical framework created in reaction to cognitive scientists who 
attributed too much of the patterns of behavior to internal structures of the individual brain and 
not the material and social environment.   
40  He 
also studied how the islanders successfully navigated small canoes for hundreds of miles without 
the use of a compass.  After receiving the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Anthropology, 
Hutchins’ research interests shifted to studying work in the Navy.  While getting some fresh air 
as a participant observer on a ship at sea, Hutchins identified the bridge and ship navigation as a 
good domain to observe and develop the concept of naturally situated cognition.41
                                                 
38 Latour, Science in Action. 
  Unlike his 
earlier research of Micronesian navigators, Hutchins treated the navigation team as a cognitive 
39 E. Hutchins, Barbara E. Holder, and R. Alejandro Peréz, Culture and Flight Deck Operations, Report Prepared for 
the Boeing Company Sponsored Research Agreement (University of California San Diego, 2002). 
40 E. Hutchins, Culture and Inference: A Trobriand Case Study (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980). 
41 E. Hutchins, Cognition in the Wild (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995). 
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and computational system.  He also expanded his research question to include not only what 
navigators need to know in order to do what they do, but he also asked, “How do they go about 
knowing what they know?”  Hutchins shifted the focus of his research from the individual to the 
system as a whole and from knowledge to the organization of the acquisition of knowledge.  In 
doing so, Hutchins realized that cognition on the bridge of a ship was a robust and socially 
distributed process composed of emergent interactions among people and tools.   
Hutchins’ distributed perspective of cognition follows and resonates with the work of 
other anthropologists and scholars in the field of the sociology of science and technology who 
used ethnographic methods to examine work in a technical setting and who were critical of the 
artificial intelligence community.  One of the most prominent of those scholars is Lucy 
Suchman, who praised Hutchins’ description of Micronesian navigation and implored computer 
scientists to incorporate social context in the development of so-called “intelligent” machines.42  
Much like Hutchins’ analysis of a navigation team, she also expanded her unit of analysis to 
include “extended networks of social and material production” as she observed pairs of workers 
struggle to use a Xerox copier for the first time.  Similarly, the cognitive anthropologist Jean 
Lave is critical of cognitive psychologists and others who separate cognition from social context 
and generalize about how people think from laboratory experiments.43
In Science in Action, Latour implores other anthropologists not to search strictly the mind 
for explanations of scientific practice.  Researchers should “first look at how the observers move 
in space and time, how the mobility, stability and combinability of inscriptions are enhanced, 
how the networks are extended, how all the informations are tied together in a cascade of re-
representation” before they look for “special cognitive capabilities.”
  Contrary to predominant 
theories about how the public solves numerical problems, Lave found that shoppers in 
supermarkets, dieters cooking in their homes, and family-members managing their money did 
not use mathematical techniques taught in school.  Her empirical analyses of cognition in 
practice revealed characteristics of behavior that others had not seen before, and the setting of 
activity as well as the context of that setting was critical to understanding human behavior.   
44
                                                 
42 Lucy A. Suchman, Plans and Situated Actions: The Problem of Human-Machine Communication (New York, 
NY: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
  Hutchins, Suchman, and 
Lave successfully describe “the use, the combination, and the re-representation” of information 
43 Jean Lave, Cognition in Practice: Mind, Mathematics, and Culture in Everyday Life (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988). 
44 Latour, Science in Action, 246-247. 
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in technical settings, and in the late 1980s, Hutchins began to study the organization of behavior 
and information exchange in commercial airline cockpits.  Amid rising concerns about 
automation and accidents in aviation, Hutchins completed the transition training courses for a 
variety of commercial aircraft, accompanied pilots on domestic flights of a major airline, and 
obtained audiovisual recordings of airline crews as they practiced emergency procedures in full-
motion simulators.45  Similar to his studies of ship navigation, Hutchins’ current research in 
aviation traces how the aircraft cockpit represents, transforms, and propagates information by 
recording flight deck operations aboard an aircraft, creating a verbal transcript of the recording, 
describing the actions that take place, and then mapping the actions of the crew and cockpit into 
a theory of socially distributed cognition.  After grounding his data from pilot interviews, flight 
observations, operation manuals, and crew training materials, Hutchins creates a narrative 
account of the cockpit system in action and weaves the representations together to describe the 
cultural, social, and mechanical context of the observed flight events.46
When applied to a specific episode of activity, the final product of Hutchins’ 
ethnographic process is what he calls “cognitive ethnography.”  Not unlike the sociologists, 
historians, and anthropologists described above, Hutchins’ methods to produce ethnographies of 
technical practice favors research techniques that bring investigators as close to their subjects as 
possible, to experience culture in action, and to place work in the context of activity itself.  By 
doing so, Hutchins is able to identify and characterize human cognitive powers that are critical to 
the successful performance of socio-technical systems: recognizing patterns, modeling simple 
dynamics of the world, and manipulating objects in the environment.
   
47  He and other 
anthropologists find that the power of technical objects is not their ability to amplify the 
cognitive capabilities of navigators, pilots, and shoppers but to transform difficult computational 
processes into easier and ubiquitous cognitive tasks.48
The computational processes Hutchins and other cognitive anthropologists observed were 
inseparable from the material world and difficult to infer theoretically from the strictly 
computational requirements of work practices.  Historians and sociologists also study and 
 
                                                 
45 E. Hutchins, “How a Cockpit Remembers Its Speeds,” Cognitive Science: A Multidisciplinary Journal 19, no. 3 
(1995): 265-288. 
46 E. Hutchins and Tove Klausen, “Distributed Cognition in an Airline Cockpit,” in Cognition and Communication 
at Work, ed. Yrjö Engeström and David Middleton (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 15-34. 
47 Hutchins, Cognition in the Wild, 155. 
48 Ibid., 170-171; Hutchins, “How a Cockpit Remembers Its Speeds,” 280-285; Hutchins and Klausen, “Distributed 
Cognition in an Airline Cockpit,” 19; Lave, Cognition in Practice, 113. 
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observe technologies in practice and are concerned about the organization of human-machine 
behavior, but their objective is not just to better understand human cognition but also to advance 
theory on how work, professional identity, and trust in the technological world both reflect and 
shape society.  These broad social objectives of the sociology of technology necessitate a 
historical perspective that Hutchins and cognitive anthropologists have not demonstrated for the 
aviation industry.  On its own, cognitive ethnography does not examine how work has evolved, 
how the automation and control of a socio-technical system has changed over time, or how 
conditions and constraints relate to the current combination of people, machines, and 
representations in a technical practice.49
This study extends Hutchins’ ethnographic methods of studying complex systems and 
supplements them with historical and sociological approaches to reveal characteristics of human-
machine relationships that are difficult to identify when researchers control the context of 
activity in a laboratory.  After employing ethnographic techniques to observe how the humans 
and machines of Reaper represent and transform information during a mission, the study maps 
observed human-machine interactions to people, tools, and processes.  Subsequent analysis of 
the mapped system through archival research and ethnographic interviews reveals how the RPA 
community, combat practices,  automation technologies, and perceptions of RPA evolved during 
the life of the system and how the distributed elements of remotely operated machines and 
people both reflected and shaped the USAF and security environment. 
 
Research Methods 
This study combines concepts and methods developed in the fields of cognitive 
anthropology, history of technology, and sociology of technology.  It consists of historical study 
of the Predator and Reaper programs and ethnography of Reaper operations.  The fundamental 
research question of the project asks, “How do operators employ RPA to find and kill targets and 
why do they operate them the way that they do?”  Other underlying questions include: 
 What do RPA operators know during operations to identify and destroy targets? 
o How do RPA operators go about knowing what they know?  
 How have RPA operators and the procedures, practices, training, tools of the system 
evolved?  
o In what way has the system been oriented to and condition by trust, 
experience, skill, automation, professional identity, and social interactions?  
                                                 
49 David A. Mindell, Between Human and Machine: Feedback, Control, and Computing Before Cybernetics 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002). 
  32 
 
The core of the research project consists of participant observation and ethnography of 
RPA in action—humans and machines in the practice of flight.  Even with the study limited to 
the investigation of the USAF, the number and extent of stakeholders and technologies involved 
in the operation of a system like Predator or Reaper are immense.  Due to the limits of a single-
person inquiry into such a distributed system, ethnographic observation and analysis of RPA 
operations focused on work groups and objects that were necessary to map human-machine 
interactions during the phase of flight where the Reaper pilot, sensor operator, mission 
coordinator, and intelligence analysts found and killed targets.50
Implementation of the proposed research program entailed three overlapping phases of 
data collection and analysis.  Evidence for the project came from a wide array of primary and 
secondary sources ranging from large organizations like the USAF and Air Combat Command to 
individuals and components of the Reaper system.  Analysis within the study, however, focused 
on the performance of the RPA as a whole—humans and machines in action—where the pilot, 
sensor operator, automated tools, and other elements of Reaper were part of a larger 
computational system that performed in ways specific to the environment and circumstances of 
operation.   
  Participant observation of 
search and strike operations consisted of audiovisual recordings, ethnographic observations, and 
interviews of RPA pilots, sensor operators, and intelligence personnel interacting directly with 
Reaper to identify, track, and destroy enemy material and combatants.   
Phase 1: Exploratory Research 
The first phase of inquiry familiarized the researcher with the history of RPA and 
contemporary issues in the field.  This phase included the review of official documents and 
government archives; attendance and participation in several conferences; exploratory interviews 
with decision-makers, engineers, operators, and scholars within the RPA community; 
observations of drone operations; and interviews with highly experienced drone operators and 
programmers.51
                                                 
50 “Finding and killing targets” involves learning what military threats on the battlefield could look like; locating, 
identifying, and tracking them remotely with the aircraft’s sensors; and investigating and destroying them with the 
aircraft’s weapons.  In combat squadrons, often the “targets” Predator and Reaper operators were looking for were 
individuals and small groups of people who were a threat to coalition forces and the indigenous government.  Often 
the insurgents and terrorists were similar in appearance to civilians and local military forces. 
  After the exploratory phase of the research program, I was able to identify, 
51 Site visits for the exploratory phase of the study included trips to:  the Air Force Historical Research Agency at 
Maxwell Air Force Base, AL; the office of the command historian of Air Combat Command at Langley Air Force 
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access, and evaluate preliminary sources of data and to understand the general characteristics of 
RPA, related programs, and organizations. 
Phase 2: Cognitive Ethnography and Analysis 
The second phase of research was cognitive ethnography of Reaper conducting strike 
missions.  This cyclic phase involved ethnographic observations, interviews, and analysis to 
create an ethnographic record and descriptions of interactions among the people and machines 
associated with Reaper finding and killing targets.  The “ethnographic research cycle” is an 
iterative process of asking ethnographic questions, collecting data, making an ethnographic 
record, and analyzing the results, and my constant companion and guide for the process was 
James Spradley’s Participant Observation.52  I referenced the book often in the field as I made 
cultural inferences from observations, interviews, and materials; formed hypotheses about the 
nature of the objects and events I observed; and repeatedly tested them during the 15 site visits I 
conducted from 2009 to 2010.53  Ethnographic fieldwork consisted of participant observation 
and recording of training flights; ethnographic interviews of Reaper operators and intelligence 
personnel in combat, training, and test squadrons; and interviews with imagery analysts 
responsible for the exploitation of Reaper and Predator video.54
Initial observations and interviews emphasized the creation of broad descriptions of the 
elements of Reaper, the interactions between them, and the propagation of information among 
the crew in the ground control station.  Site visits for a general description of Reaper operations 
consisted primarily of a weeklong visit to the USAF Weapons School and three days in the unit 
responsible for the developmental test of Reaper and Predator.
   
55
                                                                                                                                                             
Base, VA; the Future Operators Symposium at Maxwell Air Force Base, AL; the annual AUVSI Conference and 
vehicle demonstration at Pax River Naval Air Station, MD; the 82nd Aerial Targets Squadron at Tyndall Air Force 
Base, FL; the UAS Task Force in Crystal City, VA; the USAF Strategic Studies Group at the Pentagon, Washington 
DC; and the Naval War College in Newport, RI. 
  During the visits, I observed 
and interviewed elite instructor pilots and sensor operators from Air Combat Command as they 
52 James P. Spradley, Participant Observation, 1st ed. (Thompson Learning, 1980), 37. 
53 Spradley was one of the first anthropologists to study work practices in a Western setting, and his description of 
the “developmental research sequence” was a welcome guide during periods of the fieldwork when I was 
overwhelmed with data and uncertainty.  Ibid., 10, 116. 
54 Participant observation of Reaper missions and interviews with RPA pilots, sensor operators, and intelligence 
personnel was the most rewarding aspect of the research since I was able to elicit feedback from RPA crews before, 
during, and after training sorties while I recorded images and took notes on large yellow notepads.   
55 Site visits for a general understanding and description of Reaper operations included a week of interviews and 
recorded observations in the 26th Weapon School Squadron at Nellis Air Force Base, NV, and three days of 
observations and interviews in Operation Location-Detachment 3, 703rd Aeronautical Systems Group at Gray Butte, 
CA. 
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conducted strike missions at the weapons school and observed and interviewed highly 
experienced test pilots and sensor operators from General Atomics and Big Safari as they 
conducted tests and training missions with both Reaper and Predator.  With data from the two 
visits, I created a broad description and illustrated transcript of a strike mission from video 
recordings, observations, and analysis of a weapons-school sortie.  
Following my fieldwork for a general description of Reaper operations, I focused my 
observations, questions, recordings, and analysis to conduct cognitive ethnography of Reaper 
crews searching for and destroying targets.  Due to the sensitivity and classification of combat 
missions over Iraq and Afghanistan, all the observations of Reaper operations were of training 
missions for the advanced instructor course at the USAF Weapons School or for the initial 
qualification course at the 29th Attack Squadron.  Recordings from the weapons school were 
limited to the pilot and sensor operator’s intercom and the pilot’s head-up display (HUD).  While 
observing student pilots and sensor operators at the 29th Attack Squadron, however, I recorded 
the interactions of Reaper operators in the ground control station with two high definition 
camcorders and the mission coordinator in the squadron’s operations cell with a webcam.56  For 
four strike missions, I was able to record four perspectives simultaneously: the Reaper crew at 
the pilot and sensor operator’s workstations, the sensor operator at the sensor operator’s 
workstation, the mission coordinator in the operations cell, and the pilot’s HUD.  I also 
supplemented the recordings of inexperienced Reaper crews with interviews of Reaper and 
Predator personnel in combat squadrons and with interviews of imagery analysts responsible for 
the exploitation of Predator and Reaper video.57
                                                 
56 Interviews and recorded observations of training missions during the initial qualification of Reaper pilots and 
sensor operators occurred during a weeklong visit with the 29th Attack Squadron at Holloman Air Force Base, NM.   
  Analysis of ethnographic data involved 
performing a general review of the data, transcribing chunks of activity, describing human-
machine tasks, mapping the interactions among the crew and automated tools, and creating an 
illustrated narrative of a mission.  The foundation of my description of how Reaper crews find 
and destroy targets is the result of cognitive ethnography of the last training mission I recorded, 
which I use as the core of the study to describe how social, technical, and cognitive factors 
mutually constitute remote air operations.   
57 Interviews of intelligence personnel and Reaper operators in combat squadrons occurred in a weeklong visit with 
the 42nd Attack Squadron and 15th Reconnaissance Squadron at Creech Air Force Base, NV, and an afternoon of 
interviews with imagery analysts in Distributed Ground Station One (DGS-1) in the 480th Intelligence Surveillance 
and Reconnaissance Wing at Langley Air Force Base, VA.  
  35 
 
Phase 3: Historical Research and Analysis 
The final phase of the project put the cognitive map of human-machine interactions for 
Reaper in historical context through archival research, secondary sources, and ethnographic 
interviews with engineers, program managers, and policy-makers associated with the Reaper and 
Predator programs.  This phase consisted primarily of the collection and analysis of qualitative 
interviews and USAF archives to trace system tasks necessary for remote air warfare to policy 
and engineering decisions, ideologies, concepts, and tools.  The scope of the analysis 
encompassed the organizations, programs, and operators within Air Combat Command from the 
command’s establishment of the first Predator squadron in 1995 to the completion of the 
command’s latest official history of Predator and Reaper in 2007.58  The research excluded the 
study of practices in       and   
 but included employment of the weapons systems in military conflicts in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Serbia, Afghanistan, and Iraq.  The historical phase of the research included 
analysis of several official histories and studies of the Predator program and RPA operations; a 
guided tour of the fabrication, integration, and test facilities for Predator and Reaper; and 
interviews with former pilots, sensor operators, intelligence personnel, engineers, program 
managers, policymakers, and action officers from Air Combat Command, Big Safari, and 
General Atomics.59
As an officer in the USAF, evaluation pilot for the F-16 Fighting Falcon, and civilian 
flight instructor, I was familiar with the field and personnel in the Predator and Reaper 
communities before I started research on the subject.  My background, position, and contacts 
  After the final phase of the research, I was able to understand the social 
context surrounding the development of Predator and Reaper; to describe how the system and its 
elements evolved; and to trace policy decisions, engineering assumptions, professional identities, 
physical constraints, and operational concepts to the people, machines, and practices of Reaper in 
remote air warfare.  
                                                 
58                  
             
      
59 Many of the interviews I conducted with engineers, program managers, and legacy operators from General 
Atomics and Big Safari occurred on a two-day visit to General Atomics’ manufacturing facilities and the offices of 
Detachment 3, 703rd Aeronautical Systems Group in Poway, CA.  The historical analysis of the Predator and 
Reaper programs include unclassified excerpts from official unit histories and studies of the Predator program at the 
Air Force Historical Research Agency at Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, and Air Combat Command History Office at 
Langley Air Force Base, VA.  All information extracted from the classified histories is unclassified. 
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within the community gave me access to the organizations, personnel, and equipment in the RPA 
community as a participant observer (see table 1).   
Table 1. Ethnographic interviews and observations from 2009 to 2010 
             Number of   Total 
Subject Duty Title   Subjects Intervieweda  Hoursb 
Pilot        50     84.0 
Sensor operator      26     33.6 
Mission intelligence coordinator    13     19.9 
Imagery analyst        8       5.1 
Engineer       16     21.2 
Program manager      11     28.1 
Staff officer       14       9.7 
Policymaker         2       2.2 
            Number of   Total 
Event       Events Observed  Hours 
Training missionc      15     17.5 
Simulated flightd        4       0.9 
System integration & assemblye      4       3.3 
aI interviewed 140 people in 180 interviews and conducted 22 of the interviews over the phone.  I interviewed 
several of the subjects more than once and many of the subjects had more than one duty title. 
bI conducted over 156.1 hours of interviews and recorded 16.6 hours digitally.  I transcribed 10 hours of the digitally 
recorded interviews. 
cI recorded 12.9 hours of the training missions digitally. 
dI observed simulated missions for the MQ-1 Predator and BQM-167A and flew the simulator for the QF-4 drone 
and General Atomics’ “advanced cockpit.” 
eI observed the assembly of the BQM-167A, MQ-1 Predator, MQ-9 Reaper, and General Atomics’ ground control 
station. 
Privileged access to Predator and Reaper and social ties with members of the RPA 
community raise concerns of researcher bias and validity.  The year prior to the start of the 
research, the USAF increased the number of Predator and Reaper missions over Iraq and 
Afghanistan 330% and transferred over 85% of the personnel remaining from the drawdown in 
fighter aircraft to support the increase in RPA operations.60
                                                 
60 Michael B. Donley and Norton A. Schwartz, Fiscal Year 2011 Air Force Posture Statement: Presentation to the 
Committee on Armed Services United States Senate (Washington DC: United States Air Force, 2010), 9, 10. 
  Many of these personnel were 
friends and acquaintances in positions of leadership in Reaper and Predator squadrons, and the 
large number of interviews I conducted with RPA pilots reflects the professional and personal 
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connections I had with influential members of RPA community.  Weekly reviews with mentors 
and peers in the Laboratory for Automation of Robotics and Society, clear protocols, a well-
indexed database, and the triangulation of data with published operation manuals, procedures, 
and official histories guard against critiques of validity and repeatability.61
An Ethnographic and Historical Study of Remote Air Operations 
   
An ethnographic and historical study of the Reaper in action is valuable because few have 
described RPA operations of any kind, and the details available to the public and academia about 
remote air operations fit on a half dozen PowerPoint slides.  When RPA pilots briefed general 
audiences at conferences, symposiums, and other gatherings about Predator and Reaper in 2009 
and 2010, they typically presented tailored versions of a “     f.”62
                                                 
61 In a time of war, harm to the respondents and objects under observation were also serious concerns, and the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Committee On the Use of Humans as Experimental Subjects approved the 
above research program. Unless the information came from secondary sources or publically released histories of the 
Predator and Reaper programs, all of the names in the study are aliases to mitigate the potential for harm to the 
subjects. 
  In 
many cases, the briefs started with a slide depicting the major elements of the Predator and 
Reaper systems: the aircraft, satellite communications equipment, ground control station, and 
operations cell (see figure 0.1).  Following an interior view of the ground control station, the 
pilots presented a simple depiction of the architecture squadrons used to fly missions from the 
United States called “remote split operations” (see figure 0.2), listed the weapons and sensors 
onboard Predator and Reaper, and described some of the basic performance characteristics of the 
two aircraft (see figures 0.3 & 0.4).  Other slides vaguely depicted how RPA communicated with 
other aircraft, command and control organizations, intelligence agencies, and ground forces to 
create a “common operating picture” (see figure 0.5).  Invariably the briefings ended with a 
compelling narrative and video showing a terrorist or insurgent blowing up and a slide 
representing the “exponential growth” and “insatiable demand” for RPA (see figure 0.6). 
62                  
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Fig. 0.1. Major elements of Predator and Reaper RPA.  Although not an official element of the 
weapon system, the operations cell was group of intelligence personnel in Reaper and Predator 
squadrons that interacted with RPA operators over intercom and with other communication tools.  
             
 
 
Fig. 0.2. Remote split operations.  Predator and Reapers flew combat missions over Iraq and 
Afghanistan through fiber-optic and satellite links.         
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Fig. 0.3. Weapons and sensor onboard Predator.  Predator carried    
 and a sensor ball with electro-optical and infrared cameras, an infrared marker, and a 
laser illuminator for  .          
       
 
Fig. 0.4. Weapons and sensors onboard Reaper.  Reaper flew significantly higher and faster than 
Predator and carried two      , and a larger 
version of Predator’s sensor ball with the ability to fuse infrared and television images.   
            .      
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Fig. 0.5.               
             
               
                
        
 
Fig. 0.6. Total flying hours by year for Predator and Reaper RPA.  USAF policymakers and RPA 
operators used graphs like this one to represent the “exponential growth” and “insatiable 
demand” for surveillance and reconnaissance video.  Predator and Reaper operators conducted 
almost all of their training and professional development while flying combat missions.  
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Just to be clear, Predator was a single-engine, composite, low-wing monoplane General 
Atomics developed in the early 1990s to takeoff and land conventionally from prepared 
airfields.63  The Predator aircraft had a large wingspan—it was as almost as wide as a fighter 
plane was long—but weighed only as much as a light civil aircraft.  On a typical combat mission, 
Predator could fly above a target area for up to 24 hours at altitudes below 20,000 feet and 
carried one or two air-to-ground missiles, Raytheon’s MTS-A sensor ball with infrared and 
electro-optical cameras, and other sensors.  Using the same ground control station and 
communications architecture as Predator, General Atomics started development of Reaper in 
1999 to improve Predator’s payload capacity, altitude ceiling, and maximum airspeed.  The 
Reaper aircraft was twice as fast as Predator; could fly above a target area for up to 16 hours at 
altitudes above 25,000 feet; and carried four air-to-ground missiles, two 500-pound bombs, 
Raytheon’s improved MTS-B sensor ball, and other sensors.64
Table 2. Predator and Reaper characteristics 
  Table 2 compares the general 
characteristics and performance of Predator and Reaper.   
Characteristic   Predator   Reaper 
Length    26 feet    36 feet 
Wingspan   48.7 feet   64 feet 
Height      6.9 feet   12.5 feet 
Gross Takeoff Weight 2,250 pounds   10,000 pounds 
Cruise Speed          
Altitude            
Internal Payload        
External Payload        
Mission Duration              
Operating Radius         
Propulsion   101-horsepower engine, 750-horsepower engine, 
four-cylinder, turbo   turboprop 
Fuel Capacity   665 pounds (100 gallons) 4,000 pounds (602 gallons) 
System Cost           
             
      
                                                 
63           
64 Raytheon specifically designed the MTS-B, a larger version of the , for Reaper’s higher operating altitude.  
The MTS-B had the same afocal array as the still camera for the   , which was   in 
diameter,  the size of the  afocal array.  The MTS-B was also  as heavy and its gimbals were 
f   wider than the .  Unattributed interview with engineer and D. D. Weatherington, “Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems Sensors” (briefing for the NATO Research and Technology Organization presented at the meeting 
for Advanced Sensor Payloads for UAV, Neuilly-sur-Seine, France, May 1, 2005). 
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After obtaining the above information and listening to accompanying narrative, the 
study’s two primary questions remain unanswered.  How did the operators employ RPA to find 
and kill targets and why did they operate them that way?  Public discourse of Predator and 
Reaper operations did little to challenge perceptions of RPA operators as dejected supervisors of 
automated machines who “went to war” on military bases in the United States and who struggled 
internally with their warrior identities.  Predator and Reaper operators worked in black boxes, 
and what they did on a mission was invisible.  The objective of this study is to understand 
Reaper operators’ work as they did it and as they understood it, and to use the understanding to 
describe Reaper operators in action.  It shows how varied the people, tools, and practices of 
Reaper operators were when seen in detail; how Reaper operations were different and more 
complex than previously assumed; and how professional identities, prior practices, 
preconceptions, the security environment, and social and technical demands of remote air 
operations related to the evolving identities of RPA operators.       
This ethnographic and historical study of Reaper operations begins with chapter 1, 
“Flying the Matrix,” which describes how Reaper pilots and sensor operators prepared 
themselves, the ground control station, and the aircraft for a mission.  A Reaper pilot learning to 
fly Reaper described remote operation of the aircraft as “flying the matrix” because he had to 
interpret morphing characters of data from over a dozen displays that hung from computer 
terminals in the ground control station.  This introductory chapter describes where Reaper 
operators came from and how they configured the human and machine elements of the system to 
make sense of the data.  To employ the aircraft as a weapon, Reaper operators had to configure 
the same displays and automated tools that engineers and computer scientists used to design, 
program, and test prototypes of the system.  Each interface had distinct communication protocols 
and control delays that were difficult for inexperienced operators to navigate and interpret, but 
Reaper crews learned to use standard procedures and tools to create a virtual world, which they 
used to represent the “real” world below the aircraft.  Reaper operators’ configuration of the 
ground control station and their transformation and distribution of information among elements 
of the system were prerequisites for Reaper’s presence above the battlefield. 
Chapter 2, “Becoming the Camera,” describes how Reaper pilots and sensor operators 
learned to coordinate the matrix of verbal, textual, graphical, and geographical representations of 
scenes below the aircraft to support ground forces, to develop feelings of remote presence, and to 
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become the camera flying above the battlefield.  Reaper operators said the effective control of 
the aircraft and its sensors reflected their professional competency, and to gain the respect and 
information they wanted from a network of people and machines, they developed practices and 
used modes the system’s designers did not anticipate.  For Reaper operators to make the system 
work for them, they had to avoid modes known to trigger failure, decide the time and place to 
incorporate automated tools, adjust the crew’s actions to the erroneous behavior of the system, 
and translate data into formats others could receive, interpret, and evaluate.  Reaper operators 
were the adaptable human component of the system, and this chapter describes how 
inexperienced pilots and sensor operators struggled to transform themselves from technicians to 
military professionals whose social and technical skills contributed to matters of life and death.         
Chapter 3, “Building the Network,” describes how the details of practice and RPA 
operators’ feelings of remote presence were not a logical result of Predator and Reaper’s initial 
design.  When the USAF activated the first Predator squadron in 1995, RPA operators were not 
able to foster close relationships with the system, scenes from the sensor ball, or each other 
because they were professionally and physically isolated from military operations and the 
development of the system.  When searching for targets in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1990s, the 
tasks and objectives of a Predator crew were similar to those of a U-2 Dragon Lady pilot flying 
alone in the stratosphere: launch and recover the aircraft and capture images of fifty to three 
hundred targets.  As the role of RPA expanded in the Global War on Terrorism, however, 
Predator and Reaper operators negotiated an interactive role with other military personnel and 
built a network of people, tools, and protocols they used to strike targets and support ground 
forces.  After the September 11 attacks, RPA operators moved, expanded, and distributed the 
human and machine elements of the system to transform Predator and Reaper operations from 
low status missions of gathering and disseminating data to higher status tasks of creating 
information and participating in the decision-making processes used to locate, observe, and kill 
insurgents and other threats.  Through negotiation, conflict, and manipulation of the system, 
RPA operators emerged from professional isolation to the integration of Predator and Reaper 
into air operations and warfare.    
While operating Predator and Reaper and throughout the history of the RPA programs, 
RPA operators fought to transform themselves from hidden automatons pushing buttons in dark 
rooms to empowered and adaptable components of respected weapon systems.  In antithesis to 
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popular perceptions of RPA operators as isolated technicians monitoring automated machines, 
Predator and Reaper crewmembers fostered and demanded social relationships with a network of 
people and tools that extended beyond the ground control station.  Constrained by how elements 
of the system received, processed, and transmitted data, RPA operators were not satisfied with 
one-way connections with other humans and machines to accomplish a mission.  They sought 
interactive dialog with them in a form they could anticipate, understand, and evaluate so they 
could influence events on the battlefield and transform themselves into war fighters.  Shaped by 
the technical limitations of remote presence, RPA operators fought to be relevant and strained to 
be human.  The study concludes with the implications for the study’s new working model of 
RPA operators, uses it to evaluate General Atomics’ design of an “advanced cockpit,” and 
speculates about the characteristics of an alternative design with the understanding that remote 
air warfare is a social and distributed enterprise. 
The exchange of authority among aircrew and agents outside the aircraft has a long 
history in military aviation, and the USAF has used automation and the mechanization of 
humans and machines to go higher, faster, and farther since the inception of the aircraft.  Even 
prior to World War II, life support equipment, flight instruments, standardized procedures, and 
software routines elevated the status of scientists, engineers, training managers, and planners in 
the construction of flight because of the physiological limitations of human operators and the 
relentless drive to improve aircraft performance.65  During World War II, the air service sought 
to expand the scope and legitimacy of the air weapon, even if it required transformation of the 
role of the pilot and other aircraft crewmembers.66
RPA operations and unfortunate events like civilian casualty incidents in Iraq and 
Afghanistan amplify these conversations and reveal others regarding the diffusion of 
responsibility, the centralization of command and control, and the remote control of weapons and 
aircraft.  RPA are central to the development of two trends in the conduct of air warfare.  One is 
the development of “sensor-communication loops,” which enable combatants and their 
  The definition of air warfare, its distribution 
among people and machines, and the effective and efficient employment of air power has always 
been a topic of negotiation and debate in the USAF. 
                                                 
65 Timothy Schultz, “Redefining Flight: How the Predecessors of the Modern United States Air Force Transformed 
the Relationship Between Airmen and Aircraft” (Dissertation, Duke University, 2007). 
66 Raymond P. O’Mara, “The Socio-Technical Construction of Precision Bombing: A Study of Shared Control and 
Cognition by Humans, Machines, and Doctrine During World War II” (Dissertation, Cambridge, MA: 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2011). 
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commanders to control missions directly from a distance.67  The other is the growing need to 
accomplish missions that require rapid and precise responses to events, which has led the USAF 
to distribute aspects of command and control processes to a variety of physically separated 
organizations and machines.  The automation and information technologies that accompany these 
trends are evolving with the people that employ RPA and the skills they need to be successful in 
the conduct of modern air warfare.  Automation has led to the need for unanticipated kinds of 
feedback, which operators use to understand what systems are doing and to anticipate the 
performance of RPA.  Automated features, options, and modes create new demands of operators, 
who are required to know more about the system in order to avoid new kinds of errors, new paths 
of failure, and new kinds of breakdowns in collaborations among human and machine elements 
of automated systems.68
This historical ethnography of RPA operations describes how a highly automated, 
technical field influences and reflects communities of practice, weapons of war, and 
encompassing social environment.  With roots in cognitive anthropology, the sociology of 
technology, and the history of technology, it employs detailed analysis and descriptions of 
technology in action to achieve a fuller understanding of humans and machine relationships 
among socio-technical systems.  The study utilizes various methods of data acquisition and 
analysis, including ethnographic observations, qualitative interviews, and historical research to 
produce a technologically detailed and historically grounded description of a RPA that 
incorporates the professional, social, and technical components of remote air warfare. 
  The experiences of Reaper operators can reveal how these and other 
social characteristics of automation can influence operations, and the evolution of Predator and 
Reaper can show how they developed strategies, procedures, training programs, and 
workarounds to deal with them. 
                                                 
67 Michael W. Kometer, Command in Air War: Centralized Versus Decentralized Control of Combat Airpower 
(Montgomery, AL: Air University Press, 2007), 15. 
68 Engineers often automate machines to help operators cope with complex systems, but the change can also force 
operators to understand the complexity of the automated process for the system to perform successfully.  Lisanne 
Bainbridge, a cognitive systems engineer, first described this phenomenon and other “ironies of automation” in 
Lisanne Bainbridge, “Ironies of Automation,” Automatica 19, no. 6 (1983): 775–779; For a brief description of the 
ironies of automation and a historiographic and methodological study of cognitive systems engineering and other 
disciplines that analyze automated systems, see Hoffman and Militello, Perspectives on Cognitive Task Analysis, 
101-104. 
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Chapter 1 
Flying the Matrix 
 Adverse weather in a flying squadron always seemed to bring people together, and a low 
pressure area in southern New Mexico had a dozen officers and enlisted personnel in flight suits 
gathered around a large television.  A lumpy blanket of gray clouds covered a quarter of the 
state, and I expected to lose my first opportunity to observe a training mission in the 29th Attack 
Squadron, the organization responsible for training Reaper pilots and sensor operators.  As I 
looked across the room, I saw a familiar face and introduced myself.  Both of us had flown 
missions from Aviano Air Base, Italy, for the Kosovo War, and after thousands of hours flying 
fighters, the pilot was in the process of learning how to fly Reaper.  Over halfway through the 
course, he was not entirely happy with his transition.  Learning to employ the system was more 
frustrating than he anticipated, and he described remote flight with the aircraft and the need to 
interpret and manipulate morphing characters of data as “flying the matrix.”  Surrounded by 
twenty displays, seven keyboards, and a plethora of toolbars, menus, windows, and tables of 
information, student operators of Reaper often got lost in the system despite their previous 
experience in other aircraft or success in combat.    
Without getting lost in the process, the objective of this chapter is to introduce the people 
and machines of Reaper and the interactions among them by describing how three students and 
their instructors in the 29th Attack Squadron prepared for a training mission, which they 
conduced well after the weather dissipated.  After a brief introduction to the squadron and the 
people that work there, this chapter portrays the first forty minutes of a training flight I observed 
on the last day of a weeklong visit to the squadron.  The instructors, students, and intelligence 
personnel for the mission used these forty minutes to configure themselves, the ground control 
station, and the aircraft for the remainder of the 2-hour sortie.  I have tried to present the actions 
of the crew in an orderly and chronological fashion, but the pilot, sensor operator, and mission 
coordinator did not, and could not, accomplish them that way.  Each crewmember carried out his 
responsibilities as opportunity and needs arose and in accordance with the tempo of the mission.  
In a similar spirit, this chapter acquaints readers with the products, tools, modes, and techniques 
used to find and destroy targets with Reaper, but a few words of caution are necessary.  Detailed 
descriptions of Reaper and the steps needed to configure the system can seem tedious.  The 
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organization of displays and tasks in the ground control station can also seem confusing.  These 
impressions are normal and are typical of a person learning how to fly the matrix. 
In Cognition in the Wild, Hutchins describes how a navigation team aboard a Navy ship 
created, transformed, and combined spatial representations of the ship and known landmarks to 
construct their position on a map.  Hutchins calls the propagation of spatial representations 
“computation,” which he defines as “the propagation of representational states across a series of 
representational media.”1  Reaper was also a computational system, and like the navigation team 
on a Navy ship, Reaper crews coordinated their activities amongst each other and a constellation 
of tools by configuring the members of the team and the workplace to perform computations 
before the start of the mission.  Hutchins called the advanced actions of the Navigation team 
“pre-computation,” and this chapter describes how Reaper crews prepared each other and their 
consoles to create, transform, and combine representations of the aircraft, sensor ball, bombs, 
missiles, and objects and events on the ground to find threatening individuals and weapons and 
to eliminate them.2
Pilots and sensor operators configured Reaper for a mission by transforming typed, 
written, and spoken instructions into graphical representations and distributing them among the 
system’s workstations, computer applications, and crew.  Reaper pilots coordinated these 
representations and manipulated virtual objects within them to fly the aircraft, navigate around 
traffic, position the sensor ball, and configure the aircraft’s weapons.  Reaper sensor operators 
used similar products and tools to point the sensor ball at an area with the optimal camera 
settings and to investigate targets.  Coordinating the cacophony of keyboards, displays, and 
references to accomplish these tasks required discipline, skill, and patience.  Reaper pilots and 
sensor operators had to cope with displays and interfaces designed by engineers and computer 
programmers who built Reaper’s workstations to develop and test the aircraft, not to employ the 
system as a weapon.  Each one of the workstations’ displays had distinct interfaces, 
communication protocols, and control delays that were difficult for novice operators to organize, 
navigate, and interpret, and it could take more than six months for Reaper operators to master 
control of the system and to create a virtual world they could correlate with the “real” world 
below the aircraft.  Far from being idle supervisors of highly automated systems, Reaper 
 
                                               
1 E. Hutchins, Cognition in the Wild (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), 117. 
2 Ibid., 160-169. 
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operators were often intimately involved in the reception, display, and control of information 
among Reaper’s subsystems, and the operators’ manipulation and distribution of information 
were essential to the safe and effective employment of the system because of rigid limitations on 
the transmission, storage, and processing of data.   
Initial Qualification Training in the 29th Attack Squadron 
 In the summer of 2010, all USAF officers and recruits had to complete three months of 
training at Holloman Air Force Base in the 29th Attack Squadron before they could employ 
Reaper in combat.  Nestled in a dry and dusty basin between two mountain ranges in New 
Mexico, Holloman Air Force Base was six miles west of the small town of Alamogordo and was 
an hour-and-a-half drive north of the nearest international airport in El Paso, Texas.  Even by 
USAF standards, the base was geographically isolated, but all future pilots and sensor operators 
for Reaper and Predator had to pass through the base, and it was home for a squadron of F-22 
Raptors and Germany’s training center for the Tornado fighter.  Aviators considered Holloman 
an excellent place to train and fly because of its sunny weather and its close proximity to the 
White Sands Missile Range and the airspace above it, which commercial and general aviation 
aircraft could not legally enter. 
Clear weather, easy access to bombing ranges, and thousands of square miles of restricted 
airspace made the base an ideal place to learn how to operate Reaper, and after coordinating with 
the 29th Attack Squadron’s leadership, I spent a week at Holloman to observe and record training 
missions and to interact with instructors and students.3
                                               
3                  
t            .  The visit was my second trip to 
Holloman Air Force Base.  My first was in 1996 for centrifuge training prior to my initial qualification in the F-16 
Fighting Falcon.     
   Less than a year old, the squadron was in 
the process of moving into facilities once occupied by an F-117 Nighthawk squadron, and in 
many respects, walking into the squadron’s headquarters by the flight line was like walking into 
a typical fighter squadron in the USAF.  A glass door at the front of the building led into a 
narrow hallway, past the commander’s office, and into a large central area where people on 
phones and computers sat behind a counter running the length of the room.  Members of the 
squadron called the counter the “operations desk.”  There they put fresh pots of coffee and bright 
yellow bananas next to live feeds of full-motion video from the day’s training flights and posted 
the schedule, airspace traffic, and weather on high-definition displays.  Surrounding the 
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operations desk were briefing rooms of various sizes, areas for students to plan their missions, 
offices for scheduling and other administrative purposes, and hallways leading to the flight line 
and the squadron’s “heritage room.”4  Stepping out of the back of the building onto the 
squadron’s deck, I overlooked Holloman Air Force Base’s primary taxiway and the squadron’s 
equipment (see figure 1.1).     the squadron’s  ground control stations 
and the constant hum of air conditioning units filled the air as the machines pumped cool air into 
the metal containers.  Beyond the ground control stations were the squadron’s  aircraft, which 
the unit parked on the ramp, stored in large hangars, or flew in one of the day’s three training 
sorties.  Over  students, instructors, administrators, and intelligence personnel called the 
squadron their workplace, and despite small disturbances due to remodeling and construction, 
they felt it was a productive place to study and learn how to fly RPA.5
 
        
Fig. 1.1. Ground control stations, main ramp, and hangar for the 29th Attack Squadron. 
(Photograph taken by author) 
                                               
4 A more common and informal name for the heritage room was the bar.  The squadron being in existence for less 
than a year, members of the unit had not yet built one, and no one in the squadron knew who requisitioned the old 
bar from the previous tenants.  In the meantime, a full keg sat in a corner with a few folding chairs scattered around 
the room.  Fittingly, the walls of the heritage room were newly painted, white, and bare during my visit. 
5 A typical class size for initial qualification training for Reaper was  pilots and f  sensor operators.  My 
observations were of the squadron’s third class of students, most of whom were a few weeks from graduation. 
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  One of the areas I did not find when walking through the squadron was “life support.”  
F-117 pilots and the building’s prior inhabitants used the room to maintain and store helmets, 
oxygen masks, g-suits, and other personal equipment needed to fly in an aircraft.  Although a 
simulator for the MQ-9 Reaper did not exist yet, the squadron was in the process of converting 
the life-support area into a simulator room in anticipation of the device.  Members of the 29th 
Attack Squadron inhabited the space of a former F-117 squadron, and the Reaper squadron’s 
instructors and students were in the messy process of adapting the facilities and organization of 
the fighter squadron into a work area suited to remote air operations and flight from the ground.      
Shortly after I was welcomed into the squadron, the wide range of backgrounds and 
experience levels of its members became readily apparent.  Pilots in the squadron, both 
instructors and students, ranked from Captain to Lieutenant Colonel and had six to twenty years 
of experience in the USAF.  All had flown fighter, bomber, or transport aircraft prior to flying 
Reaper.  Sensor operators in the squadron ranked from Airman First Class to Chief Master 
Sergeant and had been in the USAF for six months to twenty years.   A vast majority had no 
flying experience prior to becoming a “sensor” or “1U.”6
All of the instructor pilots and sensor operators in the 29th Attack Squadron had 
volunteered to move to Holloman Air Force Base to teach and had at least two years of 
experience flying combat missions from Creech Air Force Base.  They volunteered for a number 
of reasons.  Most of the instructors “wanted to have weekends again” and to get a break from the 
“24/7” shift work necessary to maintain a constant air presence over Iraq and Afghanistan.
  The intelligence officers and enlistees 
ranked from Senior Airman to Captain, and had been in the USAF for three to six years.  Most of 
the intelligence personnel had at least a few months experience as an intelligence analyst in 
combat squadrons at Creech Air Force Base.   
7
                                               
6 Members of the Reaper community often referred to sensor operators as “sensors.”  “1U” (pronounced “one 
uniform”) referred to the Air Force service code (AFSC) for a remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) sensor operator, 
which was 1U0X1.  The AFSC for an RPA pilot was 18XXX.  The USAF considered RPA sensor operators to be 
“career enlisted aviators.”  They were eligible to receive “career enlisted flyer incentive pay” (CEFIP), which ranged 
from $150 to $400 per month depending on how long the individual had been an aviator.  Like the pilots of occupied 
aircraft, the USAF considered RPA pilots to be “rated.”  They were eligible to receive “aviation career incentive 
pay” (ACIP), which ranged from $125 to $650 per month.  The “Air Force Enlisted Classification Directory” 
(AFECD) and the “Air Force Officer Classification Directory” (AFOCD) describe the military specialties in the 
service.  Air Force Instruction 11-412, Flying Operations: Aircrew Management, 2010, 5, 64. 
  
Others saw the assignment as an opportunity to broaden their careers and to distinguish 
7  A workweek in a Reaper squadron at Creech Air Force Base consisted of working a minimum 8-hour shift for six 
days in a row followed by three days off. 
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themselves professionally from somewhere other than Creech Air Force Base.  A few others 
were more comfortable with the small town atmosphere of Alamogordo and wanted to leave the 
Las Vegas area.  From interviews of other Reaper operators, however, a vast majority of the 
Reaper community did not want to transfer to Holloman Air Force Base to teach.  Although 
Creech Air Force Base was located in a tiny town called Indian Springs, the metropolitan area of 
Las Vegas was only a 35-minute drive away.  Residents of Holloman Air Force Base had to 
commute well over an hour to find a community with comparable resources.  Creech Air Force 
Base did not have nearly the number of facilities and amenities as Holloman or any other base in 
the USAF, but all military personnel assigned to Creech received $300 to $750 per month in 
incentive pay because of the base’s austere working conditions.8
 Although instructors I observed in the 29th Attack Squadron were not directly involved in 
the counterinsurgencies taking place on the other side of the world, their students supported 
ground forces in Iraq and Afghanistan almost immediately after completing the qualification 
course.  The first sortie for all pilots and sensor operators after graduation was a combat mission, 
and operational squadrons like the 42nd Attack Squadron expected students to arrive at Creech 
Air Force Base with the knowledge, skills, and proficiency necessary to operate Reaper safely 
and effectively.
  Many pilots and sensor 
operators were reluctant to give up the money to move.  Experienced operators who may have 
been prime candidates to instruct in New Mexico also did not want to miss the opportunity to fly 
missions over Iraq and Afghanistan and to help their fellow airmen, soldiers, and marines make 
it home alive and in one piece.  
9  Instructors and students admitted the schedule of training to meet this 
requirement was aggressive for those who had not previously flown RPA or employed 
weapons.10
                                               
8 The Office of the Secretary of Defense authorized the entitlement for all members of the USAF assigned to Creech 
Air Force Base, which did not have a commissary, Base Exchange, or family housing for those assigned to the base.  
The amount of the incentive increased as the USAF member’s time on station increased.     
             
   . 
  Student pilots and sensor operators had to demonstrate the ability to develop, 
9 The USAF published the criteria and procedures for evaluating Reaper pilots and sensor operators in   
         . 
10 Although it was not a requirement, the training syllabus for Reaper stated, “fighter/bomber experience is highly 
desired” for student pilots.  At the time, no pilot had completed initial qualification training for Reaper without 
previous operational experience.           ; 
The USAF published the minimum standards for training pilots and sensor operators for Reaper in   
         .  A pilot or sensor operator did 
not need to know how to land or takeoff Reaper to be “combat mission ready” and employ the aircraft in combat. 
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communicate, and execute a plan for a typical Reaper mission after only a hundred hours of 
instruction in a classroom, twenty hours of “menu training” in a rudimentary task trainer, and 
thirty hours of remote flight from a ground control station.11  For sensor operators right out of 
basic training, this meant they could be killing combatants on battlefields less than nine months 
after they enlisted in the USAF.12
In the summer of 2010, typical Reaper combat missions often involved gathering 
information about an area or point of interest and observing potentially hostile individuals 
without them being able to detect the aircraft’s presence.  In extreme cases, missions also 
entailed the coordination and employment of timely and accurate strikes against these individuals 
with the aircraft’s air-to-ground missiles or laser-guided bombs.  To accomplish these difficult 
tasks, pilots and sensor operators had to learn how to work together as a team, and instructors in 
the 29th Attack Squadron paired the same pilots and sensor operators together for the entire 
course of training to help develop and instill what they called an “aircrew mentality.”   
 
The USAF defined "aircrew" as "personnel responsible for the safe ground and flight 
operation of the aircraft and onboard systems" and for the "airborne duties" necessary to 
accomplish the mission.13  RPA squadrons defined and characterized what these airborne duties 
entailed through the interactions among the people and machines of Reaper and how they 
represented, transformed, and propagated information to achieve remote flight and accomplish a 
mission.  For instance, a sensor operator could not identify key features of a suspected terrorist 
compound, interpret the meaning of observed activity in the courtyard of that compound, or 
guide a Hellfire missile to the feet of the appropriate individuals within that courtyard if the 
aircraft was not in the appropriate position, orientation, and condition to do so.14
                                               
11 Air Combat Command published and described the training events and course objectives for initial qualification 
training in Air Combat Command Syllabus MQ-9TX, MQ-9 Transition Training.  At the time of my observations, 
the 29th Attack squadron did not yet have a functional simulator.  Instructors in the squadron used a “training 
device” or a ground control station to introduce students to techniques on how to navigate the Reaper workstation’s 
multitude of menus and to teach crews the checklist procedures for normal operations, emergencies, and weapons 
employment. 
  Conversely, a 
12 Four students in the class entered the program straight from basic sensor operator training, a new program 
designed to satisfy the growing demand for qualified sensor operators.  Experienced sensor operators in the 
squadron called the 18- to 21-year olds “pipeline” students.  Sean Bowlin, “First group of BMT graduates begin 
‘tech school’ at Basic Sensor Operator Training”, January 22, 2010, 
http://www.randolph.af mil/news/story.asp?id=123185906. 
13 Air Force Policy Directive 11-4, Flying Operations: Aviation Service, 2004, 2. 
14 Hellfire is an acronym for the heliborne, laser, fire, and forget missile or AGM-114, which Rockwell International 
and Martin Marietta manufactured first in the late 1970s to kill tanks and other point targets.  Adam W Lange, 
“Hellfire: Getting the Most from a Lethal Missile System,” Armor 107, no. 1 (January 1998): 25-30. 
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pilot could not coordinate with intelligence organizations to detect and observe suspicious 
behavior, obtain clearance from a ground commander to employ ordnance against an insurgent, 
or observe an area undetected if the sensor operator did not direct the view of the aircraft’s 
sensors to a target with the appropriate mode and settings for the phase of the mission.  Mission 
success with Reaper required practiced and purposeful transactions among the technical systems, 
crewmembers, and organizations associated with the system and a basic knowledge of how they 
could fit together.  This chapter introduces how Reaper operators configured Reaper’s 
subsystems and how the organization of tools and tasks in the ground control station facilitated 
the system’s ability to remotely find and destroy targets. 
Preparing Reaper for a “CAS” Mission 
The importance of teamwork, effective communications, and definable roles and 
responsibilities in remote air warfare were evident during one of the most dynamic missions of 
Reaper—close air support (CAS).  CAS involves the observation, identification, and destruction 
of hostile personnel or materiel in close proximity to friendly forces, and many in the RPA 
community considered CAS to be an ideal mission for Reaper because of its long loiter time, 
communication capabilities, powerful sensors, and complement of precision weaponry.15
A supersortie in the training squadron was two sorties flown consecutively with different 
students but the same instructors, and the supersortie I describe below was the twelfth flight and 
third CAS sortie for two field-grade officers and a young sensor operator.
  The 
tasks Reaper crews accomplished during CAS sorties exemplify how the elements of Reaper 
worked together to find and kill targets, and the following is a description of how a crew of 
students and instructors from the 29th Attack Squadron prepared Reaper for a CAS “supersortie.”    
16
The class I observed in the 29th Attack Squadron was the first to have students who 
enlisted as professional RPA sensor operators.  They wholeheartedly volunteered to control 
  Both of the student 
pilots had thousands of hours as aircraft commanders in transport aircraft.  The student sensor 
operator had no prior experience in the USAF and was one of the first students ever to enlist with 
a military recruiter as a sensor operator for remotely piloted aircraft.   
                                               
15 Joint Publication 3-09.3, Close Air Support, 2009, I-2; Air Force Tactics Techniques and Procedures 3-3.MQ-9, 
Tactical Doctrine: Combat Aircraft Fundamentals—MQ-9, 2009, 1-1. 
16 Schedulers did not pair the second student pilot with a student sensor operator because his original partner was 
having trouble progressing through the course.  The instructor sensor operator performed as the student’s sensor 
operator for the second half of the supersortie.  I observed and recorded the supersortie on my fifth and final day of 
observations in the 29th Attack Squadron.   
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Reaper’s sensor ball, which was one of the most technologically advanced camera systems in the 
air, and they competed against other enlistees for the opportunity to become a sensor operator.  
Prior to 2010, sensor operators for Predator and Reaper enlisted as imagery analysts, intelligence 
specialists who interpreted photographs and video from satellites and aircraft in darkened rooms 
scattered throughout the United States.  All imagery analysts attended imagery analyst school at 
Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas, but instead of assigning the students to an intelligence 
squadron after the 6-month course, the Air Force Personnel Center had assigned the graduates to 
flying squadrons for sensor operator training.  None of the analysts had known of the new career 
field when they enlisted as imagery analysts, but most had considered the job of controlling the 
sensor ball and guiding weapons to be more challenging and personally satisfying than 
inspecting images in isolation from their professional peers.17
The instructor pilot for the mission was a company-grade officer and former flight lead 
with less than a thousand hours of experience flying fighter aircraft.  The instructor sensor 
operator was a non-commissioned officer with over a thousand hours of flight time with RPA.  
Like the majority of sensor operators in the USAF, he trained for six months as an imagery 
analyst before his assignment to Creech Air Force Base.  Both instructors were flight 
examiners—one of six highly qualified crewmembers the squadron commander designated to 
formally evaluate personnel in the unit, including other instructors.  Also helping the instructors 
with the training scenario was a mission coordinator, who performed intelligence duties from a 
simulated “operations cell” and acted as a member of various command and control agencies 
with whom RPA crews interacted during a combat mission.  The operations cell was a group of 
intelligence personnel with tools to help pilots and sensor operators plan, execute, and evaluate a 
mission.  Many of the duties of the mission coordinator involved communicating with supported 
ground units, exploitation agencies, and command and control organizations to coordinate and 
execute a mission. 
 
The configuration of Reaper for the supersortie began the day prior to the training 
mission when the students planned for the flight in the squadron’s student area, a large room 
filled with two long tables surrounded by lockers, whiteboards, and desks with laptops, 
publications, and maps of the local flying area.          
               
                                               
17 Unattributed interviews with Predator and Reaper sensor operators. 
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Before flight examiners in the 29th Attack Squadron could certify Reaper pilots, sensor 
operators, and mission coordinators as being “qualified” for remote flight, the crewmembers had 
to demonstrate they could comply with published instructions and the tactics, techniques, and 
procedures for the aircraft and the types of missions it could perform.  The students created data 
organizers, tools, and condensed versions of these publications to help them conduct the mission 
in accordance with expectations and communicate in accordance with military standards.
         
               
               
                 
              
               
           . 
20  Two 
products the students created for the supersortie were “lineup” and “9-line” cards.21
                                               
18 A “joint tactical air strike request,” “JTAR,” or Department of Defense form 1972 were standard formats 
operations personnel used to request air support through the chain of command.  The Joint Forces Air Component 
Commander published an “air tasking order” or “ATO” daily for all military aircraft in Iraq and Afghanistan to 
facilitate tasking, identification, coordination, and control of air assets in the two theaters of operations.  
  These full-
sized sheets of paper summarized anticipated events; displayed the times, frequencies, and 
“callsigns” for the mission in a tabular format; and provided scripts for the students to interpret, 
record, and transmit information to each other, the terminal controller, other aircraft, and 
19 A “joint terminal attack controller,” “JTAC,” or “terminal controller” was a representative of the USAF that 
provided liaison and control functions for the air support of ground forces, including air strikes.   
20 Common references Reaper crews used for CAS missions were joint publications on the subject:   
             d 
       ; Students and instructors also used aircraft publications, 
munitions manuals, and software tools to anticipate weapons and sensor performance during the mission:  
            
             
21 “Lineup” referred to the list of aircraft, names, and events normally recorded on the front of a lineup card.  A “9-
line” was the standard message a terminal controller passed to strike aircraft to coordinate the destruction of a target 
in close proximity to ground forces.  Item two in figure 1.2 of the supersortie’s lineup card depicts the structure of a 
9-line briefing. 
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command and control organizations.22  Another product specific to the supersortie was a 
portfolio of satellite images of the forward operating base.  The sensor operator obtained satellite 
imagery from Google Earth to create pictures of the target area with perspectives he might obtain 
from the aircraft’s “sensor ball.”23  One of the images encompassed the entire range complex 
while the other focused on the notional base and the roads surrounding its command post 
building.  The students also referenced an “Inflight Guide,” a color-coded book of figures, 
checklists, and tables of phone numbers, data-link frequencies, chat abbreviations, map icons, 
and other information necessary to fly Reaper missions at Holloman Air Force Base.24
                                               
22 A callsign was a name given to an individual or organizational representative.  In this scenario, “Widow 21” was 
the callsign of the terminal controller.  “Bones 38” was the callsign of the crew for the supersortie. 
  Although 
student pilots and sensor operators may not have referenced more than a few pages of the guide, 
they considered it and the mission’s lineup and 9-line cards to be essential tools and sources of 
information for the supersortie (see figure 1.2). 
23 The primary sensor the student sensor operators learned how to operate was the AN/DAS-1A infrared detection 
set or “sensor ball.”  Pilots and sensor operators in the 29th Attack Squadron called the AN/DAS-1A a “targeting 
pod” or “pod.”  In this study, I use the term “sensor ball.”  Targeting pods were actually long cylindrical sensors 
with the gimbals and cameras attached horizontally to the front of the cylinder.  Aircraft engineers and operators 
hung targeting pods underneath the chin or wing of fighter or bomber aircraft.  Sensor balls like the AN/DAS-1A 
also hung from aircraft, but the gimbals for the AN/DAS-1A attached vertically to the Reaper’s fuselage and the 
sensor’s detector arrays faced the ground instead of the horizon. 
24 29th Attack Squadron, “Inflight Guide: MQ-9 Annex, Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico,” December 2009. 
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Fig. 1.2. Crew’s 9-line card for the supersortie.  The crew printed the cards on standard sheets of 
paper.  The shaded areas on the left side of the card indicate the items of a 9-line the pilot had to 
read back to the terminal controller.  The student pilot attached the card to a clipboard and 
dictated 9-lines on it with a pencil.  When not writing on the card, the student pilot propped the 
clipboard on a ledge to his immediate left to reference the card during the mission.  The student 
sensor operator kept his 9-line and lineup cards on a shelf underneath his HUD and rested them 
on his left leg when transcribing information.  (Adapted from a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet of 
the crew’s 9-line card) 
The 9-line card was one of the most valuable and widely used tools in the ground control 
station.  The pilot and sensor operator always had their 9-line cards within reach, and the pilot 
propped up his card on a shelf so he could read from it when he talked on the radio or typed in a 
chat room.  Structured, malleable, and transportable in a different way than the crew’s computer 
displays, Reaper operators used 9-line cards and other paper tools for several purposes.  The 
student pilots for the supersortie used the card primarily to provide structure for both the 
transmission and reception of standard messages.  While introducing the flight to the terminal 
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controller over the radio and the airspace controller in a chat room, the student pilots read the 
blocks of data in numerical order to create compact, syntactically correct messages the 
controllers could understand.  Reaper pilots and sensor operators also used the 9-line cards to 
record, structure, and decipher messages from controllers.  Each spoken transmission of a 9-line 
or typed line of a situation update had its own line on the card, which Reaper operators used as a 
key to unpack the meaning of messages.  Blank lines and blocks of information were also 
immediately recognizable, and crews used sections of the card as reminders to seek specific 
information or accomplish certain tasks.  Reaper operators used the 9-line card and other paper 
tools to coordinate the distribution and integration of information and to regulate the use of other 
tools in the ground control station.   
After the students determined the scenario and objectives for the flight and produced the 
crew’s “mission materials,” the students and instructors met the next morning to brief each other 
on the roles and responsibilities of each member of the crew and to describe how they planned to 
work together to accomplish the goals of the mission.  Instructors placed a lot of importance on 
the brief and thought it set the tone for a sortie.25  Being late for a flight brief was a serious 
offense, and I made sure I was in my seat early for the 3:10 a.m. start in one of the squadron’s 
five briefing rooms.26
Several times during the brief, the students described particular tasks, procedures, and 
system settings for the mission as being “standard.”  The squadron standards were baseline 
criteria for mission planning and performance that squadron commanders approved and 
published every six months.  Instructors expected students to know the standards cold, and 
  The briefing began with a time hack from one of the students, and for the 
next fifty minutes, the students and instructors used flight aids, white boards, PowerPoint slides, 
maps, and satellite imagery to brief each other and the mission coordinator on the details of how 
they were going to conduct the mission.   
                                               
25 On rare occasions in the Reaper community, students performed so poorly in the brief that the sortie’s instructors 
cancelled the flight to provide additional and immediate feedback.  Instructors called these instances “no-steppers.” 
26 Afternoon thunderstorms during the rainy season compelled the squadron to begin their training sorties well 
before sunrise.  Takeoff for the flight was at 4:15 a m. and the supersortie started at 4:45 a.m.  Although the weather 
forecast was clear, rain and standing water earlier in the week drastically changed the conduct of the day’s mission.  
Contractors from    could not support the training scenario as terminal controllers and enemy 
combatants because one of their two vehicles blew an engine rod.  The company’s truck ingested water during a 
high-speed chase on the range earlier in the week.  Instead of the students being in radio contact with the contractors 
on the range and the instructors manipulating the training scenario with text message from their personal cell 
phones, the instructor pilot and sensor operator simulated they were terminal controllers by speaking with their 
students over intercom.  Since Reaper missions in Iraq and Afghanistan involved the observation and elimination of 
people, the loss of support from   during my visit was one of the biggest disappointments of the study. 
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although compliance with them was not mandatory, those who deviated from the standards had 
to explain and justify their actions.27  Describing the responsibilities and tasks of crewmembers 
for a 2-hour training sortie was time consuming, and standards allowed instructors and students 
to forgo generic details of a mission and system setup to talk about unique aspects of a mission.  
               
                  
                 
             
               
               
                  
.29  Anyone in the squadron could make recommendations to change the standards, and 
members of the squadron’s weapons and tactics “shop” contacted experienced crewmembers in 
combat squadrons to discuss the impact of suggested improvements before leadership put the 
changes into effect.30  Squadron standards gave pilots, sensor operators, and mission coordinators 
an avenue to discuss and define their roles, and leadership used the standards to improve crew 
integration and to foster interoperability within the Reaper community by making responsibilities 
and tasks of agents in the system explicit.31
                                               
27                   
r                 
         
  
28 Ibid., 6. 
29 The student briefed the techniques he was going to use while referencing two printed satellite images of the target 
area he created with Google Earth.  A criticism the instructors had for the student sensor operator after the mission 
brief was that he did not create and utilize a third image of the target area with a wider perspective, one that 
encompassed the entire Centennial Range as well as the mountain range two miles west of the forward operating 
base.   
30 In addition to their mission duties, leadership assigned instructors in the 29th Attack Squadron to administrative 
“shops” to run day-to-day operations.  These shops included weapons & tactics, scheduling, training, standardization 
& evaluation, and intelligence.  Members of the 29th Attack Squadron routed their recommended changes to the 
standards through the weapons & tactics shop.  29th Attack Squadron, “29th Attack Squadron Reaper Employment 
Standards,” 8. 
31                    
            
                 
p             
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Reaper operators used the squadron standards, published procedures, and mission briefs 
to come to an agreement about the division of labor on a sortie and to reinforce the unity of 
purpose needed to operate as a cooperative team with members who understand each other’s role 
during a mission.  A Reaper pilot during a mission was the “mission commander” or the person 
with the responsibility and authority to organize the crew, delegate tasks within the system, and 
ensure mission accomplishment.32
             
              
                  
  The pilot was responsible for the safe operation of the 
aircraft, which included getting the aircraft to and from the target area with the proper separation 
from adverse weather, artillery, and other aircraft.  The pilot was also responsible for the 
effective execution of the sortie and the accomplishment of mission objectives, which required a 
detailed understanding of the position and movement of friendly and enemy ground forces and 
the ability to direct the aircraft and its sensors and weapons to a target in the allotted time and 
with the desired results.  Usually a pilot’s responsibility for safety and effective execution of the 
mission required interactions with agents outside the ground control station using radios, chat 
clients, telephones, and other communication devices.   
                                               
32 One of the foundations for employment and standardization in the Reaper community was    
         In the document, prominent 
pilots and sensor operators in the community defined the roles and responsibilities of the pilot, sensor operator, and 
mission coordinator in successive chapters on     like CAS and intelligence, surveillance, 
reconnaissance and targeting (ISRT). 
                
               
             
             
             
            
              
              Specifically for 
the supersortie, the mission coordinator also helped the instructors make the training scenario 
33 Pilots and sensor operators called the impact point for a target the “desired point of impact” or “DPI.” 
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more realistic by simulating organizations that were not readily available to the squadron for 
training.34
After an hour-long briefing on the roles and responsibilities of each crewmember and on 
how they were going to accomplish the mission’s objectives, the instructors released the students 
and mission coordinator for a trip to the restroom before they met again at the squadron’s 
operations desk.
 
35  At the operations desk, the “Top 3” gave the crew an update on the weather 
and available airspace, and the students, instructors, and I exited the back of the squadron 
building, walked onto the ramp, and “stepped” to the scheduled ground control station (see figure 
1.1).36                 
                 
              .37
                                               
34 When using internet relay chat (mIRC), the mission coordinator acted as an airspace controller for the control and 
reporting center (CRC) and a fighter duty officer for the air support operations center (ASOC).  The instructor pilot 
and instructor sensor operator simulated being the joint terminal attack controller (JTAC) and other CAS aircraft by 
talking over the intercommunications system connecting the pilot, sensor operator, and mission coordinator. 
 
35 The 15-minute break gave me an opportunity to set up my recording equipment: two Cannon Vixia HFS20 
camcorders with wide-angle lenses in the ground control station and a 2.0 megapixel webcam in the mission 
coordinator’s office.  Digital recording equipment in the ground control station also recorded video from the head-up 
display (HUD) and audio from the intercom.   
36 The “Top-3” was a senior squadron representative who managed the flying schedule for the day from the 
operations desk.  The ground control station used for the observed sortie was a MD-1A or “block 20” ground control 
station.  
37                     
                    
              
                     
         
62 
 
 
1.  Multi-Function Worksations 5.  Observation Seat  
2.  Instructor Pilot  6.  Camcorder on Monopod 
3.  Student Sensor Operator 7.  Camcorder on Monopod 
4.  Instructor Sensor Operator 
Fig. 1.3. Interior of ground control station from the rear door.  The racks for the three multi-
function workstations blocked the view of the student pilot to the left of the instructor pilot.  As 
observer, I had a headset connected to the ground control station’s intercom system and sat in a 
chair behind the students and instructors.  From that position, I could observe the actions of the 
pilot and sensor operator, take notes, snap pictures from a handheld camera, and monitor two 
camcorders mounted on monopods.  I taped one of the monopods to a computer rack just to the 
left of the instructor pilot.  I taped the other monopod behind and to the right of the instructor 
sensor operator.  (Photograph taken by author on the third morning of observations in the 29th 
Attack Squadron) 
Upon entry to the ground control station, the students checked the system’s maintenance 
forms for notable discrepancies and then walked up to their consoles at the far end of the station.  
After receiving a “changeover brief” from the departing pilot and sensor operator, the students 
63 
 
slid into their seats and plugged their headsets into the intercom.38
To a student pilot with experience in other aircraft and even for student sensor operators 
new to aviation, the controls and displays for Reaper looked somewhat familiar.  Although only 
one console was necessary to fly the aircraft, the ground control station for Reaper consisted of 
two identical workstations positioned side by side and separated by an equipment rack.  Each 
workstation had a stick on the right to control aircraft attitude, a throttle quadrant on the left to 
control thrust, and rudder pedals underneath to control aircraft yaw and apply brakes.  At eye 
level was a head-up display (HUD) that provided a view of the world from the perspective of the 
aircraft.  Above the HUD was a moving map display, which provided a perspective of the world 
from high above the aircraft.
      
              
              
              
               
              
           
39  Below the HUD were two smaller screens that displayed status 
information for the aircraft and ground control station.  Normally the pilot sat on the left, the 
position of the aircraft commander in an occupied aircraft.  The sensor operator sat on the right, 
the position of a traditional co-pilot.  In the case of Reaper, however, the sensor operator used the 
stick and throttle to control the sensor ball—not to pilot the aircraft.  On rare occasions when a 
pilot’s workstation “locked up” or became inoperative, a pilot and sensor operator could swap 
workstations and exchange seats (see figure 1.4).40
 
  
                                               
38 The pilots and sensor operators referenced their respective    in the   
            ; Changeover procedures 
and responsibilities were also in          
   
39 A 2007 assessment conducted by the Federal Aviation Administration called the ground control station 
“egocentric” when actually Predator and Reaper pilots and sensor operators benefitted from both egocentric and 
“exocentric” points of view. Kevin W. Williams, An Assessment of Pilot Control Interfaces for Unmanned Aircraft 
(Washington DC: Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Aerospace Medicine, April 2007). 
40 Reaper operators said the last lock up in the squadron occurred six months prior to my visit and was a rare 
phenomenon at the time.   
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Fig. 1.4. General Atomics’ depiction of pilot and sensor operator’s workstations.  General 
Atomics, manufacturer of Reaper, called the screen attached to the center equipment rack the 
“auxiliary mission monitor display,” but Reaper squadrons actually had six monitors between 
and to the side of the workstations.  At the bottom of the center equipment rack, two video 
converters combined the component video signals from each of the workstations, converted them 
to composite video, and transported the signals to the operations cell with a coaxial cable.  
(Adapted from figure 1-15, Technical Order 1Q-9(M)A-1, Flight Manual, 30 March 2009, 1-19) 
Although pieces of the ground control station looked similar to what the students may 
have seen in an aircraft, sitting at a workstation for Reaper seemed unnatural at first, especially 
for former pilots of occupied aircraft.  Reclined in padded, faux-leather chairs, pilots and sensor 
operators initially felt like they were sitting at a desk rather than behind a windscreen or an 
instrument panel.41  Instead of the buttons, knobs, switches, and analog displays found in 
traditional aircraft cockpits, each workstation had two keyboards and two trackballs that 
manipulated the displays on fourteen flat-panel monitors.  The “M” keyboard and trackball built 
into the workstation were the primary interfaces to manipulate the aircraft’s subsystems with two 
18.1-inch and two 10.4-inch liquid crystal display (LCD) monitors directly in front of the pilot 
and sensor operator.42
                                               
41 Unattributed interviews with student pilots. 
  Crewmembers called the displays the “tracker,” “HUD,” and “head-down 
displays” (see figure 1.5).  
42 Unlike a standard keyboard with twelve “F” keys from F1 to F12 adjacent to an escape key, the “M” keyboard 
had ten “M” keys from M0 to M9.  Pilots and sensor operators used the “M” keys or the head-down displays’ touch 
screens to navigate system menus. 
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1.  Pilot’s Tracker   7.  Virtual Whiteboard   13. Sensor Operator’s HUD  
2.  Pilot’s HUD    8.  Pilot’s Trackball Mouse   14. Tactical Display of VITs & Sensor Ball  
3.  Pilot’s Status Screen   9.  Lineup Card on Clipboard  15. FalconView & mIRC  
4.  Pilot’s Command Screen  10. Student Pilot     16. Skynet 
5.  Pilot’s “M” Keyboard   11. Instructor Pilot    17. Student Sensor Operator 
6.  FalconView & mIRC   12. Sensor Operator’s Tracker   18. Instructor Sensor Operator 
Fig. 1.5. Reaper workstations at the start of the supersortie. (Image captured by author six minutes and forty-one seconds into the 
supersortie on the fifth day of observations in the squadron)
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An additional trackball mouse and keyboard latched to each workstation behind the “M” 
keyboard controlled applications on computer servers in the operations cell.  Six 20-inch LCD 
monitors to the right and left of the pilot and sensor operator displayed the output of these 
servers.43  The operators called these side monitors “tactical displays,” which they used to access 
          
             
 .44  The pilot’s workstation also repeated the output from a multi-function 
workstation onto a monitor attached to the center equipment rack with a keyboard, video, and 
mouse switch.  For the supersortie, the monitor displayed     
               
     
                                               
43                  
                
  
           
    , the output from the computer servers in the 
operations cell were not a direct input source for the ground control station or the aircraft. 
44                  
                 
t                    
45                   
                  
f                     
f       
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1.  Virtual Whiteboard     9.  Stores Management System  
2.  FalconView Window     10. Combined Command and Status Display 
3.  Chat Rooms      11. “M” Keyboard 
4.  VITs & Infrared Nose Camera    12. Throttle 
5.  Keyboard for Pilot’s Tactical Displays   13. Stick 
6.  Trackball Mouse for Pilot’s Tactical Displays  14. Pilot’s “Inflight Guide”  
7.  Pilot’s Tracker     15. Student Pilot 
8.  Pilot’s HUD       16. Instructor Pilot 
Fig. 1.6. Pilot’s workstation and displays.          
                 
              
              
                  
(Photograph taken by author one hour, fifty minutes, and twenty-four seconds into the 
supersortie) 
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1.  Skynet      6.  Sensor Operator’s Status Display  11. Sensor Operator’s Lineup Card 
2.  mIRC Rooms & FalconView    7.  Sensor Operator’s Command Display  12. Emergency Checklist 
3.  VITs & Infrared Nose Camera    8.  Sensor Operator’s “M” Keyboard & Trackball 13. Virtual Whiteboard 
4.  Sensor Operator’s Tracker    9.  Field-of-View Lever    14. Digital Timer 
5.  Sensor Operator’s HUD    10. Top of Stick     15. Pilot’s “Inflight Guide” 
Fig. 1.7. Sensor operator’s workstation and displays.  The sensor operator’s keyboard and trackball mouse for the tactical displays 
were out of view on the right side of the console. (Image captured by author one hour, fifty minutes, and twenty-four seconds into the 
supersortie) 
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When the student pilots and sensor operator prepared for the supersortie, many of the 
tasks they accomplished were indistinguishable from office work.  Like the crewmembers of 
occupied aircraft, Reaper pilots and sensor operators used     
        .  They 
also made phone calls, studied reference materials, met informally with colleagues, and proposed 
strategies with superiors in formal briefings.  Preparing for a mission was administrative work, 
and although the chore was far from riveting, the products, tools, and agreements crewmembers 
produced prior to a mission were obligatory and contributed to success.  The guides and cards 
crewmembers created helped them structure interactions with each other and aircraft interfaces.  
Published standards of performance, documented procedures, and mission briefs helped 
crewmembers establish mission objectives, nominal divisions of labor, and mutual understanding 
of the crewmembers’ roles and contributions.  The preparations and administrative duties 
crewmembers accomplished prior to a mission were a prerequisite for flight.  
Configuring Reaper with the “FENCE Check” 
Immediately after sitting down, the students for the supersortie used the keyboards, 
trackballs, and displays in the ground control station to check the status of the aircraft and sensor 
ball, to prepare the systems for the mission, and to coordinate with outside agencies for the 
aircraft’s arrival into the airspace.  Reaper operators and crewmembers of occupied aircraft 
called these preparatory tasks the “FENCE check,” a mnemonic that stands for “fuel, emitters, 
navigation, communication, and engage.”46
                                               
46 The students I observed accomplished applicable items of the FENCE check by memory.  Reaper operators 
published the steps of the FENCE check in           
             .  When the 
sensor operator completed his steps to the FENCE check during the supersortie, he told the student pilot he was 
“fenced in.”                 
             
        
  The FENCE check frontloaded many of the tasks 
necessary              
              
              
             
Presumably, crewmembers of an occupied aircraft could fly over the fence separating friendly 
and hostile territories safely after they completed the FENCE check, which they tailored for the 
70 
 
mission and the type and configuration of the aircraft.  Reaper operators also accomplished 
personalized FENCE checks on a mission, but they did not fly over a fence or sit in cockpit.  
They sat at a desk and flew over enemy territory from a virtual world they created in the ground 
control station.  For Reaper operators, the FENCE check was a prerequisite for being present, but 
instead of flipping switches and interpreting analog gauges, Reaper operators typed on keyboards 
and deciphered electronic spreadsheets.  Reaper operators had to navigate a work environment 
typical of an office worker, which may have been a comfortable place for aircraft engineers and 
computer programmers to design, build, and fly prototypes of the system, but the ground control 
station was a foreign place for operators of occupied aircraft.  Reaper’s ground control station 
blurred the separation of administrative work from the practice of flight.  
“Fuel” was the first part of the FENCE check, and to verify Reaper had enough fuel for a 
mission, the levels in the aircraft’s wings were evenly distributed, and the turboprop engine was 
operating normally, the student pilots referenced the HUD and tables of performance data on the 
top center screen between the pilot’s and sensor operator’s workstations.  Sensors onboard the 
aircraft and elsewhere populated thousands of data fields     
                  
              
                 
              .47    
                
       .48        
                   
    .49
                                               
47                 
.   
   
48                      
                    
             
49      
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The student pilots for the supersortie verified the nominal operation of the aircraft’s fuel 
system and turboprop engine by glancing at digital recreations of analog gauges displayed on the 
right side of the HUD.              
           
             
                
           .50
                                               
50 Pilots and sensor operators called graphics from the sensor ball “destructive” and graphics from the workstation 
“non-destructive”             . 
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     .  Twenty minutes after taking his seat and after he programmed the 
aircraft’s route back to Holloman Air Force Base, the pilot changed his display   
               
              
                   
 .
73 
 
 
1.  Indicated Airspeed Tape  3.  Symbols for GPS Landing System   5.  Angle of Attack  
2.  Magnetic Heading Compass  4.  Engine Gauges     6.  Pitch Ladder 
7.  Flight Path Marker of Aircraft  7.  Indications for Stores Management System  
Fig. 1.9. Difference between “military-standard” HUD and “air-to-ground” HUD.  The above view was from the sensor ball’s infrared 
camera, which the sensor operator pointed straight ahead in “position mode” while the aircraft flew to the target area.    
                   
            .  The sensor ball embedded white graphics 
onto the HUD display.  Some of the green and white graphics appear cut off in the above images but they were not in the pilot’s HUD.  
(Adapted from video recorded by ground control station twenty minutes into the supersortie) 
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After verifying the nominal performance of the aircraft’s engine and fuel systems, the 
pilot and sensor operator configured Reaper’s “emitters” (see figure 1.10).    
               
              
   .  Transmissions to and from the aircraft kept the aircraft flying and 
connected to the crew, and data link settings established by the pilot and sensor operator had 
immense effect on the quality and distribution of the aircraft’s most valuable asset—video from 
the sensor ball.   
 
1.  Shroud Covering the Directional Ku Antenna 4.  AN/DAS-1A Sensor Ball 
2.  Daylight TV and Infrared Nose Cameras    5.  Directional & Omni-Directional C-Band Antennae 
3.  Shroud Covering Synthetic Aperture Radar   
Fig. 1.10. The Reaper aircraft’s sensors and emitters.  Both Reaper and its predecessor, the   
MQ-1 Predator, had a  directional Ku-band antenna, which gave the aircraft its bulbous 
nose.  The antenna rested in the traditional location of the cockpit for an occupied aircraft and 
gave the dish the best view of the sky.  (Adapted from photograph from www.dvidshub.net) 
For the supersortie, the aircraft and ground control station used two communication 
modes to interact with each other.  The first mode employed line-of-sight links over C-band 
frequencies transmitted between the aircraft and ground terminals on the airfield.  In this mode, 
antennae connected to the ground control station with fiber-optic cables transmitted and received 
“uplink” and “downlink” data from C-band antennae attached to the top and bottom of the 
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aircraft’s fuselage.  Before the pilots and sensor operators for the supersortie entered the ground 
control station, another pilot and sensor operator used this method to launch the aircraft from the 
base.  Once safely airborne, they transitioned the system to “Ku” control, a second 
communications mode that used encrypted “command” and “return” links transmitted over Ku-
band frequencies between a remote satellite terminal, a communications satellite, and the 
aircraft.51
Before the crew for the supersortie entered the ground control station, one of the 
squadron’s “launch-and-recovery” crews launched the aircraft in line-of-sight mode, which 
transmitted flight data      and provided the crew  aircraft 
telemetry                 
                  
              These 
   processed variable amounts of data from the sensor ball, infrared nose 
camera, and air-to-ground radar and shared the     f available bandwidth 
with a fixed amount of bandwidth dedicated for the aircraft’s radio and telemetry.  Using a  
    window from a drop down menu in the tracker display, the student 
pilot              
            
    .
  Hundreds of miles of fiber-optic cables and     
connected the student’s ground control station to a Predator Primary SATCOM Link at  
  .  At a data rate of    , the SATCOM link’s  satellite 
dish relayed control commands and radio transmissions from the ground control station through 
a commercial communications satellite in geostationary orbit to a  dish on the top of the 
nose of the aircraft.  While tracking the communications satellite, the aircraft’s Ku-band antenna 
responded with     of sensor video, aircraft telemetry, and aircraft-radio 
transmissions and sent the  and  return data back through the geostationary 
satellite to the same SATCOM link at    .  Return data from the aircraft 
traveled from     to the ground control station at Holloman Air Force Base 
through more fiber-optic cables and    .   
52
                                               
51 Pilots and sensor operators called the two types of communication modes “line of sight” and “Ku.” 
  Touching a series of “M” keys on his command display, the 
52                    
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sensor operator directed the aircraft to send the view from the nose camera to a tactical display 
positioned between himself and the pilot so they could monitor the position of scattered clouds in 
the area while looking at the ground with the sensor ball.53  Although the students did not use the 
Lynx synthetic aperture radar during the mission, the pilot         
        to provide power to the radar so the 
system could stabilize itself and avoid damage to its antenna array when the pilot maneuvered 
the aircraft.  The student pilot          
                
             
.54               
                   
             
  .55
After receiving the digital video signal through the communications satellite,  
              
       .  Both the student pilot and sensor operator 
configured their workstations            
   
  
                
              
.  Otherwise known as “closed captioning,” the ground control station    
     and sent it to the operations cell over a coaxial cable in 
accordance with an early design of the system.57
                                               
53 Before the pilot and sensor operator entered the ground control station, the launch crew      
         
  A    operations cell   
         pushed  data streams into a  
54           
55                
            
56                   
r  
57 In the summer of 2010, test engineers and operators from Detachment 3, 703rd Aeronautical Systems Group called 
the closed captioning text                
                  
              Motion Imagery Standards Board, 
        December 14, 2006, 5.    
r        
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 server, which translated the  data from all the airborne aircraft in the squadron  
 .58
 
  To view video from the supersortie in the operations cell, the mission 
coordinator subscribed to the appropriate IP address and port number for the mission and 
displayed the video on one of his three monitors (see figure 1.11). 
1.  Pilot’s HUD     5.  Lineup Cards for Supersortie 
2.   Rooms     6.  9-Line Card for Supersortie 
3.       7.  Mission Coordinator 
4.  Intercommunication System  
Fig. 1.11. Mission coordinator working in the operations cell.  During the supersortie, the 
mission coordinator communicated with the student pilot and sensor operator verbally with 
intercom, textually using an     client for  , and 
graphically using  overlays and draw files.  The mission coordinator also subscribed 
to the video displayed on the pilot’s HUD and used the data embedded in the blanking interval of 
the video signal to feed applications for  maps.  (Image taken by author nine 
minutes into the supersortie) 
Since the student pilots and sensor operator were not using C-band frequencies to control 
the aircraft, they           the 
aircraft to personnel on the ground at or near the forward operating base.  After the student pilot 
                                               
58       
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contacted the terminal controller over the aircraft’s airborne radio, the controller told the pilot he 
had a remotely operated video enhanced receiver (ROVER), a small, portable monitor that gave 
a person the ability to view sensor imagery from an aircraft’s sensor ball   .  Using 
additional  menus on the  lay, the pilot    transmitter and 
an Omni-directional antenna on the bottom of the aircraft to transmit  video from the 
sensor ball to a ROVER. 
 the aircraft and ground control station for ROVER    f 
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Pilots and sensor operators called the keyboard built into the console the “M” keyboard.  
Unlike standard keyboards with twelve “F” keys from F1 to F12, General Atomics engineers 
labeled the identical “M” keys from M0 to M9 to match the nomenclature programmers used to 
define modes of the system, which started from zero—not one.       
              
     61  In some cases, however, instructors taught their students 
to use the “M” keys to avoid “fat fingering” an adjacent but potentially calamitous selection on 
their screens.62               
               
                  
    63  Regardless, the highly experienced “virtuosos” I observed at their 
workstations navigated through system menus far too quickly to read anything.64
It is not my intention to describe them all here, but the student pilot and sensor operator 
used             
           
              
              
                
  With 
experience and skill, Reaper operators learned to manipulate their consoles as if they were 
machines and could configure the system rapidly, but instructors taught inexperienced operators 
to evaluate every keystroke and interaction with the system so they could adapt to unforeseen 
events and anomalies more quickly. 
                                               
61                   
                  
                   
                    
                
                      
                  
   
62                 
                      
   
63                  
                      
t                
64 One pilot learning to land the Reaper used the term “virtuoso” to describe his instructors sitting at a workstation.  
He said it looked like they were playing the piano.  Unattributed interview with Reaper pilot. 
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          Such situations included typing 
with the “M” keyboard or navigating menus with the trackball cursor on the tracker display and 
trying to do too many commands at once.65  The variety and organization of the above data entry 
and presentation screens, the lengthy amount of time and large number of actions required to 
manipulate the aircraft’s systems, and the incomplete and error-ridden descriptions of the 
systems themselves in the aircraft’s operations manuals were common complaints in the 29th 
Attack Squadron.  A sentiment from veteran operators in the Reaper community was that at some 
point, student pilots and sensor operators stopped complaining about the above methods and 
workarounds, dealt with the system, and learned about the aircraft as well as they could through 
practice and talking with experienced pilots and sensor operators.66
At the operations desk waiting for a step brief before another training mission, I 
overheard two sensor operators talking about how they had learned of the   
    .  While sitting down for lunch at Creech Air Force Base’s dining 
facility less than a year prior, one of the sensor operator’s friends in another squadron had told 
him,                   
                   
                 
      .
   
67          
               
                   
    .68
                                               
65 As of 30 March 2009, Reaper’s   listed these and other input conditions that could cause a 
workstation to fail.  Prior to that date, pilots and sensor operators learned these conditions from other operators.  
           
               
                 
       After eating, the giddy sensor operator had returned to his 
66 Unattributed interviews with several RPA pilots. 
67                   
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squadron to try the mode and to tell his peers about what he had heard.     in the 
operator’s manuals for Reaper, and news of the capability had spread in the 29th Attack Squadron 
the same way it had earlier in the combat squadrons—by word of mouth.69  Technical knowledge 
was a socially distributed resource that RPA operators diffused and stored through an oral 
culture.70
Word of mouth, “sneaker com,” line-of-sight links, and satellite communications were 
not the only communication methods pilots and sensor operators used to interact with agents 
associated with the ground control station, and the “navigation” and “communication” steps of 
the FENCE check illustrated some of the additional modes, tools, and protocols Reaper crews 
used to reach a destination.
 
71  One of the primary responsibilities of the student pilot was 
“deconfliction” or the avoidance of other aircraft, munitions, and inclement weather.  Pilots of 
occupied aircraft used a variety of techniques to ensure lateral, vertical, or temporal separation 
from other objects in the sky.  “Bones 38” was no exception, but the student pilot and sensor 
operator also had to ensure they were not a threat to other traffic in the airspace or near 
Holloman Air Force Base if the crew lost immediate control of the aircraft and went “lost link.”72
Whenever a Reaper aircraft lost contact with its communications satellite, ground 
terminal, or ground control station            
           .
   
73
                                               
69 The best official descriptions of the AN/DAS-1A sensor ball are in       
           F 
             
  .  Very few sensor operators or pilots had access to the operator’s manual for the AN/DAS-1A 
sensor ball. 
  Pilots and sensor 
operators called the route the sortie’s “emergency mission.”  Bones 38 had to share airspace with 
two earlier flights,              
               
70 Julian Orr, the first author to write a book-length ethnography of technicians, noted a similar phenomenon when 
he observed the practices and interactions of photocopier repairmen.  Julian E. Orr, Talking About Machines: An 
Ethnography of a Modern Job (Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, 1996), xiii. 
71 When Reaper crews used human messengers to transfer information or when they obtained critical information 
about a mission while on lunch break, for example, they said they used “sneaker com” or the “sneaker net.” 
72 “Bones 38” was the callsign for the supersortie.  “Bones” was the standard callsign for crews from the 29th Attack 
Squadron.  “38” indicated the number of the ground control station used for the mission. 
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Fig. 1.13. Referencing position of aircraft from traffic with  maps & symbols.  The 
instructor sensor operator pointed to his student’s  map to show the crew the position 
and altitude of aircraft assigned to the same airspace as their flight.  (Image taken by author ten 
minutes and forty-nine seconds into the supersortie) 
Despite the benefits            
           .  Concerned about the potential for an 
unwanted interruption to the sortie, the instructor sensor operator thought the pilots risked having 
to leave the target area          .  After discussing 
his concern, the instructor sensor operator asked the instructor pilot,       
         That way it’s not a big deal.”  Picking up the phone, 
the instructor pilot called            
   .77
                                               
77 The crew could have also contacted Bones 34 using one of two radios in the ground control station.  The standard 
in the squadron was to set the two ground radios to “Predator Common” and “Supervisor of Flying” frequencies, 
  Unfortunately,       , so 
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the student pilot contacted  control over the radio, requested a     
           .  After the student pilot 
sent the                 
              
  .  He then read back each point and altitude on the route for the pilot to 
confirm its accuracy and typed the corresponding information        
                 f 
               
                 
               
               
               
                
                 
                 
                 
                
               
              
                
                 
               
       
              
                 
                 
                
                
               .  
                                                                                                                                                       
which the Top 3, Bones 34, and others monitored.  Bones 38, Bones 34, and Bones 09 also monitored the same 
range-control frequency simultaneously with the ARC-210 radio onboard their aircraft.      
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87 Again, the pilot referenced the check-in section of his 9-line card to construct the message.  Cells one through six 
on the top left of the card contained the elements of a check-in brief, which included the name of the mission, 
aircraft location, weapons, sensor capabilities, and amount of time it could remain in the target area.     
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91 The system’s arrival time was only useful when the aircraft was heading straight towards the control point.  
Whether the pilot was pointing the aircraft at the control point or not, the workstation computed the aircraft’s arrival 
time using the current ground speed.             
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  Reaper crews complied with directives and standard procedures by transforming 
typed, written, and spoken instructions into graphical representations and distributing them 
among the workstations, computer applications, and the crew.  Reaper operators coordinated 
these representations and manipulated virtual objects within them to put the aircraft in an optimal 
position to view a target and to point the sensor ball at the target with the optimal sensor, field of 
view, and camera settings.  Coordinating the cacophony of displays and paper products at a 
workstation required discipline and skill, and sensor operators said it took up to a half a year or 
more to master how to correlate information from  maps and imagery with objects on 
the  display and images in the HUD.  Each display had distinct interfaces, communication 
protocols, and feedback delays that were difficult for novice operators to organize, navigate, and 
interpret.      
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When the student pilot accepted responsibility for the system from the launch-and-
recovery pilot             .  The 
aircraft’s autopilot and its stability augmentation system onboard the aircraft   
   .  To climb the aircraft on a southern heading at    
, the autopilot used          
               
                
  .  Before the aircraft climbed through Bones 34’s altitude, however, the 
student pilot took some control of the roll axis from the aircraft to turn away from the other 
flight.   
The student pilot in the ground control station and the autopilot on the aircraft negotiated 
their roles in the safe execution of flight, and to turn the aircraft manually, the student pilot had 
to             
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General Atomics’ engineers limited the command authority of the autopilot to  
         to fly a standard rate turn at about  
      was the typical cruise airspeed for early aircraft designed by 
General Atomics, and the company established the design specifications for the Ku antenna and 
configured the aircraft’s fuselage for the bank angle.101  At      f 
  , the Ku antenna on the aircraft had an unobstructed view of any communication 
satellite in the sky.  At          , the aircraft turned at 
least    , the standard turn rate of occupied aircraft in controlled airspace.  
                
              
              
                 
               
            .102
One of the downsides of            
               
                  
             
                                               
101 Unattributed interview with Predator and Reaper pilot. 
102 Unattributed interview with General Atomics engineer and pilot. 
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        .  Flying the aircraft at a constant range from a 
desired point on the ground helped sensor operators maintain a crisp focus,      
                 
      
Another negative of flying the aircraft without the heading autopilot was the difficulty in 
removing the trim, and pilots described “taking out the trim” of Reaper as one of the most 
“unnatural” things they had ever done with an aircraft.            
                   
            .  In a Cessna, pilots 
rotated a trim wheel to relieve the yolk pressure needed to keep the attitude of the aircraft 
constant.  Unlike these aircraft, the flight control system and trim for Reaper    
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Another act considered “unnatural” for Reaper pilots, especially those who came from 
aircraft with excess thrust, was the manipulation of airspeed by the pilot and autopilot.  Former 
fighter pilots were flabbergasted in initial training when they learned they had to push forward 
on the stick, not the throttle, to increase airspeed.        
 
                                               
103 During my observations of Reaper operations in the 29th Attack Squadron, 42nd Attack Squadron, and 26th 
Weapons School Squadron, pilots used the altitude and airspeed autopilots almost exclusively.  For the vast majority 
of a mission, pilots used the autopilots to keep the aircraft at a precise altitude to ensure separation from other 
aircraft and to maintain a precise airspeed to avoid a stall. 
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During the supersortie, the student pilot recognized that the aircraft was going to 
overshoot its assigned altitude as the aircraft started to level off, and the student made small 
speed corrections with the stick to minimize the deviation.  In order to keep the airspeed at  
, the autopilot only gingerly lowered the pitch of the aircraft to level off at the end of the 
climb and did not reduce the power of the aircraft’s engines adequately to remain   
.
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      .  For the remainder of the mission and for all the other 
missions I observed, pilots flew with the airspeed and altitude autopilot engaged    
      .107
One of the most unpopular design characteristics of the ground control station in the 
Reaper community was the         .  Counter 
to their experiences in occupied aircraft, Reaper pilots had to    
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      .  The button to drop bombs for all fighter aircraft 
in the USAF since the Korean War has been the top and leftmost button of the control stick.   
                  
             
    
There were several other remarkable aspects about how Reaper pilots flew the aircraft 
and struggled against unfamiliar control philosophies incorporated into the system.  One example 
was that the             
         Though the HUD was the only display 
in the ground control station that resembled an attitude indicator with an artificial horizon and 
pitch ladders, there was nothing available in the HUD to      
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Another item of note was how painstakingly slowly pilots       
                
          
                .  
Once during the supersortie, the student pilot rolled the aircraft to the left at the same time the 
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           .  Instructors in the 29th Attack 
Squadron taught their student pilots to commence a turn by first commanding a small bank angle 
to get the aircraft rolling               
               
                 
               
            
                   
               
                 
                  
                
                       
                   
                 
                  
                
The first student pilot’s control inputs for the supersortie were exceedingly smooth.   
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Fig. 1.17. Line diagram of sensor operator’s console. (Adapted f     
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Once the pilot checked the above weapons modes, the pilot told his crew he was “fenced 
in” (see figure 1.22).  He, the aircraft, and the crew were ready to communicate with the terminal 
controller to determine what support the ground commander needed for the next hour and twenty 
minutes of the mission.  The end of the FENCE check initiated the active engagement of the 
system with the supported ground commander, and even though the crew had not seen or felt the 
aircraft itself, the crew began to feel like they were aviators flying above the field of battle.  At 
their disposal were the most powerful airborne video cameras in the world, the means to 
distribute the video to almost anyone with the appropriate receiver or internet connection, and 
the best aircraft munitions available to kill a few individuals in the open or to flatten a building. 
 
1.  AN/DAS-1 Sensor Ball     3.  GBU-12 Laser Guided Bombs 
2.  AGM-114 Hellfire Missiles  4.  C-Band Antennas 
Fig. 1.22. Underside of Reaper “FENCED in” and ready for a mission.  (Adapted from   
          ) 
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Analysis 
When Hutchins described how a team onboard the Palau calculated the position of the 
Navy ship on a map, he calls the preparatory actions the sailors took to configure the navigation 
deck “pre-computation.”120
 Reaper crews also performed pre-computations after they entered the ground control 
station, and they summarized the process they used to configure the aircraft, sensor ball, 
weapons, and workstations for a mission into individualized “FENCE checks.”  During a 
FENCE check, Reaper pilots, sensor operators, and mission coordinators   
               
      .  FENCE checks also moved elements of tasks 
needed to operate Reaper out of periods of high activity and transformed verbal, written, and 
typed representations of artifacts into graphical and geographical forms that operators could 
more easily interpret and manipulate during dynamic phases of a mission.  Pre-computation 
redistributed the workload of Reaper crews over time and transformed the tasks of Reaper 
operators to make their jobs easier.  For inexperienced Reaper operators, the process of pre-
computation was tedious and confusing—like flying from a desk.       
                
              They 
  Many of the pre-computations that Reaper operators accomplished 
prior to a mission occurred before the pilots and sensor operators entered the ground control 
station.  Reaper crews set expectations and configured the operators’ internal representations of 
the mission by briefing the crew’s roles and responsibilities, by rehearsing procedures and 
protocols the crews were going to employ, and by discussing what the target area and threats 
could look like.  Reaper operators also created maps, guides, cards, and other products to 
organize mission tasks and to simplify the reception, transformation, and distribution of 
information from one tool to another.  Many of the tools in the ground control station and 
operations cell were computer applications, and Reaper squadrons configured the programs to 
display invariant aspects of local missions as virtual objects that Reaper operators could tailor for 
unique characteristics of the mission.  Before entering the place of work, Reaper crews created 
artifacts that simplified tasks and reduced the demands of the crew during the actual performance 
of a mission.   
                                               
120 Hutchins, Cognition in the Wild, 160-169. 
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could accomplish FENCE checks in less than fifteen minutes and manipulated ground control 
stations to create virtual worlds they used to protect and defend ground forces.    
            
   , and the tedious actions of Reaper pilots and sensor operators were 
prerequisites for them to become virtually present above battlefields in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Conclusion 
To experienced pilots, sensor operators, and mission coordinators, Reaper was more than 
just a matrix of cascading symbols crews used to form a remote perspective of the world.  It was 
a place where engineers and operators that designed and employed the system confronted one 
another.  It was where portals connected to physically dislocated people, machines, and 
organizations met, and where the interfaces to those portals, each with their own unique 
communication protocols, connected the elements of the system to each other.  It was where the 
tensions among the operators and their physical bodies and imperfect cognitive abilities merged 
with computers and their volatile memories and brittle programs to impose unfamiliar demands 
and constraints on each other.  It was where concepts integrated and where conversations took 
place.  It was where novice operators learned how to interpret contrasting images and ideas and 
translate them into actions and resolutions in harmony with one another.  The place where the 
matrix merged for Reaper was physically in the ground control station and operations cell, but 
conceptually, instructors taught their students to use the overlapping information to transport 
themselves to the aircraft and become the camera looking over the battlefield.  The next chapter 
describes how operators in the Reaper community used the matrix to develop feelings of remote 
presence and how social, technical, and cognitive factors mutually constituted remote air 
operations in war. 
117 
 
Chapter 2 
Becoming the Camera 
 Even for an observer with nine years of experience in military aviation, the ground 
control station for Reaper could be a busy and confusing place.  It was where radio transmissions 
and phone calls            
            
               .  For the untrained 
eye, it was enough to make a person sick to their stomach.  Pilots learning how to fly the aircraft 
said it felt like they were “flying the matrix.”  They often got lost in a cacophony of cascading 
symbols and overlapping conversations.   Eventually, Reaper operators found their way, 
however, and their view of the system evolved.  Experienced Reaper crews learned how to 
configure and coordinate the matrix of verbal, textual, graphical, and geographical 
representations in the ground control station and how to use them as tools to identify threats and 
eliminate them.  While waiting at the 29th Attack Squadron’s operations desk to observe another 
training mission, a former A-10 Thunderbolt pilot with over five years of experience flying RPA 
told me the Reaper was           
         This chapter describes how Reaper pilots and 
sensor operators interacted with each other and other elements of the network, both inside and 
outside the ground control station.  It describes how Reaper operators learned to manipulate the 
system to support allied forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and how they grew so personally 
engrossed in their interactions with their compatriots on the ground that they transported 
themselves to the other side of the world.  After completing their FENCE checks and while 
“building a picture” of what was happening on the battlefield, experienced pilots and sensor 
operators in the ground control station became the camera. 
              
              
         This chapter describes how the student pilot 
and sensor operator employed the system to search for, define, and destroy targets and compares 
their performances with the expert practices observed and discussed with over a hundred other 
pilots, sensor operators, mission coordinators, terminal controllers, and imagery analysts the 
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summer of 2010.  The first part of the chapter describes the motivations of Reaper crews and 
how pilots and sensor operators worked together to create a search plan to find and identify 
objects with the Reaper’s sensor ball.  The next and largest section of the chapter describes the 
skills of the sensor operator and explains how those skills transformed the sensor ball and its 
operator into an “eye in the sky.”  Again, the supersortie is the foundation of the description 
because the sortie illustrates how technical and social skills translated into something visible by 
comparing the performance of the student and his instructor.  After explaining the interactions 
between sensor operators and the sensor ball, the chapter describes how Reaper pilots flew the 
aircraft manually, not just to touch the “joystick,” but to get the best view of an object without 
being heard and to strike a target at a predetermined time.  To describe how the pilots banked the 
aircraft and prepared the system to employ weapons, the chapter contrasts the performance of a 
student pilot and his crew with the practice of an expert pilot and his sensor operator during a 
training mission in the 26th Weapons School Squadron.  Finally, the chapter ends with a 
description of how Reaper crews used imagery from the sensor ball, the position of the aircraft, 
and other agents outside the ground control station to define the objects in their screens and to 
build a picture of what was happening on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan.  This section 
supplements ethnographic data obtained from observations of training missions with interviews 
of combat experienced personnel in the 42nd Attack Squadron, 480th Intelligence Wing, and 26th 
Weapons School Squadron.   
 To find and kill targets in Iraq and Afghanistan, Reaper pilots and sensor operators had to 
negotiate with elements of a network separated by time, distance, and operational perspectives.  
These conversations shaped how members of the Reaper community learned their craft, moved 
their bodies, and talked with one another.  These interactions also formed technical and social 
skills that were impossible to separate.  Pilots and sensor operators said the precise control of the 
aircraft, its sensors, and the quality of video from the system reflected their competency.1
For Reaper pilots and sensor operators to employ the system with respect, they had to 
learn how to coordinate and distribute data among a hodgepodge of display and input devices 
  The 
credibility the crew had with ground commanders, with the terminal controllers that supported 
them, and with the rest of the USAF related directly to the timeliness of crew’s support, the 
quality of their video, and the accuracy of their weapons. 
                                               
1 Unattributed interviews with Reaper operators. 
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and how to overcome the operational assumptions engineers used to build the system.  General 
Atomics engineers initially designed the aircraft to fly autonomously for the bulk of a mission, 
but pilots modified the ground control station and their procedures to share aircraft control with 
the autopilot in order to maneuver more quickly and destroy a target at a specified time.  
Raytheon engineers designed the aircraft’s sensor ball to adjust the iris of its cameras 
automatically, but sensor operators developed procedures and a frame of reference to adjust the 
cameras’ settings manually in order to investigate obscured areas of a scene and to create images 
that seemed more natural.  Reaper pilots and sensor operators were able to employ the weapon 
successfully despite the unanticipated practices of the operators and the seemingly haphazard 
construction of the ground control station because they acted as the “malleable and adjustable 
coordinating tissue” of the system.2  To make the system work for them, Reaper operators 
determined the time and place to use automated tools; avoided modes of operation known to 
trigger failure; adjusted to the erroneous behavior of subsystems and other operators; and 
translated data into formats other humans and machines could receive, interpret, and evaluate.3
 “Tutor et Ultor,” Protector and Avenger 
  
Expert Reaper operators were decision-makers and reconfigured the outputs and structure of the 
system in anticipation of events, anomalies, and rigid behavior of programmed machines, while 
those who subordinated themselves to the system were “stick monkeys”, “voice activated 
targeting pods”, and “chat monkeys.”  They struggled to be human.  This chapter describes 
operators’ struggles to transform themselves from automatons and technicians into military 
professional who viewed the interpretation and manipulation of the virtual world they created as 
matters of life and death.  
 Although students in the 29th Attack Squadron trained to operate an aircraft from 
thousands of miles away, the critical role Reapers played in current conflicts and the importance 
of its mission were never far from their minds.  Shortly after leaving Holloman Air Force Base, 
the students would become a critical link in the “kill chain” that ground commanders used to 
dismantle insurgent networks and to eliminate enemies of the United States, and they would 
                                               
2 E. Hutchins, Cognition in the Wild (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), 219. 
3 Harry Collins and Donald MacKenzie argue operators perform these functions to “repair” the output and 
performance of software-based systems.  H. M. Collins, Artificial Experts: Social Knowledge and Intelligent 
Machines (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1990), 60, 65; Donald A. Mackenzie, Mechanizing Proof: Computing, 
Risk, and Trust (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2001), 302-303. 
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proudly use the system to “protect and avenge” their fellow airmen, soldiers, marines, and 
coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.  “Tutor et ultor” was the motto of 49th Wing, one of the 
parent organizations for the 29th Attack Squadron at Holloman Air Force Base, and the wing 
displayed the slogan on the unit’s patch.  Pilots and sensor operators wore the patch on the left 
shoulder of their flight suits, and although they flew Reaper and its sensor ball with keyboards, 
monitors, and “joysticks,” they did not analogize Reaper operations with video games.4
Everyone from a student to the most experienced weapon school instructor felt the 
pressure to succeed.  Pilots, sensor operators, and mission coordinators were well aware the 
sensor video from their aircraft, or “the feed,” was readily available to the chain of command and 
anyone with access to the Department of Defense’s global broadcast service or the military’s 
secure internet protocol network.  During my observations in the United States alone, I saw 
dozens of screens displaying the video from a single mission.  Imagery analysts used the video 
on personal screens to interpret and exploit the images for intelligence purposes.  Command and 
control organizations displayed the video on large public monitors to assess the status of the 
mission and to evaluate communication links (see figure 2.1).  Ground personnel in 
organizations requesting support from Reaper also displayed the video and combined 
information from it and other intelligence sources to direct the timing, position, and actions of 
their forces and to identify targets for destruction.  Anyone with the clearance and inclination to 
enter the ground control station could also see the actions of the crew in person, and it was not 
unheard of to have the Chief of Staff of the Air Force give the pilot and sensor operator a pat on 
the back while on a mission.
  Lives 
were at stake, and failure could lead to the death of their comrades, the escape of enemy 
combatants, or the loss of innocent life.   
5
                                               
4 Joseph Campo, “The Eyes and the Claws” (757th Operational Support Squadron, July 2006). 
  The motivation of pilots and sensor operators to learn their jobs 
quickly, to perform above standards, and to improve the performance of Reaper and the 
perceptions of the system was high.   
5 Unattributed interview with Reaper pilot. 
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Fig. 2.1. Video feeds in the combined air operations center.  The Air Component Commander’s 
operations center for the Middle East was one of the many command and control facilities that 
prominently displayed video from Reaper and Predator.  This is an image of the “operations 
floor” of the “combined air and space operations center” for Iraq and Afghanistan.  The 
operations floor displayed “the feed” from several Reapers and Predators flying over both 
countries next to giant “common operating pictures” of Iraq, on the left, and of Afghanistan, on 
the right.  (Adapted from the “B-Roll” video from the US Air Forces Central Public Affairs, 
Combined Air Operations Center, 28 November 2008. http://www.dvidshub.net/) 
Immediately after qualifying to operate Reaper, student pilots and sensor operators 
moved their families to Las Vegas to begin “mission qualification training” in one of the RPA 
squadrons at Creech Air Force Base.  To become “mission qualified,” the students memorized 
the standard operating procedures for their new squadrons, learned the special instructions and 
rules of engagement for each theater of conflict, and applied the knowledge and skills they 
learned in initial training to combat missions in support of counter-insurgency operations.  After 
five supervised flights and a “mission check,” students became “mission qualified” and could fly 
combat sorties without an instructor present.          
            
                  
  Putting Reaper and its crew in a position to locate a target and to describe what they 
saw required the proper placement of the aircraft and the configuration of its sensors, and all the 
122 
 
members of the crew, regardless of experience and background, had to work together to be 
successful. 
Talking about “Looking Through a Soda Straw” Together 
Although policymakers and advocates of Reaper have lauded the system as an 
“unblinking eye” over the battlefield, pilots, sensor operators, and intelligence personnel 
described watching video from the sensor ball as “looking through a soda straw.”   
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 .  To find and observe targets quickly with the sensor ball, Reaper crews needed 
objects to look for and a small area or a point to begin and end their search.     
                
               
                  
                 
              
                                               
6                  
t                        
r                  
                    
                
 
123 
 
                 
                
                
                      
               
              
             
             
                 
                 
               
              
                
                
                 
              
            
                
               
                 
                
               
              
For the supersortie, the purpose of the training mission and the tasks the notional ground 
commander wanted to accomplish were straightforward.  The instructors for the sortie 
documented the scenario and the objectives for the flight clearly in the squadron’s syllabus, and 
the crew briefed them over an hour prior to entering the ground control station.  Before the 
mission, the students learned that insurgents were planning to attack the forward operating base 
with       .  Residents of the base 
also expected the insurgents to obstruct the movement around the base with   
planted along the roads leading to and from the area.  The mission of the crew was to help defend 
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the base from insurgent attacks, and the pilot and sensor operator had to determine how to 
position the aircraft and configure its subsystems to provide the best support possible given the 
weather conditions and an update of the situation from the terminal controller.   
More than anyone else on the crew, the sensor operator knew how the   
              , and 
both the sensor operator and pilot had to negotiate a plan to best position the aircraft to watch 
over the base.  While the pilot was       , 
the sensor operator conducted a “weather check” of the area with the sensor ball.  Looking for 
the sensor operator’s insight          , the pilot 
turned his head towards him and asked “Alright Chris, where do you want me to go?”  The 
sensor operator replied, “Umm, let’s go south, probably southwest a little bit.      
 .”  The aircraft was more than          
    the northern edge of the Centennial Range.  The sensor operator 
wanted the pilot to fly         view it from the south.  
Objects in the area appeared           
        .  After the mission coordinator plotted the 
current position of the terminal controller on the west side of the base    map, 
the pilot decided to set up a     south of the base.  The position offered the 
aircraft the best view of the area, and the pilot wanted to establish an      
               
                   
                   
After negotiating where to fly the aircraft to observe the target area, the pilot and sensor 
operator needed to negotiate how they were going to search the area to protect the base and its 
inhabitants.   Prior to the flight, they obtained satellite imagery of the Centennial Range and 
coordinates for the base’s command post, which they used to plan the mission.  As the aircraft 
entered the Centennial Range, the pilot contacted the terminal controller for a “situation update” 
to refine their plan and to determine the current intentions of the ground commander.  During the 
update, the terminal controller told the crew that the base had sustained two rocket and mortar 
attacks prior to the aircraft’s arrival.  One of the attacks originated from the mountains to the 
west and the other came from the east of the base.       
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In response to the situation update from the terminal controller, the student pilot replied, 
“Copy that,   ” and he turned to the sensor operator to ask “so do you got that, 
Chris?”  The sensor operator responded, “Copy that.”  It took    for the terminal 
controller to pass the pilot the ground commander’s intentions for the mission over the radio 
using the same format the crew had on their lineup cards.        
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Although the pilot and sensor operator briefed their search plan to their instructors prior 
to the mission, the pilot and sensor operator did not discuss how they were going to search for 
threats to the forward operating base after the situation update from the terminal controller, 
which contributed to a misunderstanding between the crew and the people they were protecting.  
Experienced pilots and sensor operators said they needed to “share brains” and to operate from 
the same “mental model” to be successful on a mission.  Yet despite planning, briefing, and 
flying the mission with the instructors that created the training scenario, the students for the 
supersortie did not understand or determine what exactly constituted the base until well after they 
began their search.  When the pilot contacted the terminal controller for the situation update,  
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The above conversation and misunderstanding illustrate how challenging it could be for 
the sensor operator and pilot to communicate with each other effectively.   Inexperienced sensor 
operators found it difficult to develop and communicate a search plan while they were physically 
manipulating the sensor ball and while the pilot was conversing with other people.  Often sensor 
operators could not find the right words to say, a good time to say them, or the courage to speak 
their minds.  Many sensor operators, including the student and instructor for the supersortie, had 
no previous experience in aviation and essentially had to pick up a new language and a 
condensed way of speaking while learning how to operate the sensor ball.   Several experienced 
sensor operators said they flew for months without knowing the meaning of words and acronyms 
                
     .7
Sensor operators were also significantly junior in rank compared to the pilots next to 
them, and it took time for the enlistees to think and perform as if they were an integral part of the 
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f                   
                     
t                     
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crew.  With the exception of two first lieutenants, all of the pilots in the Reaper community were 
between the rank of captain and major general.  Many had more than a decade of experience in 
aviation.  Most sensor operators started initial training with Reaper right out of basic training, a 
place where their superiors taught them to converse with officers as little as possible and where 
drill sergeants instilled in them a fear of rank.  It often took six months for sensor operators to 
think, “officers are human just like us” and to feel like an active and contributing member of the 
crew.  The ability to communicate respectfully with military members of all ranks was a skill 
obtained after months of experience working with officers and watching other enlisted personnel 
interact with their superiors, peers, and subordinates in Reaper and Predator squadrons.   
With time, sensor operators, like the instructor for the supersortie, acquired the expertise, 
power, and confidence to influence the actions of the crew and to correct poor performance 
without threatening the authority of the pilot and other members of the crew.  When the pilot for 
the supersortie selected an altitude below another flight scheduled to drop bombs, the instructor 
sensor operator anticipated a potential conflict and wanted to confirm that the other training 
mission had already employed their weapons.  Besides walking to the other ground control 
station, the instructor sensor operator had no way of contacting the other crew himself, so he 
looked at the instructor pilot and asked, “Can we call to confirm that they have not dropped 
already?  That way it’s not a big deal.”  The instructor pilot responded, “Yeah, I’ll call and ask” 
and picked up the phone directly in front of him.  Even though the instructor pilot sat only inches 
away from the phone and was the most logical person to call, the instructor sensor operator 
addressed the entire crew by using the pronoun “we” and did not impinge on the pilot’s authority 
to delegate crew tasks.  The instructor sensor operator also communicated the seriousness of his 
concern and dampened his criticism of the pilot’s decision to fly at a lower altitude by stating 
that the situation might not be a “big deal.”  Finally, the instructor made the correction during a 
lull in communications and well before the student pilot leveled the aircraft at its final altitude.  
Even without touching the stick or sitting at a workstation, the instructor demonstrated his skill 
and competency as a sensor operator, crewmember, and aviator with a timely question and 
follow-up comment that did not deride or devalue the contributions of other members of the 
team.  
In contrast, the student sensor operator had trouble saying anything let alone verbalizing 
how he planned to investigate the outskirts of the forward operating base for insurgent activity.  
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It was not for a lack of trying on anyone’s part.  The student pilot for the supersortie went out of 
his way to make his young partner feel comfortable and to engage with him as a decision maker.  
A transport pilot with years of experience flying aircraft with a crew, the student pilot actively 
sought the sensor operator’s input by asking him “where do you want me to go?” and “you got 
that Chris?”  The field-grade officer also addressed his enlisted sensor operator by his first name, 
something he could not do outside the ground control station without appearing to fraternize with 
a subordinate.  While preparing for the mission, the pilot, sensor operator, and mission 
coordinator referred to each other by their rank and last names.  Once in the ground control 
station, the pilot called the mission coordinator “mick,” a phonetic pronunciation of “MC,” an 
acronym representing his duty title.   The sensor operator also called his fellow crewmembers by 
their duty titles.  Major Johnson, the student pilot, became “pilot.”  The instructors answered to 
their professional nicknames or personal “callsigns,” which their peers bestowed upon them after 
they became “mission qualified” in their combat squadrons.  Once in the ground control station, 
the authority obtained through rank alone became less important than the tasks, duties, and 
missions the pilot, sensor operator, and mission coordinator performed as crewmembers.   
For some crewmembers, the transition from a military hierarchy based on rank to a social 
structure related to the responsibilities of the crewmember and the context of the mission was 
difficult to accept.  Initially, the young sensor operator for the supersortie could not spit out more 
than a few words at a time despite attentive coaching by his mentor, yet he remained upbeat and 
receptive to the guidance from his instructor and the student pilot’s queries.  A few sensor 
operators did not have such a positive relationship with their paired pilot, however.  Pilots with 
experience in single-seat fighters like the F-16 Fighting Falcon had previously observed, tracked, 
and illuminated targets themselves with a targeting pod while simultaneously flying the aircraft.  
Many openly wondered why the USAF needed to train someone else to do the same job they did 
countless times with their thumbs and a pinky finger.8
                                               
8 Unattributed interviews with Reaper pilots.  In the F-16 Fighting Falcon, pilots rocked a “cursor enable switch” on 
the throttle with their left thumb to slew the view of a targeting pod or to adjust its focus.  To designate, track, or 
change the polarity of an image, pilots moved a “target management switch” on the stick with their right thumbs.  
To change the field of view, pilots depressed a “pinky switch” on the stick.   
  Others treated inexperienced sensor 
operators like “voice activated targeting pods” by constantly telling them where to point the 
sensor ball’s crosshairs and what camera and field of view to use.  Until a sensor operator had 
demonstrated their proficiency, some pilots did not expect or seek the sensor operator’s input 
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prior to making decisions and tried to accomplish as many of the tasks and duties required to 
complete the mission themselves as they could.  Other pilots, like the former transport pilot on 
the supersortie, actively sought interaction with the sensor operator not just to trade information 
for their own purposes but also to develop a supporting social relationship with the crewmember, 
to distribute tasks, and to share responsibility for the conduct of the mission.      
A former “Viper” pilot with combat experience operating the AN/AAQ-14 targeting pod, 
I was skeptical of soliciting suggestions from someone with almost zero experience in military 
aviation and sympathized with a more directive approach to communicating with a sensor 
operator.9
A haughty attitude from a pilot during a mission could motivate a sensor operator to 
prove him or herself and show the crew that they were an invaluable member of the team.  Biting 
criticism and social pressure could also lead to dysfunctional performance and, in unusual cases, 
a crying sensor operator.
  Instructor sensor operators in the 29th Attack Squadron told me “weak pilots” from 
backgrounds in transport and crewed aircraft often attributed too much knowledge and 
competency to sensor operators, which led to mistakes more detrimental than the one conducted 
on the supersortie:  searching the boundary of the forward operating base without knowing where 
it was.  Asking someone who had never flown an aircraft before “where do you want me to go?” 
was a foreign concept for me.  As a fighter pilot, I thought Reaper pilots should tell sensor 
operators where they wanted to put the aircraft, why, and assume that if the sensor operators had 
a problem with it, they should say so—and they better have a good reason for speaking up.  
Fighter and bomber pilots started Reaper training already familiar with the terms and practices 
associated with CAS and other strike missions while tanker and transport pilots did not.  
Compared to tanker and transport pilots, however, sensor operators said fighter pilots were 
generally more aggressive, confrontational, and uptight than their peers.   
10
                                               
9 “Viper” is a nickname for the F-16 Fighting Falcon.  I flew Vipers with an AN/AAQ-14 targeting pod during the 
Kosovo War and in Operations Northern Watch and Southern Watch. 
  At least on one occasion, a former fighter pilot told a talented young 
sensor operator he should start a new career in the USAF because, in a few years, the Reaper will 
have a new cockpit where pilots control the aircraft, sensors, and weapons on their own.  After a 
few sorties, however, the vast majority of fighter pilots admitted the ability of a crew to observe 
objects with Reaper significantly outperformed a fighter pilot’s targeting pod and 5-inch display.  
Over the former Yugoslavia and Iraq prior to 2001, I had struggled to find tanks, missile sites, 
10 Unattributed interviews with experienced sensor operators. 
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and anti-aircraft artillery with a targeting pod.           
               
               
               
      
The ability of Reaper pilots, sensor operators, and mission coordinators to communicate, 
develop, and execute a plan to “look through a soda straw” was a critical skill necessary to 
defend ground forces and to obtain the best video possible, and crews used portions of a mission 
as opportunities to improve the rapport between members of the team.  Crewmembers improved 
the social relationships among a crew by discussing the features of a target while using hand 
gestures and the HUD to illustrate a point.  They also verified each other’s work by writing 
information on white boards for all to see, and some even passed paper notes to each other to 
avoid interruption of ongoing conversations with other people or to minimize disruptions of 
interactions with the workstation.  Members of the Reaper community called the skills necessary 
to work together as a coherent team “crew resource management,” and pilots, sensor operators, 
and mission coordinators developed the ability to share knowledge and other resources within 
the ground control station by seeking the attention and involvement of each member of the team 
in the planning and execution of the mission.  Employing Reaper as a weapon of war required 
social as well as technical skills, and operators used the phases of missions to develop social 
relationships with their tools and other members of the crew and to negotiate divisions of labor 
and to distribute mission tasks.  The distribution of tasks and shared knowledge enabled Reaper 
crews to coordinate more information from a wider network of operators and intelligence 
personnel, which they used to position the aircraft, to cue the sensor ball, and to add context to 
the images in the HUD.  
The Sensor Operator: An “Eye in the Sky” 
In addition to purposeful conversations among members of the crew, a critical component 
of managing resources in the ground control station was how well the pilot and sensor operator 
could communicate with the machines in front of them.  The speed and precision with which the 
pilot flew the aircraft and the sensor operator directed the sensor ball determined how much time 
and attention they could devote to each other, to agents connected to the ground control station, 
to solving other problems, and to anticipating future actions.  Often the technical skills associated 
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with maneuvering the aircraft and manipulating the sensor ball involved fine motor skills, 
especially for the sensor operator.  With instruction and practice, sensor operators “mastered the 
reticle” by moving the sensor ball’s crosshairs onto an object with one sweeping motion and by 
keeping them stationary on a target despite aircraft movement and reticle drift.  The best sensor 
operators also had “golden hands” and dazzled others with their ability to keep the sensor ball 
stable and focused and to pull out details from a scene with an array of cameras and image 
optimization modes.  It took months in a combat squadron for sensor operators to feel like their 
hands could control the orientation of the sensor ball and images from its cameras precisely.  Yet 
in the process of learning their craft, they gained confidence in their abilities, obtained power and 
authority among the people and machines connected to the ground control station, and eventually 
felt as though they were an “eye in the sky.”  
“Mastering the Reticle” 
One of the most basic skills sensor operators had to learn was how to rotate or “slew” the 
view of a sensor ball to a target or object of interest.            
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The student sensor operator for the supersortie sortie visibly struggled with   and 
the control of the sensor ball and had difficulty judging the performance of the system.  After the 
sensor operator typed coordinates for the forward operating base into his workstation and 
commanded the sensor ball to look there, the cursors settled near an airfield north of the 
command post, more than a kilometer away from where the sensor operator wanted to begin his 
sweep of the area.  To center the command post in the HUD,        
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Instructors in the 29th Attack Squadron called the method the student sensor operator used 
to         They said the technique was typical of an operator just 
starting to learn how to employ the system or an experienced sensor operator who had not 
                                               
11                   
t                     
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touched the stick for several weeks and had       .  Experienced sensor 
operators developed a memory for           
        .  Inexperienced and non-proficient sensor 
operators used the   strategy to learn or remember how the factors related to each 
other and eventually were able to          .  
“Mastering the reticle” was a learned and practiced skill in all Reaper squadrons, and the 
instructors in the 29th Attack Squadron emphasized smooth control of the reticle and the 
development of endurance to do so for hours without a break for several reasons.  Operating 
alone, a single Reaper and its crew often had to maintain a constant view of a    
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      .14
Holding the reticle steady on a target or       with the 
spring-loaded stick was tiring for sensor operators, especially without a place to rest their arms.  
There was an armrest the operators could clamp onto the console, but it was ungainly and anyone 
requesting to use the device was subject to ridicule.
            
                 
                  
15
One of the tools operators could use to free their hands was trim.  If the drift from the 
sensor ball or the              
                    
                  
             .  Instructors 
introduced students to trim to help them       , but they 
discouraged the use of the technique in general because the        
  Part of the regimen in the 29th Attack 
Squadron was to build the muscle endurance necessary to track objects for   
, but students also practiced using tools that allowed them to release stick pressure and 
to do other things with their hands.   
                                               
14 The above description of   for the sensor ball comes from several unattributed telephone 
interviews of two Raytheon engineers responsible for the development of the system and from unattributed 
interviews of sensor operators in Detachment 3, 703rd Aeronautical Systems Group and in the 26th Weapons School 
Squadron.  You can find more information on the topic and the operation of the AN/DAS-1A in Raytheon’s 
operator’s manual for the sensor ball, in the fourth chapter of the flight manual for the Reaper, and in the 26th 
Weapons School Squadron’s academic briefing on the system.      
            F 
              
          
15 Many of the older sensor operators had flown with Versatron’s M-14 “skyball” onboard the Predator before 2003.  
The skyball was     was much harder to control than the AN/DAS-1A. 
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    and aspects from the target and sensor operators needed their hands on 
the stick to follow     .         
                 
                
                    
                
      .16  Most experienced sensor operators said they used the 
technique at least once in combat but did not do so again.17
Video tracking features of the sensor ball called        
                   
        .  When the student sensor operator 
had the roof of the command post under the sensor ball’s crosshairs during the supersortie, he 
had to                   
   .  While the sensor operator was tracking the command post manually, the 
pilot contacted the terminal controller for a “situation update” for information regarding the 
protection of the forward operating base.  After the pilot started talking to the terminal controller, 
the sensor operator              while 
he transcribed the terminal controller’s words on a folded lineup card he rested on his left leg 
(see figure 2.2).  Unable to write and control the sensor ball at the same time, the sensor operator 
adapted to the dynamic work environment by employing an automated tool to take part in the 
division of labor as the conditions of the mission changed. 
  The sensor operators for the 
supersortie did not use trim during the mission but relied on another tool to help them precisely 
      or to take their hands off the stick to write something down
  
                                               
16 Sensor operators       by referencing a         
   In some cases, sensor operators used the trim to         
         despite it being in a neutral position.     
17 Trim also           the primary mode of the sensor ball for landing 
the aircraft.  Pilots often                  
                      
                  
t        
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1.  Student Writing Situation Update on Lineup Card 
2.  Geographic Position of Aircraft with Sensor Pointer on Command Post 
3.  Sensor Ball in Offset Area Track on Peak of Command Post’s Roof 
Fig. 2.2. Using automation to record and coordinate information.  The sensor operator put the 
sensor ball in area track on the command post while he copied a situation update on his lap.  
(Image taken by author forty-one minutes into the supersortie) 
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In the 29th Attack Squadron, instructors often did not get a lot of “stick time,” and intent 
on rebuilding his “muscle memory”    , the instructor sensor operator  
            during the second half of 
the supersortie.  An hour after he took his seat, however, the sensor ball    
         he and the second student pilot were about to attack.  
The sensor ball        after the student pilot commanded 
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the aircraft to fire a Hellfire missile at the target.  Engineers from Raytheon   
                 
          , but in this case, the sensor 
operator           .  Instead, the sensor ball 
inexplicably           .  Immediately after the 
sensor ball established          , the instructor sensor 
operator asked the instructor pilot “Did you see that?             
            The sensor operator had      
         himself.  The system     
              (see figure 2.4).   
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Despite the occasional inexplicable behavior of the workstation and the   
 , instructors and students in the Reaper community practiced   
 and became comfortable with them by practicing how to foster the conditions necessary to 
create and maintain them and by learning when it was advantageous to use them.  Under the right 
circumstances, members of the squadron also used another       
                 
 .  On a training mission conducted several days prior to the supersortie, another 
instructor encouraged a student to             f 
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1.  AN/DAS-1A Sensor Ball Turret Hanging from a Reaper       
2.  AN/DAS-1A Sensor Ball Turret 
3.  Azimuth and Elevation Gimbals of an AN/DAS-1A Sensor Ball       
Fig. 2.6. Sensor      .  Reaper crews     
              
               (Adapted from pictures 
from Raytheon’s “Multi-Spectral Targeting System: MTS-B,” 28 March 2010, 
http://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/mts_b/; and Dyke D. Weatherington’s 
“Unmanned Aircraft Systems Sensors,” Office of the Secretary of Defense Unmanned Air 
Vehicle Planning Task Force, 1 May 2005.) 
The standard for sensor operators to call out  instead of a higher number was a 
holdover from the AAS-52 sensor ball on the Predator, which      
   .19
                                               
19 The term “69” instead of “70” or “80” was a transplant from the fighter community and their infatuation with the 
number.  Many of the sexually explicit terms USAF pilots have used to describe flight operations have disappeared 
because of the introduction of women in combat roles and the presence of coworkers of all sexual orientations, even 
if unacknowledged.  The number sixty-nine has remained a placeholder, a memory aid, and a term to get someone’s 
attention in the fighter and Reaper communities because of its sexual neutrality and ambiguity.   
  Unlike the AAS-52, however, the   for the 
AN/DAS-1A were on a  , which had a       
                  
    Without action from the student pilot, the AN/DAS-1A     
                  
                  
                  
                 
          stopped, and said “sorry, I’m making 
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my turn.”  Fortunately, the sensor operator            
                  
When the mission was over and the instructors debriefed the students about their 
performance, the instructors praised the sensor operator for his actions to    
    Shortly before             
                   
  Despite looking through a “soda straw,” one of the highest priorities of the sensor 
operator was to be the “unblinking eye” and to maintain       
                
                    
                  
         , even as he struggled to make the images on 
his HUD focused, clear, and bright.  Despite the student’s primitive skills for creating crisp 
images with the sensor ball, his actions    illustrate the role of humans in the 
system.  Even with less than ten sorties of experience with the aircraft, the sensor operator used 
his experience and rules of thumb to model the behavior of the sensor ball and to recognize when 
an adverse situation could develop.  Unlike a machine, the sensor operator also altered his 
activities to coordinate a solution with the student pilot, and when his attempt to influence the 
actions of the student pilot failed, he restructured his individual priorities and tasks to keep the 
target in the HUD.20
“Kids with Golden Hands” 
  The sensor operator coordinated information from a variety of sources, 
helped other members of the crew coordinate actions with the rest of the crew, and dynamically 
reconfigured tasks and structure of the system in response to events, anomalies, and rigid 
performances of automated machines.       
The ability to               was a 
basic requirement to become a qualified sensor operator, but experienced sensor operators were 
adept at manipulating images from the sensor ball’s multiple cameras as well.  Reaper pilots and 
intelligence personnel called the best sensor operators “kids with golden hands” because they 
could              
                                               
20 Hutchins might describe the role of the sensor operator and other humans for Reaper as “malleable and adaptable 
coordinating tissue.”  Hutchins, Cognition in the Wild, 219. 
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         .  Members of the Reaper community 
expected sensor operators to “work the image” and to        
                  
         Proficient sensor operators often did these things when the 
object under investigation was not in the center of the HUD.  For example, sensor operators 
needed to             
          These tasks required motor skills and 
the ability to work with their hands. 
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For a number of reasons other than experience and proficiency, the student sensor 
operator for the supersortie struggled to   that satisfied the student pilot and 
instructors for the mission.  Shortly after the student sensor operator settled in his seat, the 
instructor sensor operator told him he needed to         
               
               
            
              
                
               
  “you are at the whims of the payload and how it adjusts.”   
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Throughout the supersortie, the student sensor operator had trouble    
                
           and by the young student on his 
ninth flight.  Figure 2.9 compares another scene processed by the sensor ball and by the 
instructor sensor operator, who had more than three years of combat experience.  The student 
                  
                
 .  Instructors in the 29th Attack Squadron said students who did not have months of 
experience           
                 
.  The instructor sensor operator believed his student’s normal struggle   
                f 
                
                
                  
                   
           The student for the supersortie judged 
the adequacy of images from the sensor ball by looking at what most likely were   
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23 “HMI” stood for “human-machine interface.”  During my interviews of sensor operators, I never mentioned the 
acronym, and the use of the human-factors term surprised me.  I was not the first to ask the sensor operators about 
how they controlled the sensor ball.  The     published the best 
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           .24
                                                                                                                                                       
analyses of operations in the ground control station that I have found.  The reports hoped to support the development 
of a dedicated career field for RPA operators and influence the design of the ground control station.     
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Instructor sensor operators in the 29th Attack Squadron said it took at    
of “hands-on instruction” to teach a student how to navigate the above menus, and sensor 
operators needed to practice the technique on every sortie to become proficient.   The student 
sensor operator for the supersortie received           
                 
                
     Sensor operators in the 29th Attack Squadron considered it 
“PhD-type stuff,” but the instructor for the supersortie wanted his student to practice the 
capability while the pilot was busy talking to the terminal controller.  It took only   
                   
          .  After the student pilot 
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finished talking to the terminal controller and focused his eyes on the video from the sensor ball, 
he turned to the sensor operator and said, “Is that the best...       
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Being the Ball 
It is hard to exaggerate the importance sensor operators placed in the quality of the video 
displayed in the HUD.  To maximize performance and a sensor operator’s engagement with the 
video in front of them, instructor sensor operators in the Reaper community instilled in their 
students a perspective I did not have in the F-16 Fighting Falcon.  Having taught fighter pilots 
how to employ a targeting pod in the F-16 Fighting Falcon and having used one myself on 
numerous occasions to search for targets and to guide weapons in combat, the interaction of 
experienced sensor operators with the sensor ball fascinated me.  The deftness with which they 
explored objects on their screens and massaged images with the levers in their hands was 
impressive, especially for someone like me who set the focus, gain, and level of the targeting pod 
once during the FENCE check and used the targeting pod’s automated modes almost exclusively 
to display images.  If the targeting pod did not give me the information I needed to find, identify, 
or strike a target, I descended in altitude or flew closer to it.  In the opinion of experienced sensor 
operators, I put myself at the mercy of the camera and was lazy.  Conversely, sensor operators 
dedicated themselves to providing valuable imagery, rarely took their eyes off the HUD, and 
grew to feel as if they were the sensor ball itself.   
During the first training mission I observed in the 29th Attack Squadron, a student sensor 
operator turned to his instructor and asked him if the image in the HUD was    
       The instructor sensor operator’s response was that it was a 
“credibility issue.”  The image may have been adequate, but the student needed to improve the 
image for the sake of the sensor operator, the crew, and the rest of the Reaper community.  A 
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sensor operator’s pride, attention, and value revolved around video from the sensor ball, and 
instead of submitting to the           
     , sensor operators taught themselves to engage with 
the image in the HUD.  In the process of doing to, they became the camera.   
After “strapping on” an F-16 Fighting Falcon prior to a mission, I often felt like I was 
inseparable from the aircraft and only needed to think about where to go and I could fly there.  It 
was a powerful feeling, but I did not have to transport myself conceptually somewhere else to get 
the sensation.  Instructor sensor operators taught their students to visualize themselves being on 
the Reaper aircraft, floating above the ground and looking down at their quarry from the belly of 
the aircraft.  I also never felt as if the video from the targeting pod was a product of my own new 
self.  I used the targeting pod to get images of the target displayed on a 5-inch screen.  
Experienced sensor operators who “flew” the sensor ball from an 18-inch monitor became the 
machine.  They became the eye in the sky.   
Apart from instructors telling their students to become the camera explicitly, a sensor 
operator’s feeling of remote presence was evident in the lessons they learned, in the language 
they used, and in the way experienced sensor operators interacted with the HUD.  A fundamental 
skill sensor operators practiced was            
               
                    
                 
                  
               
              
Another instructor told his student to            
                  
                  
          The instructor then told the young sensor 
operator to              
                   
     These statements did not make literal sense without the student being 
onboard the aircraft and living in the infrared camera’s white, gray, and black world.   
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After a couple hundred hours of flight experience and a sense of comfort with the modes, 
interfaces, and capabilities of the sensor ball, sensor operators began to feel like they were a part 
of the machine.  With proficiency as a “sensor,” sensor operators found themselves shifting and 
straining their bodies in front of the HUD to look around an object.  As pilots flew closer to a 
target, the transported operators tilted their heads in anticipation of the camera’s    
   Feelings of remote presence helped sensor operators move their bodies, and 
instructors believed that operators who felt as if they were “flying the sensor” could hold their 
attention longer on a scene, were more curious of what they saw, could sense change and 
movement easier, and            .  A 
sensor operator’s close relationship with the sensor ball helped them do their jobs well.   
When sensor operators felt like they were a part of the sensor ball flying above the 
battlefield, a sensor operator’s step out of the dark and cold ground control station into the bright 
desert heat of Nevada often felt like “stepping out of a portal.”  The short physical journey 
seemed like a stranger trip than the conceptual leap to an orbit thousands of miles away over Iraq 
or Afghanistan.  Reaper crewmembers made the leap possible after hundreds of hours of “over 
the shoulder” instruction and guidance, first-hand experience of the how actions of an operator 
translated into the movement of the machine and the alteration of the image, and an 
understanding of how to participate as an empowered member of the crew.  Only after 
accomplishing these objectives did a sensor operator feel like he or she was an eye in the sky. 
The Pilot: “Mission Commander” 
As much as the actions of a sensor operator fascinated me when he or she “flew the 
sensor” and      , I wondered if Reaper pilots felt a similar connection 
with the aircraft as a sensor operator did with the sensor ball.  As a “pilot in command,” did 
Reaper pilots feel as if they were the aircraft flying above Iraq and Afghanistan?  Could they feel 
like I did in an F-16 Fighting Falcon and become one with the aircraft?  When the student pilot 
asked his sensor operator for his input, he asked, “Where do you want me to go?” not “Where do 
you want me to fly the aircraft?”  Both pilots and sensor operators said pilots did not transport 
themselves conceptually into the machine to the same extent as a sensor operator.  Nor did pilots 
attain similar feelings of connection and control with Reaper as they did with their previous 
aircraft.  Reaper pilots who were “takeoff and landing qualified” said flying the aircraft gently 
onto a runway “almost felt like flying a real airplane.”  One legendary test pilot with experience 
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in the SR-71 Blackbird said landing the Reaper aircraft was “the most difficult thing he has ever 
done in aviation,” but Reaper pilots did not need the same level of attitude and airspeed control 
during a mission as they did on landing.  While on a mission, they used the autopilot to change 
the aircraft’s airspeed and altitude and hardly touched the throttle and rudder pedals.  Reaper 
pilots often banked the aircraft precisely in manual mode, but they rarely felt as if they were part 
of the aircraft when they pulled on the stick.  Like a sensor operator, a Reaper pilot could feel as 
if he or she was a telescope overlooking the battlefield, but as the “mission commander,” he or 
she was not just a passive eye in the sky or a “stick monkey” who flew the aircraft in accordance 
with rigid instructions.  Reaper pilots felt like they were part of a system that could not only 
gather critical information for ground commanders but also distribute and act on that 
information, change the course of events, and support their compatriots on the ground.   
Putting “the Thing on the Thing” 
As described in the previous chapter, flying the Reaper on a mission involved a 
significant amount of programming and “babysitting the autopilot,” but there were instances 
when manual control of the aircraft was necessary to put the aircraft, its sensors, and its weapons 
in the right place at a predetermined time.            
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 “Hitting a TOT” 
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 Manual control of the aircraft’s bank angle gave pilots more command of the turn rate 
and radius of the aircraft, which allowed them to use automated tools like the     
       .  Reaper pilots also used the added 
maneuverability of manual control to            
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  Despite          
experienced Reaper pilots           and used 
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the visible and audible feedback from the automated device to indicate when they were 
maneuvering the aircraft to its full potential.  
As pilots grew more comfortable with the flight characteristics of the aircraft under 
manual control, they learned how          
           .  During my week of observations in 
the 29th Attack Squadron, I saw only one student pilot fly aggressively enough to    
               .  In a week 
of observations in the 26th Weapons School Squadron at Nellis Air Force Base, the select group 
of instructor pilots in the squadron expected to         
        The wing commander at Creech Air Force Base 
nominated these instructors, considered the best young Reaper instructors in the USAF, to attend 
the “weapons instructor course” and to study and fly with other top instructors attending 
weapons school from various other aircraft and weapon systems.  When instructor pilots 
graduated from the 6-month course, they became “weapons instructors”—the Reaper 
community’s most proficient operators and a Reaper squadron’s most trusted advisors and 
mentors on weapons and tactics.  In the 26th Weapons School Squadron,    
             
            during the three flights I observed 
there.29
                 
               
                 
  Unlike the training missions in the 29th Attack Squadron, the pilots in weapons school 
also              
                  
                
               
           .  None of the pilots I observed had 
ever stalled the aircraft, however.  They used the         
     as possible. 
                                               
29 Many of the   these expert pilots generated were extremely short and difficult to discern     
t         
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The weapons school student’s aggressiveness was something he developed well after 
graduation from initial qualification training.  Without the ability to feel the wing buffet or other 
tactile indications from the aircraft, even the most accomplished pilots told me they were initially 
afraid to push the flight limits of Reaper until they saw someone else do it first.  One weapons 
school instructor said after he had watched another pilot consistently fly the aircraft through 
                 
    The airplane was just fine.  I’m going to go try it myself and see what happens.”  
Pilots in the Reaper community gained knowledge and confidence with the aircraft by looking 
over the shoulder of more experienced and assertive pilots.  Reaper pilots banked the aircraft 
above angles recommended by the system’s flight manual to achieve a higher turn rate and a 
tighter turn radius so they could orbit Reaper closer to targets to see them more clearly and to 
destroy them more quickly.  
Although there were benefits to the precise control of Reaper, especially in the roll axis, 
pilots did not foster feelings of remote presence and become a part of the aircraft to the same 
extent sensor operators became part of the camera.  Reaper pilots used     
    and to position the aircraft in accordance with the needs of a mission, 
but they did not              Pilots “flew 
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the airplane to   and by rejecting tools that could give them a perspective of a pilot 
sitting in the aircraft, they nurtured a closer relationship to the camera than the part of the 
machine under their immediate control.  Reaper pilots could have displayed video from one of 
the nose cameras in the HUD, but they only did so in preparation to takeoff, land, or “handoff” 
the aircraft to another crew.  For the rest of a mission,         f 
                 
                  
                
                   
               
              
   One of the differences between the pilot and sensor operator’s HUD was that the 
sensor operator’s workstation put a colored triangle just to the north of the sensor ball’s symbol 
for north, a black or white “N.”30
To Reaper pilots, the interpretation of video from the sensor ball was a matter of life and 
death, and although it was vital to the accomplishment of a mission, flying the aircraft was just a 
skill they needed to develop, a proficiency they needed to practice.  A pilot’s ability to support 
Americans and their allies in Iraq and Afghanistan was a product of Reaper’s sensors, the crew’s 
negotiations with “operations” and “intelligence” sources of information to characterize the 
status and intent of friendly and enemy ground forces detected by those sensors, and the 
aircraft’s air-to-ground weapons.  Even had there been people onboard the aircraft, Reaper pilots 
did not have to evade an adaptive enemy trying to shoot the plane down.      
              
  Reaper crews called it the “north arrow.”  The pilot’s 
workstation did not put a “north arrow” on his or her HUD, and the “N” was often difficult to 
find.  It was quite common for Reaper pilots to glance over to the sensor operator’s HUD to find 
the “north arrow” and to orient video from the sensor ball to the common reference system.  
After one training mission in the 29th Attack Squadron, an instructor pilot told me, “I would die 
without that red north arrow.”  Like sensor operators, pilots could feel more connected to 
symbols and imagery related to the sensor ball than they did to the aircraft and the pilot’s HUD.   
                                               
30 See figures 1.15 and 2.15 for examples of a sensor operator and a pilot’s HUD with and without a north arrow.  
The “N” in figure 2.15 is over the “L” in the warning “LTM LASE.” 
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Reaper pilots and sensor operators varied the use of automated tools during a sortie to 
increase overall performance and to incorporate context into the actions of the crew and images 
in the HUD.  Reaper operators alternated the use of automated modes to develop and maintain 
the motor skills needed for special circumstances.  Pilots maintained the     
               
              
             
         Reaper operators also expanded and 
contracted the use of automated tools to devote more or less attention to other components of the 
mission.                
                
              
             
                 
   Finally, Reaper operators used the behavior of automated tools as indicators of 
performance.  Experienced Reaper pilots knew they were turning the aircraft as   
      
              
               
        The bulk of a Reaper pilot’s 
attention, however, was on the video from the sensor ball and the sources of information that 
gave meaning to the images from it. 
                                               
31 Some pilots used the rack handles for the HUD monitor as a reference for a turn.  Lining up the horizon line with 
the top of the right handle and the bottom of the left handle established about a 20-degree-bank turn to the left.  
Others marked the edge of their screens with a dry-erase marker for the same purpose and essentially drew a crude 
attitude indicator on their HUD.  The vast majority of pilots in the community did not bother to do so. 
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        The ability of Reaper pilots and sensor 
operators to control the timing and extent of automated tools helped them improve the 
performance of the system and draw human operators closer to events on the ground in time, 
space, and purpose.   
“Building a Picture” 
To a Reaper pilot, the task of flying the aircraft was secondary to his or her role as an 
“information manager” trying to determine what was happening in front of the camera.  Pilots, 
sensor operators, and mission coordinators repeatedly described the essence of any Reaper 
mission as “building a picture of what was going on,” and the picture was more than images 
from the sensor ball.  To position the aircraft, configure its sensors, and interpret the objects on 
their displays, Reaper crews wanted contextual information.  They wanted to know the 
disposition and tactics of the insurgents and terrorists in Iraq and Afghanistan trying to harm 
allied forces in order to defend them.  They also wanted to know the plans, objectives, and intent 
of those forces in order to support them.  To achieve mission objectives and to understand what 
was happening on their screens, Reaper crews needed to distinguish the civilian population, 
normal operations, and peaceful behavior from combatants, threats, and ominous behavior.  
To build a picture with video from the sensor ball, Reaper crews needed additional 
information they could not get from the aircraft or from inside the ground control station alone.  
The majority of them had never been to Iraq or Afghanistan.  Only a small fraction of the pilots 
and sensor operators had traveled outside the confines of the air bases there.  None of them had 
participated in a raid, had driven in a military convoy, had met an insurgent, or had seen a 
  with their own eyes, yet they needed answers to specific questions regarding 
these and other topics related to the conflicts in both countries.  “If we were soldiers attacking 
this compound, what information should we have?”  “If we were insurgents trying to disrupt 
operations from this base, how and where could we do so without being seen?”  Even on scripted 
training missions, Reaper crews routinely looked at objects in the HUD and asked, “What is 
that?”  To resolve questions like these, Reaper pilots, sensor operators, and mission coordinators 
could not draw insight from combat situations and events they experienced from the ground in 
person.  The vast majority of Reaper operators, including pilots with prior combat experience, 
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had fought exclusively from the air.  Reaper crews had to negotiate solutions to questions 
regarding ground combat with ground commanders and their staffs, “intelligence analysts,” 
“operations directors,” and other war fighters spread throughout the Middle East and the United 
States.  Unlike students flying training missions from the 29th Attack Squadron, however, Reaper 
crews in operational squadrons could not sit down with individuals participating in a future 
operation, ask questions about the support they needed, or plan the mission the day prior.  
Combat crews had to coordinate their missions and subordinate tasks with agents thousands of 
miles away while they operated the aircraft and as the conditions on the ground and in the air 
evolved.   
The “Supported Unit” 
To ask questions and to negotiate solutions with people they had not met in places they 
had not been, Reaper crews interacted with an extended web of people and machines “where 
everyone had a voice.”  Some of these voices came from representatives of the “supported unit.”  
The commander of the supported unit, often an Army battalion or brigade in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, initiated the request for Reaper, and members of his or her staff helped determine 
the time, place, and purpose of a Reaper mission supporting the organization.  As a mission and 
events on the ground evolved, these personnel understood the original intent of a request, the 
“essential elements of information” desired by the supported ground commander, the status of 
enemy and friendly forces in the area, and the targets the commander did or did not want 
destroyed.  To understand the context of a mission and to develop the “right” plan of action, 
Reaper crews felt they had to “justify” their need for information by communicating with the 
supported ground commander and his or her staff through two representatives: the “JTAC” and 
the “S2.”    
The “JTAC.”  In Iraq and Afghanistan, a “JTAC” was a “joint terminal attack 
controller”—the link between Reaper crews and fielded forces when supporting a ground 
“operation” or conducting an air attack.  A officer or enlisted person with two to fourteen years 
of service in the military, terminal controllers were most often USAF personnel that lived, ate, 
and slept with the members of the “supported unit.”  They passed clearances to conduct bomb 
and missile strikes from the ground commander, and as members of the air component, they 
were a liaison between the ground and air forces when conducting an operation.  An “operation” 
could be anything from protecting a convoy of a few vehicles travelling between bases to 
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participation in a large-scale raid of a heavily defended compound using artillery, helicopters, 
and other aircraft.  The “fire and maneuver” elements of a supported unit, led by the “S3” or the 
senior member of the ground commander’s operations staff, planned and led these military 
movements.  Through the terminal controller, Reaper crews obtained permission from ground 
commanders to search for specific hostile threats during an operation and clearance to drop 
weapons onto a target during an air strike.32
While supporting an operation, Reaper crews interacted with a terminal controller 
verbally using the aircraft’s radio and pictorially with images from the sensor ball displayed on 
the controller’s handheld video terminal.  Carrying a radio on their backs and talking though a 
headset underneath their Kevlar helmets, terminal controllers were in constant contact with the 
crew once the pilot and the controller tuned their radios to the same frequency (see figure 2.17).  
To notify the terminal controller that the aircraft had arrived for the requested mission, the pilot 
“checked in” with the controller and gave him the status of the aircraft with a “fighter-to-FAC” 
brief in accordance with published tactics, techniques, and procedures.
   
33
                                               
32 “PID” or “positive identification” was the targeting function ground commanders used in Iraq and Afghanistan to 
comply with the concepts of distinction, necessity, and proportionality in the laws of armed conflict.  Commanders 
could identify people and objects for destruction in terms of their threatening behavior or other “positive enemy” 
characteristics and their geographic location or other “lack of friendly” characteristics.  The extent to which these 
and other factors influenced the targeting function varied with the context of the situation and the published rules of 
engagement. 
  In return, terminal 
controllers gave Reaper crews an “area of operation update” of the situation on the ground.  To 
transmit video from the sensor ball, the pilot also tuned the aircraft’s C-band transmitter to the 
terminal controller’s ROVER frequency, and controllers called successful connections between 
remote video terminals and sensor balls a “handshake.”  To “pass” a target to a Reaper crew, 
controllers verbally described the target and the position of the nearest friendly forces by giving 
the pilot a “9-line.”  With coordinates to point the sensor ball toward a target and a common 
video picture of the area, controllers could quickly give the crew a “talk on” to an object by 
referencing images from the sensor ball.  Once the sensor operator found and centered a target in 
the HUD, the terminal controller could tell the crew they were “cleared hot” to strike the person, 
vehicle, or structure underneath the sensor ball’s crosshairs. 
33 Joint Publication 3-09.3, Close Air Support, 2009.  The enlisted JTAC or “1C4” Air Force Service Code was one 
of the few remaining combat duties limited to males in the service.  Female fighter pilots and officers have qualified 
as JTACs, however.  “FAC” stands for “forward air controller.” 
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Fig. 2.17. Coordinating a strike from the battlefield.  Joint terminal attack controllers (JTAC) 
conversed with Reaper pilots and other aircraft operators using a boom mike and headphones 
underneath their Kevlar helmets.  This is a picture of a terminal controller traveling with a 
company on a foot patrol in Afghanistan.  The aircraft above his right shoulder is an AH-64 
Apache helicopter.  (Adapted from a “B-Roll” video from the American Forces Network, 
Afghanistan by James Craddick and Ben Lake, JTACs, Korengal Valley, Afghanistan, 14 
October 2009.) 
Talking with a terminal controller over the radio and striking targets with them was the 
most satisfying aspect of a mission for a Reaper crew.  Several sensor operators said talking with 
a terminal controller was “the coolest thing in the world,” and interactions with the controller 
enabled the crew to create effects they could see on the battlefield through the camera.  Terminal 
controllers and the ground forces they supported were “fighting the real fight,” and crews 
worked hard to foster a positive relationship with them.  RPA operators on a mission “fought for 
context” and the aircraft’s radio was a valuable tool pilots and controllers used to share context 
and their view of events on the ground.   
In addition to “building a picture” of the situation, experienced pilots and terminal 
controllers instinctively evaluated each other’s competency and emotional state through “radio 
discipline” and by how they talked to one another.  To sound alert, a pilot needed to wait for a 
break in transmissions between the terminal controller and other pilots so they did not “step on 
someone” and interrupt a conversation.  To sound knowledgeable, pilots used standard phrases 
and “brevity words” familiar to controllers and the operators of strike aircraft.  To sound 
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organized, pilots spoke in a standard format and conveyed information in an orderly and 
proscribed fashion.  To sound poised and confident, pilots broadcasted messages with one 
contiguous transmission and without interjections.  One of the most valued skills of a Reaper 
pilot was the ability to “sound good on the radio,” which was harder to do with a Reaper than in 
an occupied aircraft because of the           
             
                
  Instructor pilots in the Reaper community emphasized “clear and concise 
communications” to overcome these challenges because Reaper pilots used radio dialog to focus 
the controller’s attention on the remote video receiver, to exchange impressions of what they 
saw, and to put captured scenes in the context of the “operation.”  Student pilots configured the 
lineup and 9-line cards for a mission to prompt them to transmit and receive certain information 
during a mission and to structure conversations with controllers.  These structured conversations 
helped controllers to organize their own work and to interact with the Reaper crew and the video 
more efficiently.  Inexperienced pilots also read portions of radio messages instead of recalling 
them to regulate the speed and accuracy of transmissions and to demonstrate the competency of 
the crew.  Radio conversations contained technical as well as social messages. 
Combined with vivid imagery from the sensor ball, radio transmissions from controllers 
immersed crews in the moment, and the connection with someone personally involved in the 
“operation” made Reaper pilots and sensor operators feel like they were there.  During an attack, 
crewmembers could hear gunfire and the stress in a controller’s voice as he exerted himself to 
find cover.  Hiding from the enemy, a controller often talked to the pilot in a hushed voice, and 
Reaper crews have caught themselves whispering futilely to each other over intercom to avoid 
detection.  Hours could disappear in a blink of an eye as Reaper crews and their compatriots 
urgently searched for the perpetrators of an attack.   
As eyes in the sky and remote participants in “operations,” Reaper crews did not feel 
physically threatened by what they heard on the radio or by they saw in the HUD.  They only had 
a general sense of the vulnerability of the controller and the ground forces they supported.  Once 
a ground commander identified a threat for destruction, however, most often it was in everyone’s 
interests to destroy the target quickly to protect coalition forces and to prevent the insurgents 
from getting away.  There were two major components of a controller’s decision to use a specific 
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aircraft to kill a target.  One was collateral damage; did the aircraft have the munitions necessary 
to create the effects desired without a disproportionate risk to the civilian population?  By this 
measure, the Reaper had one of the most precise weapons in the USAF inventory—the Hellfire 
missile—and the aircraft could             
   given considerations of collateral damage and fratricide.  The other component of 
a controller’s decision was responsiveness; of the aircraft available, which one could kill the 
target the fastest?  From this perspective, the Reaper and its crew suffered from significant 
disadvantages they strained to overcome.   
Often it could take                
        .  To prevent aircraft from hitting each other in 
the target area, controllers created a “stack” of available strike assets where each mission had its 
own altitude block and holding pattern to maneuver a formation and to prepare for an attack.   
                 
      .34
Even if a Reaper was at the bottom of a terminal controller’s “stack” and had the ideal 
weapon to destroy a target,           
                 
                    
  Although General Atomics published the checklist as a “step-by-step” guide to 
eliminate the probability of omission of a step, I did not see a pilot touch the checklist let alone 
  With other aircraft in the area, Reaper pilots needed to descend 
the aircraft to a lower altitude to avoid dropping bombs or missiles through another flight’s 
altitude block and potentially hitting them.  To descend to a lower altitude, Reaper pilots had to 
coordinate the descent with the terminal controller and other aircraft in the area    
                 
                   
              
                  
    because Reaper crews could not look outside the cockpit and assure 
other aircraft pilots they were safe from collision. 
                                               
34 When controllers assign aircraft to a “hard” altitude, they expect the aircraft to remain at a constant barometric 
altitude to ensure separation from other airborne traffic. 
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reference one during flight.35
               
                 
            
              
 
  Pilots and sensor operators complained the technical writers for the 
company did not prioritize the steps for a given task, and checklists for weapons employment 
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.37
Intent on responsiveness and precision when employing a weapon, Reaper crews tailored 
their practices in the ground control station to match the characteristics of the flight environment, 
the expectations and experiences of the terminal controller, and the priorities of the ground 
commander. 
   
The “S2.”  Reaper crews prided themselves in their ability to find elusive combatants 
and to kill fleeting targets during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Yet, in accordance with a 
disciplined counterinsurgency strategy, moments of “force application” were brief, rare, and 
often took place after months of observation and assessment of the threat and insurgent network.  
The “S2” or the senior intelligence officer on a ground commander’s staff was the link between 
Reaper crews and the creation of “intelligence assessments” and “intelligence products” 
commanders and their staffs used to plan future operations, neutralize insurgent networks, and 
protect allied forces.  
Ground commanders used observations and sensor data from Reaper to analyze “patterns 
of life,” to discover “nefarious activity,” to follow suspect individuals, and to describe the 
characteristics of an area, village, road, compound, building, vehicle, or insurgent network.  
Leading the data-collection effort was the S2, the senior intelligence officer in the “supported 
unit.”  The S2 and the ground commander’s intelligence staff integrated the images and 
information gathered by Reaper with their assessments of the operational environment, friendly 
forces, civilian population, and insurgent network.  They used this information to make 
decisions, to direct the course of operations, and to create a counterinsurgency strategy tailored 
to their area of operations and the phase of the campaign.  
The S2 and their intelligence staff were active members of the supported unit and lived in 
the organization’s area of operations.  Sitting next to the commander in the “tactical operations 
center,” they best understood what information the commander considered important and what 
behavior the commander considered a threat to the counterinsurgency.  Although they worked at 
a desk and lived in a foreign land, a unit’s intelligence staff studied and knew the area of 
operations, the concerns of the local population, and the condition of the insurgency.  Through 
                                               
37 When setting the shift point, the pilot said, “Shift point will be…shift one to the left of the target. Otherwise, we’ll 
shift south.  Actually, we’ll shift to the east for any fires.”  The sensor operator replied, “Copy, ready.”   
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the S2 and the intelligence staff, Reaper crews learned “the big why” and the commander’s 
“essential elements of information.”  With the intelligence personnel, the crew negotiated 
compromises between the covertness of the aircraft, the view of the sensor ball, the quality of the 
image, and the ability of the crew to track a target.  Through interactions with the S2, Reaper 
crews learned the objectives for the mission and the ground commander’s vision for intelligence 
collection and engagements with the enemy.     
Exchanges among Reaper crews and intelligence personnel were often extremely 
sensitive.  The release of classified information to the enemy or to other non-approved 
organizations could compromise the success of an operation and threaten the lives of the people 
Reaper crews were trying to protect.  To guard against the unintentional release of damaging 
information, Reaper crews communicated with supported units over several networks tailored to 
the content of the transmitted message and the sensitivity of information.      
             
     .38       
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       in the ground control station on separate 
monitors bolted to their workstations.   
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The “Distributed Crew”   
For a supported unit, the S2 directed the collection of data needed to conduct the 
counterinsurgency, but a “distributed crew” in the United States interpreted the video from 
Reaper to create the first and second iteration of intelligence products for the ground 
commander.  Although critical to the counterinsurgency, Reaper missions were only a small part 
of the intelligence collection effort in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The supported unit did not have 
enough human and technical resources to watch video from the aircraft intently, to interpret and 
store the results of these observations for future use, and to disseminate what Reaper discovered 
to other organizations.  Members of the intelligence community called these tasks “processing, 
exploitation, and dissemination” or “PED.”  A distributed crew of imagery analysts in a 
“distributed common ground station” created the reports, looked for patterns and trends, and 
built an accessible database of video and sensor data from Reaper and other airborne assets. 
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When policymakers described Reaper and other surveillance assets as an “unblinking 
eye” over the battlefield, they were not literally correct.         
               
     Pilots, sensor operators, and mission coordinators also looked away from the 
sensor video to type and to communicate with each other, the ground control station, the aircraft, 
and the people and machines connected to them.  One person connected to Predator and Reaper, 
however, never shifted his or her gaze from the sensor video.  This person never typed and only 
used his or her hands to point at objects in the video.  This person was an “imagery analyst,” a 
member of the distributed crew in one of the half a dozen distributed ground stations (DGS) in 
the United States. 
One of these ground stations was DGS-1, a large building on Langley Air Force Base, 
Virginia, containing satellite communications equipment and hundreds of personnel, telephones, 
 , computer servers, and flat screen displays in a cold and dark room about the size 
of a gymnasium.  In the building, intelligence specialists processed data from the USAF’s 
premier intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms: the Reaper, Predator, and RQ-4 
Global Hawk remotely piloted aircraft and the U-2 Dragon Lady, an occupied aircraft.  To 
interpret images from a Reaper mission, a minimum of four “imagery analysts” and an 
intelligence officer on the “operations floor” of a distributed ground station “processed, 
exploited, and disseminated” information they could glean from the video and then created 
intelligence products from the data for the customer.41  Three of the imagery analysts for a 
mission sat on one side of a square “pod,” a cluster of tables, chairs, and displays that could 
support four Reaper missions simultaneously—one mission per side of the square pod.42
                                               
41 Intelligence personnel in DGS-1 referred to the organization requesting support from the Reaper as the 
“customer.”  Members of the Reaper community purposely did not use the term and called the requesting 
organization the “supported unit” instead. 
  Each 
side of the pod had three analyst stations with three phone lines,       
 , and a 42-inch monitor of the sensor video centered above them.  Each station 
had six 24-inch monitors, a keyboard, a mouse, and a keyboard-video-mouse switch to 
manipulate and display video from the sensor ball, video recording and editing software, instant 
chat programs, intelligence databases,    , and reference graphics 
from the supported unit.      
42 The “operations floor” of DGS-1 had dozens of “pods.” With seventy-six LCD screens per “pod,” I had never 
seen so many displays in one room.   
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The processing of images from the Reaper in a distributed ground station began with an 
analyst staring at video from the aircraft and making “call outs” of what he or she saw (see figure 
2.18).  The analyst, an enlisted person with less than two years of experience in the intelligence 
career field, was a graduate of the service’s “geospatial imagery analyst” course at Goodfellow 
Air Force Base, Texas, and had earned the specialty code “1N1.”  During the 6-month course, 
experienced instructors exposed the analyst to thousands of images and video clips from a 
variety of collection sources and environments and tested his or her ability to find and identify 
       .  After the course and three weeks of 
qualification training at Langley Air Force Base, the analyst became a certified member of a 
distributed crew and could describe what he or she saw on Reaper’s video feed without instructor 
supervision.  As the junior crewmember, the imagery analyst’s duty was to keep his or her eyes 
on the video and call out what he or she saw in terms of the labels on the Reaper mission’s 
reference graphics created by the supported unit and passed to the distributed crew.  For 
example, while observing an area to document    an imagery analyst might say 
the following when he or she saw            
                  
 
Fig. 2.18. The “unblinking” eye of Reaper and Predator.  Imagery analysts, like the one above, 
stared at video from Reaper and Predator to make call outs of what they saw for the screener 
sitting next to them.  (Adapted from a USAF photograph by Senior Airman Dana Hill in Michael 
C. Sirak’s “ISR Revolution,” Air Force Magazine, June 2010, 36-37) 
Sitting to the left of the junior imagery analyst was the “screener,” who typed the call 
outs into    , input the information into a database, and coordinated with 
other imagery analysts to make annotated stills and video clips for the supported unit.  The 
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screener had a least a few months experience as an imagery analyst making “callouts” and had 
completed another qualification process for the position.  Both the junior imagery analyst and 
screener had displays of  and a “God’s eye view” of the aircraft’s position,  
 and annotated satellite imagery of the observation area, and several chat rooms connecting 
them with the Reaper crew, the S2, applicable command and control agencies, and other agents 
associated with the mission.  In a   dedicated to the Reaper mission, the screener typed 
in an abbreviated version of what the junior imagery analyst said.  For the above example, a 
screener might type the following in     more than   after the 
Reaper crew saw the activity in the HUD:   
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           The supervisor oversaw up to 
four distributed crews at a time, and in addition to checking reports, he or she scheduled breaks 
and rotated personnel to cover several missions over a 12-hour shift.  Normally, the supervisor 
    
                
               
                  
               
      
                                               
43         
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had at least several years of experience as an imagery analyst and screener.  Once a mission was 
complete, the screener met with the “mission commander,” an intelligence officer responsible for 
several distributed crews.  After a “hot wash” with the distributed crew and their supervisor, the 
mission commander summarized the mission’s results and emailed them and the finished reports 
to the S2 in the supported unit.   
Anyone with access to the appropriate    could download video 
products and analyze mission results from Reapers or any other intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance aircraft supported by a distributed crew.      
            
          .44  Imagery analysts also 
searched the  database themselves to analyze trends and to compare objects over time.  
                  
                
                 
                   
                      
      An imagery analyst searched the database and found images of the 
object taken a few weeks prior, which clearly showed it was a watering hole for livestock.  In 
addition to investigating objects over time and place, those with access to the   
and the  database could search and filter data by the supported unit, intelligence 
organization, aircraft, significant event, or keyword.45
For a fighter pilot with sixteen years in the USAF and four years removed from a cockpit, 
one of the most surprising characteristics of the distributed crews was their young age.  Many of 
the imagery analysts I observed were only a few years out of high school, and although I was 
only able to spend a half a day in a distributed ground station, it became quickly apparent the 
inordinate amount of focus and stamina required to interpret video and the pride the analysts had 
in their work.  Depending upon what they were observing, the time of day, the mission, and the 
behavior of the people they saw, a distributed crew might work feverishly for hours nonstop and 
   
                                               
44                    
t              
45 To help imagery analysts navigate    in the 480th Intelligence Wing maintained a 
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use several analysts to make call outs of activity taking place in more than one area of a scene.  
On other occasions, they struggled to stay awake when nothing moved on their displays for half 
a shift.  At the start of one such mission, the mission supervisor walked over to an imagery 
analyst and asked “eyes on, Smith?”46
With only the hum of computer fans, the clicking of keyboards and mice, and the 
occasional phone call, imagery analysts said they did not transport themselves above the 
battlefield during these quiet  missions.   “Detached” from the scene,   
          .  Some analysts did feel like 
they were the camera, however, when they supported the safe        
          Iraq and Afghanistan.  When 
supporting these sorties, the analysts felt more emotionally attached to the mission and the 
people they supported.  Regardless of the type of mission and the video they exploited, however, 
the nine analysts I observed felt they “saved lives” and were proud of their contributions to the 
counterinsurgency and finding     in Iraq and Afghanistan over the 
past year.  
  He replied, “Yep.”   Ten minutes into the mission, I asked 
how long it took before he became bored out of his mind: “about ten minutes.”  Fifty minutes 
into the mission and after the screener typed “no significant activity in the past 20 minutes” for 
the second time; the young analyst yawned and inspired the screener and me to do the same.  The 
supervisor walked over to the analyst again and asked, “Are you still good with being eyes on?”  
The analyst replied, “I need a bathroom break,” so the supervisor appointed another analyst to 
fill in for him.  Prior to going to the restroom, the imagery analyst blinked, but he never shifted 
his gaze from the sensor video.   
Reaper pilots, sensor operators, and intelligence coordinators also acknowledged the 
services of imagery analysts in distributed ground stations.  To them, the screener was “like a 
stenographer for a courtroom” and the more people available to watch “the feed” the better.  
When watching a dynamic scene, the pilot and sensor operator often focused their attention on 
the area surrounding the sensor ball’s crosshairs and not “the other ninety-five percent of the 
screen.”  Mission coordinators were a great help, but they could spend a significant amount of 
time with their attention diverted to tasks such as typing,   , and 
                                               
46 “Distributed crews” were more formal when addressing each other than MQ-9 Reaper crews were.  Analysts and 
their supervisors addressed each other by their rank, last name, or both.   
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assisting the pilot and sensor operator plan and execute tasks in the ground control station.  
Imagery analysts in a distributed ground station were unaware of these tasks, and they had the 
time, resources, and incentive to monitor scenes from Reaper’s sensor ball intently.  The screener 
and the analysts working for him or her were not part of the “mission crew” or the “flight crew,” 
and some pilots thought personnel in a distributed ground station were “less vulnerable to the 
social pressures” of a Reaper crew and provided a ground commander an “impartial perspective” 
that saved lives.47
Intelligence personnel in distributed ground stations knew little of how Reaper crews 
worked together to create images, and although video from Reaper structured the tasks of 
screeners and imagery analysts, the interactions among Reaper crewmembers did not.  For 
example, negotiations between the pilot and sensor operator about where to place the sensor 
ball’s crosshairs to maximize       did not compel imagery analysts in 
the distributed ground station to look at the crosshairs and   in the middle of 
the HUD.  They were more likely to examine and monitor other areas of a scene.  On a recent 
mission, a pilot told me he was a few seconds away from firing       
   when the mission coordinator said “kids” over the intercom.     
     the pilot, sensor operator, and mission coordinator did not notice 
the smaller individuals grazing the bottom of the HUD.  The imagery analysts in the distributed 
ground station did see them and called out “kids.”  The screener typed the message into in the 
  , and the mission coordinator saw the  message and notified the crew.  
The pilot aborted the attack immediately and was grateful for the attentiveness of the distributed 
crew.     
   
Despite the persuasiveness of the above example, very few of the eighty-nine pilots, 
sensor operators, and mission coordinators I interviewed shared positive stories of how 
distributed crews and Reaper worked together to find, characterize,    
 for a supported unit.  Most were quick to give examples of how imagery analysts in the 
distributed ground station “compromised operations” and tried to “run the mission” without 
understanding what the supported unit needed or how to operate the Reaper and its sensors.  
According to Reaper crewmembers, imagery analysts in a distributed ground station have called 
                                               
47 Although everyone I observed in the MQ-9 Reaper community thought a “mission crew” consisted of a pilot, 
sensor operator, and mission coordinator, they also used the term “flight crew,” which did not include the mission 
coordinator.   
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        One sensor operator said after he  
              , so the mission coordinator 
“whispered” with the screener to work out the discrepancy in a private chat room.48  A few 
minutes later, the                 
          .  When sensor operators tried to type 
their own call outs in the mission’s chat room, the screener often replied, “You can’t make call 
outs.”  After four to five months in combat, most sensor operators felt that they could make 
better call outs than imagery analysts could in a distributed ground station.  Both had similar 
training, but sensor operators felt they had “better information.”  Almost all of the sensor 
operators in the Reaper community attended the same imagery analyst school as their peers in 
the distributed common ground station.  Most only learned of their assignment to an RPA 
squadron at the end of their training to become an imagery analyst.49
Imagery analysts in distributed ground stations were also at a technical disadvantage to 
Reaper sensor operators.  The distribution of images        
                
              
             .  The 
clearest pictures from the sensor ball were in the ground control station, and even the mission 
coordinator’s video in the operations cell was lower in quality.  Finally, most imagery analysts in 
the distributed ground station could not communicate with Reaper crews on intercom or listen to 
crew communications with terminal controllers over the aircraft’s radio.  Unless the mission 
  The selection of one career 
path over another also appeared to be completely dependent upon the personnel needs of the 
USAF and not the performance or the potential of the student.  In many cases, the USAF 
personnel center appointed an entire class of imagery analysts to become sensor operators.  In the 
eyes of Reaper crews, the only additional training an imagery analyst in a distributed ground 
station received was three weeks of qualification training in the analysts’ intelligence squadrons.  
                                               
48                  
                  
                 
r                   
49 A small number of sensor operators were intelligence officers with the service code “14N” and did not receive the 
extensive training in imagery analysis as a “1N1.” Beginning the summer of 2010, all prospective sensor operators 
for Predator and Reaper attended an abbreviated aircrew training course at Randolph Air Force Base instead of 
imagery analyst training at Goodfellow Air Force Base.   
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coordinator transcribed radio conversations in the   , the distributed crew had 
no way of knowing if the supported unit tasked the crew over the radio or if a terminal controller 
passed the crew a 9-line    .    
Despite the primary source of data being the same—the sensor ball—the perspectives of 
a Reaper crew and a distributed crew were markedly different.  Ground commanders used both 
perspectives as separate sources of information.  The vast majority of the time, Reaper crews and 
imagery analysts in a distributed ground station agreed on what they were seeing.  Sensor 
operator said ninety-eight times out of a hundred the technical differences described above did 
not visibly affect the assessment of images from the aircraft.  If sensor operators saw what they 
thought were , they or the mission coordinator could “whisper” their assessment to the 
screener and ask, “DGS concur?” without a conflict spilling over into the   .50
Both Reaper and distributed crews told me they had good relationships with “supported 
units” or “customers” and understood the needs of ground forces better than the other respective 
organization.  Unfortunately, I did not have the access or the resources to explore these 
relationships from the perspective of ground commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan.  From 
discussions with the operators and analysts, however, the struggle to build a picture was a 
conflict within the greater conflict of the counterinsurgency and the struggle among intelligence 
  
Two times out of a hundred, however, sensor operators said they worked with imagery analysts 
on a “power trip.”              
                   
                
              
               
               
                 
                  
                   
               
              
             
                                               
50 “DGS” stands for “distributed ground station,” also known as a “distributed common ground station” or “DCGS.” 
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and operations personnel to define objects and behavior taking place on the other side of the 
world.  Distributed crews emphasized the collection and distribution of information about threats 
to support friendly forces, and Reaper crews were poised to eliminate those threats.  Reaper was 
the nexus of this struggle and anyone with access to the    and the 
   could participate in the debate. 
Analysis 
 In Cognition in the Wild, Hutchins defined a “functional system” as a constellation of 
representational media that people and tools brought into coordination with one another to 
accomplish a task.51
 Reaper operators configured the crew, ground control station, and procedures to enter 
into a virtual world and become the camera because threats to ground forces were difficult to 
find and the distinguishing characteristics of enemy combatants were subtle and fleeting.  Reaper 
crews said they could detect and adapt to dynamic events on the ground quickly, however, if they 
controlled the environment of the ground control station and achieved feelings of remote 
  Reaper was a functional system of many functional subsystems, and over 
the course of a mission, Reaper operators distributed media representations and negotiated the 
components of tasks among a network of other operators, analysts, machines, and computer 
applications and integrated the results to search for, identify, and destroy targets.  Inputs to the 
Reaper system were verbal, written, pictorial, and geographical representations of friendly forces 
and potential enemy activity; the physical and behavioral characteristics of objects under 
observation; and information commanders, analysts, and crews considered necessary to inform 
decisions and to eliminate threats             
                  
Collaboration among people and tools and the distribution of tasks were critical to the successful 
output of the system because of the adaptive and elusive nature of the enemy and because Reaper 
operators could not observe and interpret the battlefield below the aircraft on their own.  Reaper 
operators had to construct representations of the world through a constellation of input devices, 
computers, sensors, displays, individuals, organizations, standards, practices, algorithms, and 
communication protocols, and the ability of Reaper crews to manipulate the network of people, 
machines, and processes required technical skill and an interactive presence in a virtual and 
social world. 
                                               
51 Hutchins, Cognition in the Wild, 170. 
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presence.  Reaper operators structured their environment and the organization of crew tasks to 
attain feelings of remote presence by configuring automated tools to distribute information 
among crewmembers and to arrange components of a task in a way that allowed pilots, sensor 
operators, and mission coordinators to do things they did well.  Reaper crews recognized patterns 
in video from the sensor ball and made associations between items in an image with other verbal, 
written, and oral representations of a scene.  Reaper crews put the aircraft and sensor ball in the 
best position to create interpretable images by creating a constrained and predictable virtual 
world and by manipulating objects within that world.  Reaper crews, like other humans within 
socio-technical systems, restructured the functional system and valued tools that permitted them 
to do things humans did well: identify patterns, model simple systems, and manipulate objects in 
a constrained environment.52
A defining characteristic of the tools Reaper operators used to attain feelings of remote 
presence was automation.  Reaper crews varied the use of automated tools during a sortie to 
develop motor skills, to focus individual operators’ attention, to evaluate performance, and to 
reconfigure the tasks and organization of the crew by integrating tasks or by distributing and 
decomposing the elements of tasks into smaller components.  For example, Reaper pilots used 
the autopilot to break up the task of remote flight into three components: the maintenance of 
altitude, airspeed, and heading, and operators varied the use of automated tools for each 
component depending upon the objectives, the situation, and the skills of the crew.   
                 
               
The operator’s view of automation as a tool to integrate and decompose tasks differed 
significantly from human factors engineers concerned with the breadth and level of automation 
in human-machine systems.
   
53
                                               
52 Ibid., 155. 
  Sheridan, Parasuraman, and others developed a framework to 
study human-machine systems by categorizing automation into functional classes: data 
53 The first to develop a taxonomy for “levels of automation” was Sheridan and Verplank in Thomas B Sheridan and 
William Lawrence Verplank, Human and Computer Control of Undersea Teleoperators (Cambridge, MA: Man-
Machine Laboratory, Department of Mechanical Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1978); 
Sheridan increases the number of levels between the extremes of manual and full automation for decision-making 
functions in two subsequent works on supervisory control.  Thomas B Sheridan, Telerobotics, Automation, and 
Human Supervisory Control (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992); Thomas B Sheridan, Humans and Automation: 
System Design and Research Issues (New York: J. Wiley & Sons, 2002). 
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acquisition, data analysis, decision-making, and execution.54
Conclusion 
  The applied psychologists argued 
that automation ranged across a continuum from low to high levels of autonomy in those four 
functional classes, and they implored human-factors engineers to evaluate prospective levels of 
automation against performance, cost, and reliability criteria before designing and automating 
human functions in a system.  For Reaper, researchers could categorize all machine tasks in the 
above ethnographic description into one or more of those classes, but Reaper operators did not 
judge the usefulness of an automated tool by how well it performed in relationship to a level of 
automation.  Reaper operators valued and used automated tools that could integrate, decompose, 
or share tasks among human operators and could transform tasks into simpler problems.  Like 
Sheridan and others, Reaper operators were concerned about the potential negative consequences 
of automation like decreased situational awareness, complacency, and the degradation of motor 
skills, yet the operators, not engineers, developed strategies to mitigate those factors.  
In the summer of 2010, most sensor operators said that flying Reaper’s sensor ball was 
“the best job in the Air Force.”  There were few jobs in the service where someone out of high 
school could control a million dollar camera and a 500-pound warhead.  Comparatively, Reaper 
pilots were not as enthusiastic about their work, and many still hoped to return to their previous 
aircraft despite the importance and success of RPA in military campaigns at the time.  Reaper 
pilots said flying the RPA was not as fun as flying fighters, bombers, or transport aircraft, and 
they missed the feelings of power, awe, and excitement they could get from accelerating their 
bodies, from lifting themselves into the air, and from sitting on top of the world.  Most 
acknowledged that RPA were “the future of the Air Force,” however, and that the missions they 
conducted were personally rewarding.  As a mission commander of a RPA, they saw more 
battles, saved more lives, and killed more insurgents and terrorists than their airborne peers, and 
they cherished the relationships they developed with supported ground forces.   
When I talked with Reaper pilots, sensor operators, and mission coordinators in 2010, 
they often said they were “closer to the fight” with the RPA than they had been in an occupied 
aircraft.  At first, I categorized this statement as a colloquialism or a professional habit.  Their 
assertion could not be literally true.  Other than the desert environment, it was hard to imagine a 
                                               
54 R. Parasuraman, T.B. Sheridan, and C.D. Wickens, “A Model for Types and Levels of Human Interaction with 
Automation,” Systems, Man and Cybernetics, Part A: Systems and Humans, IEEE Transactions on 30, no. 3 (May 
2000): 286-297. 
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place farther away from the Middle East than Las Vegas, Nevada.  Toward the end of my 
research, however, I began to understand what they meant.  By observing how Reaper pilots, 
sensor operators, and mission coordinators talked to each other, how they taught each other, and 
how they interacted with people and machines connected to them, I saw how Reaper crews could 
feel as if they were floating above the battlefield supporting and defending their fellow airmen, 
soldiers, and marines in Iraq and Afghanistan.55
RPA operators did not always have a rich social and technical relationship with Reaper, 
Predator, or the humans and machines interacting with the systems.  Early RPA pilots called 
themselves “air vehicle operators,” not pilots, and one was more likely to curl up with a blanket 
for a nap than communicate with someone below the aircraft on a mission.  RPA pilots and 
sensor operators prior to 2002 deployed with ground forces to a combat theater, but they were 
professionally, socially, and physically isolated from the battlefield.  They did not become the 
camera.  The next chapter describes how operators, engineers, and program managers developed 
Reaper and the aircraft’s predecessor, the MQ-1 Predator, and explains how the construction of 
the people, practices, and machines associated with the system contributed to feelings of remote 
presence and transformed RPA operators.    
   
                                               
55 With only a summer of experience observing Reaper operations, I did not attain feelings of remote presence 
myself. 
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Chapter 3 
Building the Network 
In 2010, Reaper pilots, sensor operators, and mission coordinators were part of a large 
network of people and machines the crew coordinated to search for threats, to employ the 
aircraft’s weapons and sensors, and to protect and defend ground forces.  Inexperienced 
operators called the network and the human interfaces of Reaper a matrix, where a jumble of 
cascading symbols and morphing representations of the system overlapped in the ground control 
station.  Reaper pilots with experience in occupied aircraft often struggled to operate the system 
effectively and wondered who could have designed and assembled such a haphazard 
constellation of menus, displays, and input devices.  With time and practice, however, 
experienced operators stopped complaining about the ground control station and learned to use 
Reaper to coordinate a plethora of images, mapping applications, and verbal and written 
descriptions of a situation to build a picture and become part of activity below the aircraft.  
Skilled Reaper operators envisioned and used the system as a collaborative network of operators, 
intelligence analysts, and ground personnel to establish objectives, exchange information, and 
understand the context of a mission, but the employment of the system as a network of 
distributed work was not an inherent characteristic of remotely operated aircraft.  USAF 
operators started to assemble the constellation of people, practices, and tools they used to 
conduct remote air warfare after Air Combat Command activated the first Predator squadron in 
1995.   RPA operators built the network.  
When USAF pilots and sensor operators deployed to Hungary in 1996 to support 
peacekeeping operations in Bosnia with a smaller version of Reaper called Predator, RPA crews 
watched troop movements and searched for mass graves with almost no interaction among 
themselves and other people outside the ground control station.  With a printed list of up to three 
hundred target coordinates, Predator pilots programmed the aircraft to fly from point to point 
autonomously while they struggled to troubleshoot frequent failures of the system’s fragile 
ground control station.1
                                               
1 Unattributed interviews with Predator pilots. 
  Sensor operators searched the target coordinates for weapons and 
military activity with Predator’s sensor ball, but the feedback the crew received from 
commanders and imagery analysts on the performance of a mission was negligible and came 
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only by telephone.  It took years of debate and conflict for RPA operators to negotiate an 
interactive role with members of the network and to participate in the active support of ground 
forces. 
To understand how RPA crewmembers transformed the system and why they operated 
the system the way they did, it is essential to understand the circumstances of Predator and 
Reaper’s development, how technical characteristics of the system influenced relationships 
among elements of the network, and how social factors shaped the interactions they had among 
one another.  For example, the lack of presence in an aircraft fostered animosity among Predator 
pilots and hampered the distribution of systems knowledge and experience needed to train large 
numbers of RPA operators; Soviet air defenses and strategies to fly under them contributed to the 
color and makeup of Predator and Reaper’s HUD; and arming Predator and the political 
imperatives of war created an environment where combatants demanded responsive connections 
among Predator operators, ground forces, engineers, and subsystems.  Predator’s missile strikes 
in Afghanistan and Iraq were synonymous with the integration of Predator and Reaper into 
military operations, and the evolution of Predator was inseparable from history and the context 
of the system’s development.   
The previous chapter described how the humans of the Reaper system learned to mobilize 
and coordinate an extended network of tools and people to transport the Reaper operators 
conceptually above the battlefield and to become the camera.  This chapter traces the practices 
and tools RPA crews used to construct remote presence to policy and engineering assumptions, 
professional identities, wartime necessities, operational concepts, and past practices.  There are 
three major sections to the chapter, all of which draw upon evidence from over a hundred 
interviews with RPA operators and engineers and extracted information from classified USAF 
histories of RPA programs and case studies of RPA development.2
                                               
2 All information extracted from official USAF histories is unclassified. 
  The first section describes 
how organizational practices, professional identities, policy decisions, and aspects of the aircraft 
and ground control station’s design contributed to the physical and social isolation of Predator 
operators.  Dysfunctional social relationships among Predator operators prevented USAF pilots 
and sensor operators from understanding the limitations and performance characteristics of the 
system and from participating in the RPA’s development before 2001.  The second section 
describes the evolution of the RPA’s HUD, illustrates how occupied aircraft of the Cold War 
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influenced the HUD’s design, and exemplifies the difficulty of modifying the software and 
displays in the ground control station.  Finally, the last and most significant section describes 
how RPA operators and engineers connected the system to a network of other aircraft, operators, 
and tools to integrate RPA into military campaigns and explains how RPA operators transformed 
those connections into social relationships and a reorganization of tasks among RPA 
crewmembers. 
RPA operators both reflected and shaped their work environment and remote air warfare, 
yet there was a consistent trajectory in the development of Predator and Reaper.  RPA operators 
restructured the ground control station and crew tasks to shift the actions of crewmembers from 
low status missions of gathering and disseminating data to higher status tasks of integrating and 
creating information, participating in the assessment of threats, and actively contributing to 
commanders’ decision-making processes.  RPA operators were not satisfied with simple 
connections to a network of people and tools to accomplish a mission.  They sought and fostered 
social relationships with them and demanded interactive dialog among them in a form they could 
anticipate, understand, and evaluate.  Initially flown like a high altitude spy plane, RPA 
squadrons gradually altered the organization of tasks among Predator crewmembers to match the 
social structure of the crew by inserting Predator pilots, the highest ranking personnel operating 
the RPA, in the processes that sensor operators, imagery analysts, and ground commanders 
employed to look for, define, and potentially eliminate threatening behavior.  Throughout the 
history of the Predator and Reaper programs, RPA operators expanded and contracted the human 
and machine elements of the system and actively sought and negotiated the distribution of tasks 
among organizations, crewmembers, and automated tools.  In the process, they embedded the 
role of RPA operators and the evolution of RPA missions in social and technical relationships 
and transformed RPA pilots and sensor operators into war fighters.  
The ability of RPA pilots and sensor operators to participate in military operations and 
feel close to supported ground forces was not a logical result of Predator or Reaper’s design.  
Early Predator operators had little power or opportunity to participate in the development of the 
system or to analyze images from the aircraft’s sensors.  This chapter describes how the tools 
and practices of Predator evolved and how Predator operators emerged from professional 
isolation to the integration of Predator into air operations and warfare. 
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The Isolation of Predator Operators 
When talking to Reaper pilots and sensor operators about how they learned to employ the 
aircraft and its sensors, invariably they complained about the quality of the operations manuals 
and checklists they needed to operate the system.  Many of the documents they used as 
references to develop procedures and understand the modes of the aircraft and sensor ball were 
incomplete and neglected basic topics in spite of their hefty size.3  Incorrect procedures and 
formatting errors riddled the documents despite scores of formal requests for the manufacturer to 
correct them, and members of the community published system descriptions and the steps to 
accomplish routine tasks and troubleshoot system anomalies in local “in-flight guides”, “smart 
packs”, “handbooks,” and other products to supplement the aircraft’s official manuals and 
checklists.4
                                               
3                   
                     
f                  
             
              
  Operators attributed the discrepancies and their workarounds to the rapid 
development of the system’s predecessors, Amber and Predator.  Over fourteen years had passed 
since the Predator entered the USAF inventory, however, and the Reaper used the same 
workstation,      as the smaller aircraft.  The 
importance Predator and Reaper crews’ placed in formal documentation of the system and the 
seemingly inexplicable struggle to understand the system and to translate knowledge into actions 
was due to more than just shortcuts in design and manufacturing.  The relative immaturity of the 
operations manuals and checklists was a symptom of years of physical and professional 
separation of USAF pilots and sensor operators from the people, products, and organizations 
involved in the development of the system and the dysfunctional relationships among Predator 
operators.  For years after USAF operators started to fly the aircraft, Predator pilots and sensor 
operators did not become the camera or feel they were an integral part of the machine because of 
the isolation of the Predator crew and the inability of the operators to shape the tools, processes, 
4               
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and cognitive tasks used to find threats and accomplish a mission.  Predator crews were at the 
mercy of the aircraft and ground control station and the people who designed and built them.   
One of the principle figures in the design of Predator was Abraham Karem, the lead 
engineer, designer, and manufacturer of the aircraft and workstation that became the foundation 
of the Predator program.5  Predator was a derivative of Amber, an initiative in the 1980s to 
develop a reconnaissance vehicle with long endurance for the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency.  Karem designed and built Amber with the help of engineers and computer 
scientists in Leading Systems, a company he started from his garage.  Leading Systems was an 
“engineer’s company,” and in 1988, Karem and his team were the first to fly the RPA for more 
than thirty-eight hours without refueling.6  Despite their success, Karem was unable to obtain 
funding for the program beyond the basic demonstration of endurance, and without a government 
contract or a paying customer, his company initiated bankruptcy proceedings by 1990.7
The same year, General Atomics, a private company held by James and Linden Blue of 
San Diego, bought Leading Systems and its publicly marketed version of Amber from the 
bankruptcy court and hired ten engineers from Leading Systems to participate in the 
development of Predator.
   
8  Predator was a larger version of Amber with the ability to use 
satellite links to fly over the horizon, and the engineers from Leading Systems and General 
Atomics built the aircraft under the leadership of experienced program managers hired by the 
Blue brothers.  In 1999, General Atomics started an independent research and development 
program to improve the performance of Predator and develop a remotely piloted aircraft with the 
ability to carry 3,000 pounds of payload and fly at altitudes up to 50,000 feet.9
                                               
5 Unattributed interview with Leading Systems engineer. 
  Now known as 
the MQ-9 Reaper, General Atomics called the system the “Predator B,” and the significantly 
larger aircraft           
        With Predator B and Karem’s legacy of designing 
6 Ronald D. Murphy, “AMBER for Long Endurance,” Aerospace America, February 1989. 
7 Leading Systems sold a marketed version of Amber called the Gnat-750 to the Turkish military for about $3.6 
million, but the country defaulted on their payments for the system.  Thomas P. Ehrhard, “Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles in the United States Armed Services: A Comparative Study of Weapon System Innovation” (Dissertation, 
Johns Hopkins University, 2000), Note 396. 
8 Unattributed interview with Leading Systems engineer; in the spirit of Karem’s dedication to his work, one of 
Leading Systems’ former employees programmed and tested software for Predator with a workstation and sensor 
ball he had in his garage.   
9                  
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and building long endurance vehicles, General Atomics continued Leading System’s strategy of 
“rapidly prototyping and building” unoccupied aircraft, demonstrating their ability to fly 
unrefueled for long periods, and selling the systems to government agencies.10
Many of the design elements intended to reduce the weight and complexity of General 
Atomics’ aircraft to improve endurance increased the risk of mission failure and the need for a 
knowledgeable, experienced, and proficient operator.  Amber, Predator, and Reaper were 
composite aircraft with high aspect and laminar-flow wings susceptible to atmospheric 
disturbances on landing and the severe loss of lift in visible moisture.  All of the aircraft were 
challenging to get on the ground safely, and the distinctive “V” design of the planes’ tail sections 
guarded against propeller strikes on botched landings.  The V-tail also kept the tail’s surface area 
and weight to a minimum and was one of the many elements incorporated into the planes’ design 
to keep the weight of the aircraft down.
    
11  One feature of Predator’s design that saved weight was 
the aircraft’s lack of a fuel-quantity sensor or fuel-flow meter.  The system determined the 
amount of fuel remaining by calculating fuel flow from the commanded throttle setting and the 
expected performance of its engine, which was often in error.  The aircraft also did not use micro 
switches to indicate the position of the landing gear.  The amperage draw from the landing gear 
servos and a time delay determined gear indications, and sensor operators checked the state of 
the landing gear with the sensor ball on every sortie.12  The landing gear also did not have a 
“squat” switch to indicate when the aircraft was on the ground.  During an aborted takeoff, it was 
difficult to determine if the aircraft had lifted off or if the pilot could apply its brakes safely.13
                                               
10 Unattributed interview with General Atomics engineer. 
  
The nature of remote operations separated Predator crews physically from the aircraft, but the 
priorities to minimize the aircraft weight and maximize endurance also added a computational 
barrier to a pilot and sensor operator’s connection to the aircraft and made the knowledge of 
those computations and the potential causes for errors a prerequisite for success.  
11 Unattributed interviews with government engineers and Predator pilots.  The V-tail design also facilitated the 
stowage and deployment of Amber from torpedo tubes.  Ehrhard, “Unmanned aerial vehicles in the United States 
armed services,” 171, Note 389. 
12 A failure of the nose gear to extend fully damaged the Predator program’s first laser designator in 1999.  Sean M. 
Frisbee, “Weaponizing the Predator UAV: Toward a New Theory of Weapon System Innovation” (Air University 
School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 2004), 62. 
13 Pilots also had to use a different control strategy for the yaw axis compared to the pitch and roll axes because the 
system did not know if the aircraft was airborne or not.  Whether in the air or on the ground, pilots maneuvered the 
aircraft in yaw by commanding a desired rate of rotation with the rudder pedals, which simultaneously activated the 
nose-wheel steering and the tail rudder.  In pitch and roll, pilots commanded the desired angle with the position of 
the stick. 
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A Predator operator’s immediate connection to the aircraft was through familiar objects, 
a stick and a throttle, but the need for General Atomics to test, develop, and demonstrate the 
system simultaneously introduced Predator crews to displays and data-entry methods not found 
in occupied aircraft.  Karem and the engineers who designed the Predator and Reaper’s 
workstation saw themselves as aircraft designers and manufacturers of remotely operated 
aircraft, not cockpit engineers intending to comply with the aviation industry’s style guides.14  
Their priority was to demonstrate the unparalleled flight endurance of a RPA, and they only 
grudgingly built a ground control station to perform “quick and dirty integration” of the plane 
and its sensors.15
The techniques implemented to test the aircraft, reduce weight, and increase endurance 
did not prevent its crew from achieving remote flight, but they fundamentally shaped the tasks 
Predator crewmembers had to accomplish.  Many of these tasks became cognitively different 
than corresponding tasks in an occupied aircraft.  To turn an occupied aircraft and set a specific 
bank angle, pilots aligned an artificial horizon of an attitude indicator with a tick mark about a 
degree wide.  To turn the Predator, pilots increased or decreased the commanded bank angle 
until it matched the desired value displayed digitally to the nearest tenth of a degree.  For both 
cases, pilots tried to anticipate the roll rate of the aircraft given the flight parameters and 
  Karem and the engineers from General Atomics designed the workstation to 
look like a cockpit but refrained from using analog gauges and switches because a keyboard and 
displays of pure text and raster graphics offered more flexibility in development.  As the system 
evolved and their experience with the aircraft grew, they only needed to change the software to 
drive a new component, create an appropriate menu option, and to evaluate performance.  With 
conventional cockpit controls and a flexible design, the Predator’s designers could focus on 
maximizing flight endurance and not swapping instrument panels or altering the physical 
components of the workstation as they added sensors and other capabilities to the aircraft.  
                                               
14 Unattributed interview with General Atomics engineer. 
15 The workstation for the Predator was almost identical to that of Amber, which Karem told his employees he was 
reluctant to build.  At first, the Navy wanted Karem to use a modified version of the RQ-2 Pioneer’s workstation for 
Amber called the GCS-2000 built by the AAI Corporation.  By 1987, Karem felt AAI was “sandbagging” 
development of GCS-2000 and were unnecessarily limiting his engineers’ access to the system.  AAI only had five 
ground control stations in the United States, and General Atomics’ ability to tailor the system for Amber was 
extremely limited.  Amber pilots had to type in pitch values from a keyboard to change the setting for the constant 
speed propeller, which the Pioneer did not have.  AAI’s engineers also wanted Amber’s pilots to type in commands 
for differential braking, which the Pioneer could not do.  Unable to work around these and other limitations, Karem 
told AAI and Navy representatives he had no choice but to design and build a ground control station for Amber.  
Unattributed interview with Leading Systems engineer. 
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deflection of the yolk or stick, but the pilot of the occupied aircraft manipulated an artificial 
representation of the world while the Predator pilot matched rapidly increasing or decreasing 
numbers.  The structure of knobs, switches, and panels in a traditional aircraft cockpit also 
implied what experienced pilots needed to accomplish to fly and conduct the elements of a task.  
The Predator’s workstation hid most of the tools Predator pilots and sensor operators used to 
accomplish a mission.  The primary input device for the Predator was a generic keyboard, which 
Predator operators used to access menu options up to five layers deep.  Characteristics of the 
Predator’s design facilitated the testing and development of the system for General Atomics’ 
engineers, but it also increased the complexity of the displays, influenced the criteria for 
acceptable performance of the operators, and altered the interactions pilots and sensor operators 
had with their controls. 
When the pilots and sensor operators in the USAF started to fly Predator in 1996, they 
were not immune to how the system transformed flight tasks and put a premium on 
understanding the unique characteristics of the system.  For years after obtaining the 
responsibility to employ the aircraft, however, the developmental nature of the program 
restricted the operators’ access to the Predator aircraft, ground control station, and other expert 
operators, and hampered the ability of USAF operators to study and experience the modes and 
operational routines of the system firsthand.   
The USAF’s active involvement with the Predator began in July 1995 when the 
commander of Air Combat Command activated the 11th Reconnaissance Squadron at Nellis Air 
Force Base, Nevada.16  The USAF had not previously participated in the Predator program, but 
after the successful performance of the system at several joint exercises and in the Bosnia War, 
the Air Force Chief of Staff created the squadron and lobbied for the USAF to become the “lead 
service” for the aircraft.17
                                               
16                 
                
          
  In April 1996, the Secretary of Defense formally charged the USAF 
with the responsibility to employ and maintain the aircraft while giving the Navy the 
responsibility for development and procurement.  Despite the early establishment of the 
squadron, the unit did not have access to a Predator system for over a year, and by the end of 
17 Ibid., 35. 
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1996, a cadre of Army Warrant Officers trained five crews from the 11th Reconnaissance 
Squadron to fly the Predator from Fort Huachuca, Arizona.18
For members of the squadron, knowledge of the new and evolving weapon system was 
completely under the purview of aviation personnel at Fort Huachuca and with engineers and 
pilots working for General Atomics in California.  The handful of tanker and transport pilots 
entering the squadron in 1996 did not know the aircraft existed before their assignment, and there 
was no requirement for General Atomics to develop an operations manual, flight checklist, 
training regimen, or simulator for Predator.
 
19  Predator operators depended solely upon personal 
instruction and hands-on experience with the ground control station to learn about the system.  
Anticipating a formal training regimen, the USAF crews who traveled to Fort Huachuca to learn 
how to fly the aircraft called the training they received a “pick-up game.”20  Although they said 
the Army-helicopter pilots who taught them to takeoff, land, and employ the aircraft did a 
“fantastic job,” all of the training was by “word of mouth.” 21
After Air Combat Command obtained the responsibility to organize, train, and equip 
USAF pilots and sensor operators for combat operations in the Balkans, the command’s staff was 
acutely aware of the lack of technical data for the system, and the Predator’s program managers 
made the acquisition of manuals and checklists for the 11th Reconnaissance Squadron a top 
  Other than knowledge embodied 
in the system and in themselves, none of the information they received was portable.  After four 
months of training at Fort Huachuca, the USAF crews traveled to Hungary to finish the Predator 
program’s second deployment to the Balkans and to replace the Army personnel flying the 
Predator in combat.  Three years into the Predator program, the Department of Defense removed 
a critical component of the system, experienced human operators, and replaced them with a 
community of pilots and intelligence personnel who had little knowledge of the Predator and few 
tools to transfer and reproduce what others had learned from flying and developing the aircraft.     
                                               
18                 
 
19 The Air Force Research Laboratory did not install the first “multi-task trainer” for the RQ-1 Predator until 1998, 
and Air Combat Command did not approve General Atomics’ operations manuals and checklist for Predator until 
2000.  Ibid., 21, 40. 
20                  
               
 
21 Ibid. 
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priority.22  The command felt validated operations and maintenance procedures were critical to 
the successful integration of the Predator into USAF operations and maintenance processes.23  
The command also scheduled the Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center to evaluate 
the system in late 2000, and the center needed the documents to provide the command “with 
operational inputs for employments, sustainment, and tactics.”24
The agency eventually tasked to procure the operations and maintenance manuals for the 
Predator was “Big Safari,” an atypical acquisition organization known for its ingenuity, not the 
bureaucratic oversight needed to produce the documents.  Although the USAF gained 
responsibility for the employment and sustainment of the five Predator systems in 1996, the 
service did not obtain full control of the Predator program from the Navy until execution of the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998.  In a report attached to the act, members of 
the House’s committee on intelligence matters lamented the “overly bureaucratic management 
and acquisition structure the Department of Defense put in place for the Predator” and “strongly 
urged” the USAF to use Big Safari’s “streamlined acquisition program” to manage the system.
   
25  
In 1998, the USAF obtained all program management responsibilities for the Predator program 
and tasked Big Safari to “provide operations and maintenance manuals, handbooks, drawings 
and specifications” for the system.26
                                               
22               
                
      
   
23 The procurement of “validated and verified” manuals and checklists was a key component of Air Combat 
Command’s plan to “normalize the 11th Reconnaissance Squadron into Air Combat Command and Air Force 
processes.”  Program managers in Big Safari complained that Air Combat Command wanted to treat Predator like an 
F-16 Fighting Falcon.  Unattributed interviews;          
       
24 Air Combat Command originally anticipated initial operational test and evaluation of Predator to take place in 
October 1998 after they received the first “baseline” Predator.  The baseline Predator had an aircraft radio and other 
communications equipment the command deemed essential for USAF operations.  Actual operational test and 
evaluation did not occur until October 2000 when the command received the first baseline Predator the same year.  
Ibid., 28;              
               
               
      
25 House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, 105th 
Cong., 1st sess., 1997, 30-31. 
26           
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Unfortunately, Big Safari was not accustomed or staffed to produce the standardized 
documents because of initiatives to reduce the managerial oversight of the Predator program and 
because the organization had no prior need to develop detailed manuals and checklists.  The 
Department of Defense created Big Safari in 1953 to develop one-of-a-kind aircraft at the height 
of the Cold War.27             
           
             
28  Big Safari’s motto was “rapidly delivering war-winning capability,” and all of the above 
aircraft were a product of Big Safari’s strategy of “recombination”:  the integration of mature 
aircraft and sensors to produce “special purpose weapons systems.”29  They modified existing 
aircraft and sensors and recombined them in innovative ways, and while doing so, they fostered 
close relationships with the manufacturers of those systems.  In August 1998, six of Big Safari’s 
best engineers and a Predator crew handpicked from the 11th Reconnaissance Squadron 
established an “operation location”          
, where they worked daily with the company’s engineers and pilots.30
Everything about the Predator was developmental, and Big Safari’s program managers 
thought Air Combat Command’s aggressive timetable and incessant demands to “normalize” the 
Predator with the same manuals and checklists as a major weapon system were wasteful, 
counterproductive, and at odds with the number of aircraft configurations and modifications to 
the system.
  Until then, all 
the aircraft associated with Big Safari programs were mature systems with validated operations 
manuals.  The procedures required to fly the aircraft did not change appreciably with the 
integration of turrets, gimbals, sensors, and other devices.  The Predator was an exceptional 
challenge for Big Safari because the aircraft’s sensors were critical components needed for basic 
flight, and a seemingly innocuous change in the software or the protocols of a subsystem could 
alter routines from takeoff to landing, which themselves were undocumented.   
31
                                               
27 Unclassified histories of Big Safari do not exist.  Unattributed interviews with Big Safari program managers. 
  For the first five years of the Predator program, the USAF had three general 
28 Unattributed interview with program manager. 
29 Jon J. Rosenwasser, “Governance Structure and Weapon Innovation: The Case of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles” 
(Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (Tufts University), 2004), 287; Frisbee, “Weaponizing the Predator UAV: 
Toward a New Theory of Weapon System Innovation,” 64. 
30                
   
31 Unattributed interviews with program managers. 
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configurations of Predator.32
The baseline Predator incorporated major improvements to the aircraft, and Air Combat 
Command considered the modifications essential for flight with other USAF aircraft in contested 
airspace.  The upgrades included a deicing capability with a more powerful engine to 
compensate for the added weight and drag of deicing fluid, an aircraft radio for communications 
with air traffic control and other aircraft, and an IFF transponder with “Mode IV”—an encrypted 
communications technique used to identify aircraft in hostile airspace.
  One configuration included a single ground control station and two 
unmodified aircraft left over from the technology demonstration.  The 11th Reconnaissance 
Squadron trained with the obsolete assets once they obtained them from Fort Huachuca in 1996.  
Another version of the Predator was an “interim configuration.”  These aircraft incorporated an 
anti-ice capability and flew over the Balkans.  The third version was the “baseline” 
configuration, which General Atomics did not complete until early 2000.     
33  The baseline 
configuration also incorporated a capability they called “relief on station,” which allowed a 
single ground control station to keep at least one aircraft above a target for more than 24 hours.34  
All of the above modifications included major changes to the aircraft, ground control station, and 
crew tasks.  Manufacturers and program managers normally conducted these kinds of alterations 
during the “engineering, manufacturing, and development” phase of a traditional weapons 
program and prior to the evaluation of aircraft manuals, checklists, and procedures.35  Air 
Combat Command wanted General Atomics and Big Safari to make the major improvements and 
develop the manuals and checklists concurrently in record time, and Big Safari spent the 
equivalent of two Predator systems working with General Atomics to create the technical 
documents.36
                                               
32             
  General Atomics and Big Safari produced four versions of the manuals and 
checklists, all of which were obsolete upon publication because of alterations to the baseline 
Predator and the presence of other configurations.  No two aircraft and ground control stations 
were alike, and many of the aircraft and ground control stations were incompatible with each 
33 Michael R. Thirtle, Robert V. Johnson, and John L. Birkler, The Predator ACTD: A Case Study for Transition 
Planning for the Formal Acquisition Process (RAND Corporation, 1997), 35. 
34                
    
35 Prior to the Predator, no RPA had made it past the engineering, manufacturing, and development phase because of 
mounting requirements, cost overruns, delays, and accidents.  Ehrhard, “Unmanned aerial vehicles in the United 
States armed services.” 
36 Unattributed interview with program manager. 
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other.37
With experience flying Amber and every configuration of the Predator, General Atomics’ 
pilots should have been in the best position to document flight procedures and to create 
operational descriptions of the systems.  Karem’s vision for a RPA workstation remained the 
basis for the company’s pilot and sensor operator’s ground control station for decades.  In 
between taking off and landing the aircraft manually like an occupied aircraft, General Atomics’ 
engineers and pilots anticipated Predator operators would program the aircraft to fly from point 
to point autonomously unless they needed to respond to an emergency or anomalous situation.  
Autonomous flight enabled Predator operators to fly a route at a precise airspeed and altitude for 
optimum endurance, and the aircraft            
             
      The layout and design of the workstations for Amber and the 
Predator were almost identical physically, and the        
             
  Individual Predator systems were craft products operated by a small number of people 
who designed and built them, and USAF representatives had difficulty creating the standardized 
products and aids needed to distribute knowledge of the system quickly and to produce Predator 
pilots and sensor operators on a larger scale.    
38
Like Big Safari, however, General Atomics’ strategy for aircraft development was to 
sacrifice configuration control to maximize innovation and minimize costs.  Both Predator and 
Reaper began as independent research and development programs funded by General Atomics, 
not government contracts.  The company’s pilots and system engineers had little incentive or 
inclination to provide Air Combat Command with the engineering data and technical support 
needed to document standardized procedures and to evaluate the system in an operational setting 
with USAF pilots and sensor operators.  The Predator had already proven its worth in the Bosnia 
War, and at the conclusion of the technology demonstration in 1996, General Atomics received a 
$23 million contract to build five aircraft in addition to the five systems produced during the 
demonstration for $31.7 million.
 
39
                                               
37               
 
  It was never the function or the intention of the engineers and 
38          
39                
 Unlike a traditional USAF program, the purpose of the congressionally mandated “operational test” for 
the Predator was not to support or discourage a “production decision” to buy additional aircraft.    
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pilots working for General Atomics to determine how best to employ the aircraft and document 
their findings for a third party.  Their objective was to take advantage of the reduced reliability 
requirements of an unoccupied aircraft, design and build a system optimized for maximum 
endurance, and then “figure out how to use it as we go with the user.”40
The professional chasm between civilian and military pilots also impaired the 
standardization and documentation of procedures.  General Atomics’ chief pilot, a former 
employee of Leading Systems and fabled pilot of remote control aircraft, hired and trained only 
two former military pilots for the first five years of the Predator program.
  When prototypes 
showed promise, customers could pay for system upgrades.  As manufacturer of the Predator, 
General Atomics’ priority was not to create standardized training programs or employment 
procedures for a community of military pilots.  These were the responsibilities of Air Combat 
Command.  Members of the small company incorporated their knowledge and improvements to 
the system into the machine, not on pieces of paper in the form of the military’s technical orders 
and checklists.  
41  General Atomics 
also did not hire sensor operators and used the company’s junior pilots to accomplish the 
seemingly mundane task of pointing the sensor ball.42  A vast majority of the company’s 
operators started out as recent college graduates and general aviation enthusiasts who flew light 
aircraft from local airports in southern California.43  Under the chief’s personal tutelage, their 
training often lasted more than a year, and his program emphasized basic flight and the rapid 
testing and integration of the evolving elements of the aircraft and finicky ground control station, 
not the incorporation of combat tactics or the retraining of experienced military pilots.  The 
distinct priorities and backgrounds within the Predator’s flying circle exasperated the civilian 
pilots’ disdain for the military’s technical orders and the ignorance of the USAF’s Predator 
pilots, which Air Combat Command certified to operate the aircraft after only four months of 
training and a few dozen takeoff and landings.44
                                                                                                                                                       
             
       
  The relationship between the general aviation 
pilots from General Atomics and the military pilots in the command was antagonistic at best, and 
40 Unattributed interviews with General Atomics engineers.  
41 Unattributed interviews with General Atomics pilots and Predator pilots. 
42 Unattributed interviews with General Atomics pilots. 
43 Unattributed interviews with General Atomics pilots and Predator pilots. 
44 Unattributed interviews with General Atomics pilots. 
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the professional strain between the two groups negatively affected the ability of military pilots to 
interact with and learn from the Predator’s most experienced and proficient operators.  
Most of the General Atomics’ pilots openly despised Air Combat Command’s desire for 
standardized procedures and the command’s pilots, who called themselves “air vehicle 
operators” and not “pilots.”  Many in Air Combat Command did not think the people flying the 
Predator were pilots despite the command’s policy of only allowing pilots to fly the aircraft.  
Pilot certification had been a prerequisite for Predator operations throughout the history of the 
program.  The impetus for Predator stemmed from unrest in the former Yugoslavia and an urgent 
request from the White House to find the Serbian mortars shelling Sarajevo.45  To get to Bosnia, 
the Predator aircraft needed to fly through Europe’s controlled airspace with other military and 
civilian aircraft.  Consequently, the Navy required members of the Army intelligence battalion 
flying Predator to have a pilot certificate issued by the Federal Aviation Administration.46  Air 
Combat Command also made it a requirement for certified pilots to fly the aircraft because of the 
recent cancellation of the Army’s “Hunter” RPA.  The Army Chief of Staff abandoned the 
Hunter program in 1995 after a series of crashes and the successful performance of the slightly 
larger Predator in combat.47  Critics of the Hunter program said the Army intelligence officers 
who managed the daily operation of the aircraft treated it like a “flying truck” with little regard 
for flight standardization, training, or safety.48  The commander of Air Combat Command 
wanted to give Predator operations the same attention and professionalism accorded occupied 
aircraft, so he decided only experienced pilots and navigators should fly the RPA.49
Once the experienced pilots and navigators arrived in the 11th Reconnaissance Squadron, 
their duty title was under the purview of the squadron commander, who decided to call himself 
and his subordinates “air vehicle operators,” not pilots.
   
50
                                               
45 Rosenwasser, “Governance Structure and Weapon Innovation,” 186. 
  Many in Air Combat Command felt the 
term “pilot” was inappropriate because USAF regulations stated “duty titles must show the 
46 Ehrhard, “Unmanned aerial vehicles in the United States armed services,” 539, Note 1380. 
47 Rosenwasser, “Governance Structure and Weapon Innovation,” 228; Ehrhard, “Unmanned aerial vehicles in the 
United States armed services,” 535. 
48 Ehrhard, “Unmanned aerial vehicles in the United States armed services,” 537. 
49 The commander of Air Combat Command said “takeoffs must equal landings” and rated officers were “the best 
way to ensure that outcome for the time being."           
      
50 Ibid., 15; The first commander of the 11th Reconnaissance Squadron was an F-4G Phantom weapon systems 
officer.  Houston R. Cantwell, “Beyond Butterflies: Predator and the Evolution of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle in Air 
Force Culture” (Air University School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 2007), 80. 
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actual job members perform” and “describe the specific jobs” rather than an officer’s specialty.51  
The commander of the 11th Reconnaissance Squadron thought the term “operator” was more 
descriptive than “pilot” because they were not onboard the aircraft and they monitored systems 
more than flew the plane.  To the commander, the need for the pilot to launch and recover the 
Predator under manual control was a temporary inconvenience.  It was a liability unique to the 
Predator and not representative of “modern” unoccupied systems, like the RQ-4 Global Hawk 
and RQ-3 Darkstar.52
Although Predator pilots acknowledged flying skills were necessary to employ the 
aircraft, the USAF did not give them credit for exercising those skills, which adversely affected 
the quality and extent of their work.  Air Combat Command’s Director of Operations had the 
responsibility for publishing the training and employment standards for Predator, and his staff 
spent two years coordinating their approval because of disputes over the terms “aircrew” and 
“mission crew.”
  The commander expected subsequent systems to require human 
intervention only in case of emergency, traffic, weather, or threat.  Most Predator pilots 
programmed the aircraft’s autopilot to fly the aircraft autonomously after takeoff and rarely 
touched the stick or throttle after the aircraft leveled off at altitude.  Predator pilots monitored the 
aircraft from a computer console on the ground, and when flying Predator, the pilots in the 11th 
Reconnaissance Squadron did not think of themselves or General Atomics’ pilots as true pilots.     
53  The personnel operating a UAV and its sensors were not in the air, and this 
distinction was important because “aircrew” accrued credit to receive a monthly stipend called 
“flight pay” for the rest of their careers and “crew” did not.  “Flight pay” or “aviation career 
incentive pay” was a tool created by Congress to discourage the USAF from repeatedly 
appointing highly trained pilots and navigators to non-flying staff and support duties.54  The Air 
Force Judge Advocate General did not consider a tour in the 11th Reconnaissance Squadron a 
flying assignment, however, because air vehicle operators did not participate in “aerial flight,” 
which an Executive Order in 1964 defined as “flight in an aircraft.”55
                                               
51                  
    
  Predictably, Air Combat 
52               
 
53               
                
        
54 Keith E. Tobin, “Piloting the USAF’s UAV Fleet: Pilots, Non-Rated Officers, Enlisted, or Contractors?” (Air 
University School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 1999), 43. 
55 Ibid., 44. 
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Command had difficulty attracting volunteers to leave their airframes and jeopardize their 
careers to fly Predator.  To reduce the negative effects the duty assignment could have on a 
pilot’s bank account and career progression, the command shortened tours from three to two 
years and gave volunteers their base of choice for their next assignment.56
Prior to 2001, the vast majority of the twenty pilots in Predator squadrons were 
“voluntold” to become unmanned aerial vehicle operators and saw themselves as part of a “leper 
colony” isolated from their peers at an auxiliary airfield in the United States or on austere bases 
in the Balkans and the Middle East.
   
57  During their short assignments, the officers depended 
upon “WOM” from instructor pilots in the squadron, “Kabuki” procedures from General 
Atomics they did not understand, and their own hands-on experience with the system to employ 
the aircraft safely.58
Air Combat Command’s policies exasperated the pilots’ ignorance and seemingly 
lackadaisical attitude.  Shortly after transferring the Predator ACTD from Arizona to Nevada, the 
command used contractors to develop courseware for their pilots’ initial training and to 
supplement the in-flight instruction provided by the 11th Reconnaissance Squadron’s own 
instructor pilots.  By all accounts, the small group of retired radar-intercept operators for the     
F-14 Tomcat performed admirably until 1999.  That year, their company, Battlespace, Inc., lost 
the Predator’s training contract to British Aerospace Engineering, which did not hire a single 
pilot from Battlespace to build a new instructor corps.
  Most had little interest in becoming permanent fixtures in the program, 
bided their time until they could leave, and learned enough about the system to get by.   
59
                                               
56 Cantwell, “Beyond Butterflies: Predator and the Evolution of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle in Air Force Culture,” 95. 
  Air Combat Command and the new 
company effectively dismissed the most knowledgeable pilots in the Predator community and 
started to build the new contractor’s experience with the system from scratch.  The command 
also forced the 11th Reconnaissance Squadron to train with the outdated ACTD systems until 
2000 while they waited for the verification and validation of technical orders, aircraft manuals, 
and checklists for the baseline Predator.  Staff members in Air Combat Command thought the 
technical documents were a prerequisite for the development of operations and training 
57 Unattributed interviews of Predator pilots and sensor operators.  Members of the 11th Reconnaissance Squadron 
posted a “Leper Colony” sign above the entrance to their squadron at Indian Springs Air Force Auxiliary Field.  
Rosenwasser, “Governance Structure and Weapon Innovation,” 282. 
58 Unattributed interviews with Predator pilots and sensor operators.  “WOM” stands for “word of mouth,” which 
was the name Predator pilots and sensor operators used to describe procedures, limitations, and rules of thumb that 
were not supported by written documentation.           
             
59 Unattributed interviews with Predator pilots. 
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programs, and the 11th Reconnaissance Squadron did not fly the most up-to-date system to “keep 
the pressure” on General Atomics in an attempt to force the manufacturer to improve the 
provisional manuals and checklists for the system.60
Air Combat Command’s strategy to coerce General Atomics to produce the documents 
did not work.  The USAF had already paid for and accepted the baseline system, and the 
technical data the command wanted was not available until May 2000, seventeen months after 
General Atomics delivered the baseline aircraft and ground control station to the USAF.  During 
the delay, the baseline configuration quickly became obsolete as Big Safari and General Atomics 
engineers responded to numerous urgent requests from combatant commanders in Europe to 
modify the system for Operation Allied Force.  By the start of the Kosovo War, General Atomics 
had built only six complete Predator systems for the USAF, the sixth being the baseline 
configuration delivered in January 1999.
  
61  Shortly after the start of Operations Allied Force in 
March, the commander of Air Combat Command supported four “quick reaction capabilities” for 
the Predator program.62  Working closely with General Atomics, Big Safari developed, tested, 
and delivered the altered systems to the Balkans in less than thirty-seven days each, and these 
alterations included modifications to the first baseline aircraft. The most comprehensive change 
replaced the Predator’s sensor ball with one containing a laser designator in a little over a month, 
a monumental feat for the engineers from Big Safari, General Atomics, and Raytheon, which 
was the manufacturer of the sensor ball under development for two Navy helicopters.63  Air 
Combat Command refused to allow its pilots in the 11th Reconnaissance Squadron to fly the 
aircraft, however, because of the lack of approved documentation and procedures for what staff 
officers in the command called a “science project.”64
                                               
60             f 
            
               
        
  With an F-15E Strike Eagle crew looking 
over their shoulder, pilots from Big Safari and General Atomics—not line Pilots from the 11th 
Reconnaissance Squadron—flew the modified Predator over Kosovo.  After the war, Air Combat 
Command ordered the removal of the new sensor ball and associated equipment in preparation 
for the program’s official evaluation by the Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center in 
61             
62 Ibid., 145. 
63 Frisbee, “Weaponizing the Predator UAV: Toward a New Theory of Weapon System Innovation,” 60. 
64 Unattributed interviews with project managers, Predator pilots, and staff officers. 
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October 2000.65
In contrast to their military peers, the Predator pilots for General Atomics did not see 
their line of work as a temporary penance.  Many felt fortunate to have a job in the tepid aviation 
industry of the 1990s and proudly flew the aircraft.  After the initial success of the Predator, 
General Atomics advertised the system as a “real airplane operated by real pilots.”
  In the meantime, members of the 11th Reconnaissance Squadron missed another 
one of many opportunities to gain experience employing the most current version of the aircraft 
and to participate in its development.   
66  To them, 
their pilots flew the aircraft “vicariously though a nose camera” with “conventional cockpit 
controls” and “the real world displayed in the ground control station.”67  General Atomics’ pilots, 
most with engineering backgrounds, were some of the most experienced remote control pilots in 
the country.  With positive attitudes and significantly more experience flying and testing the 
system, they felt they were better than their military peers, and a rivalry developed between the 
two groups.  Upon meeting an “unmanned vehicle operator” from the 11th Reconnaissance 
Squadron, a typical General Atomics pilot might ask, “So what sin did you commit?” or “Who’s 
Cheerios did you piss in?”68  In return, the military pilot might annoy the civilian with an only 
slightly exaggerated indifference, “Why do you care if we crash?  Your company will just build 
another one.”69  Pilots from General Atomics felt they knew how to operate the Predator better 
than anyone did, and their “biggest frustration” was passing their knowledge to USAF pilots, 
who seemed disinterested in forming a core of knowledgeable practitioners of remote flight.70
Despite the tendency of Predator workstations to lock up and the need to diagnose routine 
system malfunctions, the relationships among General Atomics and USAF operators were not 
functional enough to share knowledge with formal documentation or to standardize 
troubleshooting procedures              
         .
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65 Rosenwasser, “Governance Structure and Weapon Innovation,” 354, 355. 
  General 
66 Larry L. Ernst, “Predator: Our Experience in Bosnia Using UAVs in Combat,” Proceedings of SPIE: the 
international society for optical engineering 2829 (1996): 137. 
67 Larry L. Ernst, “Predator Update,” Proceedings of SPIE: the international society for optical engineering 3128 
(1997): 57. 
68 Unattributed interviews with General Atomics pilots and Predator pilots. 
69 Unattributed interviews with General Atomics pilots and Predator pilots. 
70 Unattributed interview with General Atomics pilot. 
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Atomics’ pilots were familiar with how to overcome these problems and make the system work, 
but they were not interested in attempting to translate what they knew into nominal checklists.  
Unfamiliar with “technical orders,” the chief pilot and his subordinates thought the military’s 
standards for flight manuals and numbered checklists were “horrible” and wanted nothing to do 
with them.72  They used their own checklists instead, which they created for a Predator pilot with 
a high level of proficiency and systems knowledge, not for sensor operators fresh out of imagery-
analyst school or for pilots transitioning from an occupied aircraft.  Only eight pages long, the 
abbreviated checklist was a bulleted “memory jogger” that did not describe the procedures to 
execute specific tasks or to troubleshoot an apparent malfunction.73  The USAF’s operations 
manuals and checklists eventually did incorporate menu selections and other details necessary to 
perform nominal mission tasks and to analyze system failures, but the documents were also 
orders of magnitude longer and were rife with errors.  During the service’s test of the baseline 
system in October 2000, the USAF’s test pilots identified 128 mistakes in the products in just 
nine days of flight operations.74  Many of the drawings in the operations manual were blatantly 
incorrect and General Atomics printed the flight checklist on full sheets of paper.  Pilots from 
General Atomics refused to improve or fly with the USAF’s cumbersome and outdated checklist 
until 2002, when they “submitted to what the customer wanted” and took an active role in the 
production of the documents.75
The reluctance of General Atomics’ pilots to codify technical descriptions of Predator 
and the isolation of USAF operators from the system reflected and shaped the dysfunctional 
social relationships among Predator operators.  Early in the Predator program, all Predator pilots 
in Air Combat Command were experienced pilots in occupied aircraft, but they knew little of 
Predator, and knowledge of the system was critical for the successful employment of the aircraft.  
Personal instruction and experience flying Predator were essential to success because the 
organization of the workstation was not intuitive for traditional pilots.  The nature of remote 
flight and the emphasis on development and weight reduction added layers of hidden 
computations and complexity to Predator operations, but social and professional barriers 
  
                                                                                                                                                       
             
   
72 Unattributed interviews with General Atomics pilots and Predator pilots. 
73 Unattributed interviews with Predator pilots. 
74               
        
75 Unattributed interviews with General Atomics pilots. 
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prevented military and civilian operators from working cooperatively to create nominal 
procedures for inexperienced operators to understand how the components and tools of Predator 
worked together.  Predator pilots and sensor operators needed to understand how aspects of the 
design constrained performance—not just to develop motor skills and to interpret displays, but to 
recognize when components of the system were not working optimally, to determine how to 
reconfigure tasks and the system to accomplish a mission, and to develop procedures for 
repeatable and consistent performances.  The ignorance of Predator operators negatively affected 
individual and group performance, and it exasperated the isolation of Predator crews and the 
resignation of Predator pilots, who were the human component of Predator with the highest 
power and status to restructure the system and to distribute knowledge among the community.  
Only after the horrors of 9/11 were Predator operators compelled to build and maintain 
constructive social relationships among one another.      
The Evolution of Predator’s HUD 
The terrorist attacks against the United States in 2001 and the important role Predator 
played in the prosecution of the War on Terrorism eased the tensions among the operators and 
engineers of General Atomics, Big Safari, and Air Combat Command, and the events exemplify 
how the security environment can influence social relationships.  Social relationships and the 
familiar tools of occupied aircraft also shaped the tasks operators accomplished when flying 
RPA missions, and one example of how social forces, prior practices, and the Cold War could 
influence the tools and cognitive tasks of RPA operators is the evolution of the Predator’s HUD.   
The struggle to develop a standard HUD for Predator exemplifies how engineers and 
operators negotiated the construction and employment of tools used to conduct remote flight and 
how they adapted techniques used to design occupied aircraft to the design of RPA.  Although 
this section describes the development of Predator’s HUD, one could tell a similar story about 
how social forces and the security environment could transform RPA operations by describing 
the evolution of the Predator’s stick and throttle quadrant, its moving map displays, or its Ku-
antenna assembly.  Development of these and other subsystems during the Predator and Reaper 
programs were similar in many respects.  To provide combatant commanders with a military 
capability quickly, system engineers worked closely with company pilots to find an “80% 
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solution” for an operational need in a matter of weeks or months.76
In 1987, Abe Karem and his engineers from Leading Systems designed a simple and 
expedient HUD to display basic flight information for a pilot by embedding telemetry data in 
images from Amber’s electro-optical camera.
  USAF operators, concerned 
with employing the aircraft in combat, often found it difficult to adapt to the engineers’ solution, 
which seemed disjointed from prior experiences and military practices.  Eventually, General 
Atomics engineers, RPA operators, and program managers negotiated an alternative solution to 
the problem, but well after the identification of more pressing needs, years of adequate 
performance, and a greater understanding of the technologies associated with remote flight.  In 
many cases, engineers and operators designed and constructed subsystems using techniques 
tailored for occupied aircraft before they negotiated alternative solutions to address issues unique 
to remote air warfare.  How Predator crews flew missions was contingent upon history and prior 
engineering practices.  In the case of the HUD, it took over a decade for engineers and operators 
to transform knowledge of how Predator operators interpreted images from the aircraft and 
sensor ball into a HUD that improved Predator pilots’ ability to fly armed combat missions. 
77  Predator used a slightly modified version of the 
same design until 2006.78
 
  Predator’s first HUD, later called the “legacy” HUD, blinked the 
aircraft’s angle of attack, airspeed, vertical speed, engine performance, and altitude in columns 
of highlighted numbers overlaying video from the nose camera (see figure 3.1).  Ostensibly, 
Predator pilots could observe the rate of change of these flight variables by noting the vertical 
position, movement, and color of each cell when looking at the center of the screen.  Normal cell 
values were green and generally in the middle of the display.  Abnormal values became yellow 
and then red as the numbers progress up or down to the edge of the pilot’s screen.  The “legacy 
HUD” also had a virtual magnetic compass at the bottom of the monitor, an orange line 
conforming to the horizon, and a purple cross denoting the longitudinal axis of the aircraft.  
 
                                               
76 Unattributed interviews with Big Safari and General Atomics engineers. 
77 Unattributed interview with General Atomics engineer. 
78 Unattributed interviews with Predator and Reaper pilots. 
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Fig. 3.1. Predator’s “Legacy” HUD.  This picture is from an early Predator simulator, not a 
ground control station.  The background is a virtual scene from the day-television camera on 
Predator’s nose.  (Adapted from a briefing by Steve Harbour, Chairman of the Flight Symbology 
Development Group, for the group’s annual “all-hands” conference 26-27 May 2008, slide 22) 
As a primary flight reference, the Predator’s HUD was unlike anything military or 
general aviation pilots had ever seen and they complained that the blinking blocks of bright color 
obscured their view of the scene from the nose camera.79
Origins of the military HUD and the projection of distant virtual images and flight 
information within the pilot’s view trace back to the “reflector gun sight,” which projected the 
image of a gun reticle onto a half-silvered mirror in front of fighter pilots in the 1920s.
  The legacy HUD did not comply with 
military standards for a primary flight reference, a display with all the required information for 
flight, and the Navy contracted with General Atomics to design a new HUD in 1997 to meet the 
requirements of a primary flight display and to facilitate pilots’ transition to the aircraft.   
80
                                               
79 Pilots of occupied aircraft had similar complaints.  Daniel J. Weintraub and Michael Ensing, Human Factors 
Issues in Head-Up Display Design: The Book of the HUD (Dayton, OH: Crew System Ergonomics Information 
Analysis Center, May 1992), 51. 
  The 
HUD is a derivative of the virtual gun sight, but in addition to aiming weapons, a HUD can 
display flight information and project virtual objects conforming to the horizon, the flight path of 
an aircraft, or the trajectory of a selected weapon.  Pilots in the US military first employed a 
80 D. N. Jarrett, Cockpit Engineering (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Pub., 2005), 189. 
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HUD on the Navy’s A-7 Corsair II in the 1960s.  Without having to shift their gaze and focus on 
instruments in the cockpit, pilots looking through the Corsair’s HUD could focus on North 
Vietnamese targets and avoid ground obstructions while maintaining the precise flight 
parameters necessary for an accurate weapons engagement.  Pilots using the HUD could keep 
their head up, and the device became a common fixture in fighter cockpits after the Vietnam 
War.  In 1984, the Department of Defense established standard specifications for the symbols 
and text of the military HUD to slow the proliferation of aircraft-specific designs, to facilitate 
training, and to mitigate the potential for misinterpretations.81
General Atomics began work on a new design for the Predator HUD in 1997.  The year 
prior, the Department of Defense published its second revision of HUD standards, and the 
company’s engineers and pilots endeavored to comply with it “to the letter” with a few 
exceptions unique to the unarmed Predator.
   
82  In May 2000, General Atomics started ground and 
flight tests with the improved HUD or “I-HUD,” and in February 2001, the company published 
an endorsement package for the new display.83  The “primary flight reference” for any USAF 
aircraft providing pilots with flight information had to complete an endorsement process prior to 
adoption, and after receiving General Atomics’ submittal of the I-HUD, representatives from the 
Air Force Research Laboratory attempted to observe the performance of the display.  
Unfortunately, the lab’s assessment group was unable to obtain access to an aircraft and ground 
control station for testing until 2003 because of combat deployments and weapons testing.84  In 
2000, Big Safari began Air Combat Command’s initiative to arm the Predator with AGM-114K 
Hellfire missiles and a new sensor ball for target illumination.85  The high priority effort utilized 
the only system available for rapid integration and testing, and the I-HUD made no 
accommodation for the employment of weapons.86  General Atomics engineers made simple 
adjustments to the legacy HUD instead of the unproven I-HUD for missile cues.87
                                               
81 The Department of Defense published the required standard characteristics of a flight HUD in Military-Standard 
1787, Department of Defense Interface Standard: Aircraft Display Symbology, 1984. 
  The 
82 Unattributed interview with General Atomics pilot. 
83 Unattributed interviews with Predator pilots. 
84 Billy G. Combs, “Flight Symbology Development Group Recommendations for Primary Flight Reference 
Endorsement of the Improved Head-Up Display (I-HUD) in the Ground Control Station for the RQ-1 Predator 
Remotely Operated Aircraft” (Chief, Joint Program Office, October 31, 2003), 3. 
85               
 
86 Other Predator systems were training with the 11th Reconnaissance Squadron in Nevada, flying over Afghanistan 
in search of Osama bin Laden, and enforcing the southern no-fly zone over Iraq.   
87 Interview with General Atomics pilot. 
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assessment group finally obtained access to a system for I-HUD tests in 2003, but a blizzard 
grounded the fleet during their visit.  After watching recent recordings of I-HUD trials and 
talking with operators from General Atomics and Big Safari, the Flight Symbology Development 
Group endorsed the I-HUD as a primary flight reference for surveillance and reconnaissance 
missions in a memorandum to the Air Force Flight Standards Agency in October 2003.88
Almost immediately after exposing the new display to Predator and Reaper pilots in Air 
Combat Command, General Atomics and Big Safari received complaints and deficiency reports 
for the cluttered I-HUD.
  
General Atomics did not field the I-HUD for several more years, however, to make 
modifications of the original I-HUD design and to incorporate changes demanded by Air Combat 
Command’s test pilots at Creech Air Force Base.  In 2006, almost a decade after General 
Atomics’ original contract to modify the legacy HUD, the company completed the distribution of 
the software necessary to drive the display.  
89  Too many symbols and lines obstructed the pilots’ only view of the 
world outside the aircraft and critical information was often difficult to distinguish from the 
background scene (see figure 3.2).  Other than the analog displays at the top of the screen and a 
few other indicators, the I-HUD resembled the HUD for the F-16 Fighting Falcon, which the 
USAF developed in concert with the military’s HUD standards.90
 
  Like the I-HUD, the Viper’s 
HUD had moving airspeed and altitude “tapes” on each side of its HUD so pilots could 
immediately observe altitude and airspeed trends as the pilot flew along terrain contours and 
below the coverage of Soviet radar systems.   
                                               
88 Combs, “Memorandum for Air Force Flight Standards Agency Executive Officer,” 3. 
89 Interview with Predator and Reaper pilot. 
90 Military-Standard 1787, Department of Defense Interface Standard: Aircraft Display Symbology. 
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Fig. 3.2. Predator and Reaper’s I-HUD.  This picture is from a PowerPoint briefing and is not an 
actual picture of an I-HUD.  The background is a simulated view from the day-television camera 
on Predator or Reaper’s nose.             
             
       
By 2006, pilots typically flew the Predator and Reaper at a constant altitude, and once the 
aircraft was safely off the ground, Predator and Reaper pilots overlaid the symbols of the HUD 
on top of video from the sensor ball, not the nose camera.  The changes in altitude and airspeed 
of a surveillance aircraft on a benign flight path were negligible compared to a strike aircraft 
penetrating enemy airspace at low altitude,           
               
           especially near 
the middle of the screen, so programmers widened the distance between the airspeed and altitude 
indicators and gave pilots the option to “declutter” the HUD (see Figure 3.3).91
                                               
91 Unattributed interviews with Predator and Reaper pilots. 
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Fig. 3.3. “Decluttered” I-HUD.  This image of the I-HUD has a background from the sensor 
ball’s day-television camera.  (Adapted from video recorded by the pilot’s workstation for a 
training mission on the second day of observations in the 29th Attack Squadron) 
Compared to the observation of the world from the nose of the aircraft, the ability of 
Predator and Reaper pilots to project a representation of the world on top of the redundant scene 
from the sensor ball changed how pilots flew the aircraft and how the crew found objects and 
identified targets.            
                       
                 
                  
                 
                    
            .92
                                               
92 The consensus of human factors engineers was that         
                   The 
sentiment was true with Reaper to a degree.  Pilots trained themselves not to assimilate the HUD and sensor video at 
the same time because the alternative was disorienting and made them sick.      
r                  
p                    
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distributed the component tasks used to accomplish a mission, allowed the crew to identify 
objects in the HUD in parallel, and increased the redundancy and robustness of the system.  The 
crew’s reorganization of the task increased lethality and saved innocent lives. 
 The I-HUD and the layering of video and sensor telemetry from the sensor ball 
reorganized the behavior of Predator crews and improved the system’s effectiveness, but 
Predator pilots complained that some critical data, like the current altitude and airspeed, were 
difficult to interpret.  The legacy HUD for Amber and Predator was the first multi-colored HUD 
in aviation, and the engineers from Leading Systems used bright colors to create contrast 
between the HUD’s virtual objects and video from the nose camera.  Early iterations of the I-
HUD also used bright red and green highlights as a background for a few select flight variables, 
like airspeed and altitude, but pilots found the backlit numbers hard to read.  After programmers 
removed the blocks of bright color to create the final version of the I-HUD, the light green 
numbers indicating airspeed and altitude were indistinguishable from various backgrounds from 
the day-television camera.   Pilots could change the color or shade of the I-HUD’s symbols, but 
colorful and complex views of the ground obscured the flight information.  Using the familiar 
green symbols of a traditional HUD, Predator and Reaper pilots and engineers had difficulty 
balancing the desire for clear and understandable flight instruments and the need for an 
unobstructed view of the target area. 
 Maintaining symbol clarity without overly masking a pilot’s view of the world was not a 
new problem in the aviation industry, but many of the techniques and standards that worked well 
for occupied aircraft did not translate well to Predator and Reaper.  One of the engineering 
challenges of building a HUD in an occupied aircraft was creating the appropriate amount of 
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contrast between the HUD’s symbols and the objects in a pilot’s view while he or she flew in a 
wide range of environmental conditions.  Symbols projected in front of the pilot needed to be 
bright enough to see against sunlit clouds but not so bright that they could ruin a pilot’s night 
vision. For occupied aircraft, cockpit engineers used powerful cathode-ray-tube (CRT) projectors 
to produce images with high luminance, fine symbol width, and dimming range of at least 10,000 
to one.93
Despite the inability of Predator pilots to alter the relative brightness of HUD symbols, 
the Predator and Reaper’s HUD had one characteristic others did not—color.  Displays in 
occupied aircraft had to account for illumination from the sun, which could reflect off the HUD’s 
projector onto the combiner glass and into the pilot’s eyes.  To mitigate glare from the sun, 
occupied aircraft used monochromatic CRT projectors, a narrowband phosphor, anti-reflection 
coatings, and holographic combiner to ensure the device only emitted or reflected one color: 
yellow-green.
  Depending upon the weather or time of day, pilots in an occupied aircraft could change 
the brightness of the HUD’s symbols with a dimmer switch or the aircraft could adjust the HUD 
automatically with illumination sensors in front of the cockpit.  For the Predator and Reaper, the 
iris of the selected camera and the workstation’s commercial-grade LCD and CRT monitors 
controlled the brightness of a scene for the pilot, and unlike a projected HUD, Predator and 
Reaper pilots could not alter the luminance of their HUD symbols in isolation from the rest of 
the HUD video.  When embedding flight information into a video scene, General Atomics’ pilots 
and engineers could not appreciably adjust the interpretability of the HUD by altering the 
display’s brightness.  
94
As General Atomics fielded the I-HUD, the company’s employees began to work on a 
new HUD they called the “Advanced HUD” or “AHUD” (see figure 3.4).  Originally scheduled 
for December 2007, General Atomics did not complete the software update for the AHUD until 
  Sitting in a dark ground control station, the color palate of Predator and Reaper 
pilots was not constrained by the rays of the sun.  They could reduce glare from ambient light by 
turning off the station’s interior lights and by regulating when the station’s doors opened.  The 
controlled environment of the ground control station enabled Predator engineers and operators to 
use more than one color, or the absence of color, to create contrast between the HUD’s symbols 
and the sensor ball’s view of the world.   
                                               
93 Jarrett, Cockpit Engineering, 192, 201. 
94 Weintraub and Ensing, Human Factors Issues in Head-Up Display Design: The Book of the HUD, 53. 
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the summer of 2010, reportedly because of efforts to support the surge for the Global War on 
Terrorism.95
 
  Like the I-HUD, the AHUD tried to reduce the number of obstructions in the center 
of the screen and gave pilots the option to “declutter” their displays.  The AHUD improved a 
pilot’s view of the ground, however, because its designers abandoned light green as the dominant 
color, reduced the thickness of the I-HUD’s symbols, and outlined flight information in black.  
Pilots also had the option to draw the aircraft’s altitude, airspeed, and other flight data closer to 
the forefront by backing the data with “black tape,” which contrasted the numbers against the 
smooth background images of the infrared sensor and the “cluttered” scenes from the day-
television camera.   
Fig. 3.4. Predator’s AHUD.  The background scene was from the sensor ball’s infrared camera.  
               
             
Situated in the controlled environment of the ground control station, Predator and Reaper 
pilots did not alter the luminance of the system’s instruments or rigidly control the hue of its 
displays to improve the interpretability of flight information.  They used color and the absence of 
color to distinguish HUD elements from each other and to put HUD objects in a virtual relief 
                                               
95 Reaper will get the AHUD in 2012.  Unattributed interview with Predator pilot. 
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with scenes from any one of Predator’s six cameras.  Predator cockpits were not constrained by 
the wide-ranging environments of an occupied aircraft nor were they configured to penetrate 
Soviet-era air defenses protecting Eastern Europe.  Predator pilots could use the ground control 
station as a tool to construct a dark and controlled environment and to create contrast between 
the display and its surroundings.  In turn, video from the sensor ball, telemetry from the aircraft, 
and conformal symbols from the HUD transformed each other to form the pilots’ perspective of 
the world below and in front of the aircraft.  The I-HUD’s dependence upon a bright green to 
distinguish itself from the background scene was a solution to a technical problem that no longer 
existed, and the embossed symbols of the AHUD were examples of the “evolution of 
representation” over time and context and from one domain to another.96  Creating depth with the 
HUD by putting flight data lightly in the foreground helped pilots feel like they were looking 
“in” the display instead of searching for objects “on” their screens, and the duplication of video 
from the sensor operator’s HUD distributed the processes Predator crews used explore a scene 
and to guide weapons to a target.97
Building a Network and the Transformation of the Predator Crew 
  Overcoming the limitations of displays for occupied aircraft 
developed during the Cold War, Predator operators used tools and representations to create an 
environment that helped pilots and sensor operators enter into a scene together and investigate 
the world as a team. 
A decade after the end of the Cold War, military requirements to penetrate Soviet air 
defenses at low altitude shaped the color and design of Predator’s airspeed and altitude 
indicators.  Similarly, high altitude aircraft used to conduct strategic reconnaissance over the 
Soviet Union influenced the design and organization of tasks in the ground control station.  Like 
a pilot flying high in the stratosphere, early Predator crews shut themselves in a metal container 
with little ability to communicate with the outside world.  With only a few phone lines and a 
couple of line-of-sight radios, Predator crews in Bosnia carried all the knowledge they had about 
a mission with them into the ground control station, and although sensor operators used maps, 
pictures, and coordinates of targets to identify them in scenes from the sensor ball, Predator 
crews only collected and distributed data.  They did not participate in the analysis and integration 
of the information they gathered.   
                                               
96 E. Hutchins, Cognition in the Wild (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), 152. 
97 The Predator and Reaper operators I observed said they looked “in” or “into” the HUD or told others to look “in” 
or “into” the HUD.   
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By the end of the Balkans conflicts, however, Predator operators began to communicate 
with aircraft and ground forces near the RPA and to build a network of people and tools used to 
accomplish missions.  The final section of this chapter describes how Predator squadrons 
extended and contracted the human and machine elements of Predator and Reaper to reorganize 
the distribution of tasks among RPA crewmembers, to transform the missions of the weapon 
systems, and to influence the perception of RPA operators from people who supervise automated 
machines to military professionals who fight wars.  Predator’s growing connection to networks 
outside the system and subsequent infusion of those networks and tools inside the ground control 
station transformed the Predator crew from a passive source of data to a team that actively 
participated in the support and defense of US military personnel.  Predator operators became 
more interactive with the aircraft’s sensors, other crewmembers, and supported ground forces 
than the pilots of the occupied aircraft the USAF used as a template to orchestrate RPA 
operations—the U-2 Dragon Lady.      
The U-2 Dragon Lady and the Organization of Predator Tasks 
 When flying Predator over the Balkans and southern Iraq prior to 2001, pilots did not 
analyze video from the sensor ball and immerse themselves in images in the HUD.  Although 
ultimately responsible for mission accomplishment, the primary duty of Predator pilots was to fly 
the aircraft from target to target and to ensure the system returned to base safely, not to control 
the sensor ball or to direct the collection of imagery intelligence.  Predator pilots and sensor 
operators organized the tasks necessary to find and identify targets in ways similar to one of Air 
Combat Command’s other reconnaissance aircraft—the U-2 Dragon Lady. 
Air Combat Command’s intention was that Predator should complement the 
reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities of the U-2, and the command patterned the duties 
and responsibilities of Predator operators after the occupied aircraft.98
                                               
98                 
               
               
              
  The U-2 was a high 
altitude reconnaissance aircraft designed in the 1950s to gather signals and imagery intelligence 
on Soviet weapons systems from above the country’s extensive aircraft and missile defenses.  
Like Predator pilots, pilots in the U-2 were responsible for the safe operation of the aircraft, most 
importantly for takeoff and landing, and not for the direction of the aircraft’s sensors.  U-2 pilots 
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could not control the orientation or settings of the aircraft’s cameras, and there was no ability for 
the pilot to monitor the performance and output of the camera or other sensors from inside the 
cockpit.99  Intelligence personnel in the United States and in the combat theater planned, 
managed, and executed the collection and “exploitation” of intelligence data from the U-2 as part 
of a “distributed ground system,” or “DGS.”100  With a combination of ground, line-of-sight, and 
satellite communications techniques, intelligence analysts in the DGS pointed the U-2’s cameras 
and other sensors, analyzed the collected images and sensor data, and talked with the pilot on an 
intercommunication system.  On the way to a target and when flying from point to point, U-2 
pilots coordinated with air traffic control and other command and control agencies with the 
aircraft’s radio, but they only deviated from the preplanned flight path of the aircraft for adverse 
weather, system failures, approved alterations to the “collection deck,” and other unforeseen 
events.101
Although Predator pilots flew the aircraft from the ground, the initial design and 
operation of the system also tightly controlled their environment.  Until 2002, Predator only had 
three forms of two-way communication available to interact with people other than the crew: two 
line-of-sight radios, four phones, and personal contact with people entering through one of the 
ground control station’s two doors.           
                
                
             
            
     As a remotely piloted aircraft, the connection between 
Predator pilots and sensor operators to the plane was essential, but the ability of Predator crews 
to interact with people outside the ground control station was minimal.    
  Sitting inside a pressure suit and flying above 60,000 feet, the tasks of U-2 pilots and 
their connections to the world below them were highly constrained by the stratosphere, the 
aircraft’s light weight, and the cramped conditions of the cockpit.   
                                               
99 Unattributed interviews with Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Mission Commanders for the U-2 
Dragon Lady. 
100                
                 
             
101 Unattributed interviews with Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Mission Commanders for the U-2 
Dragon Lady. 
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A Predator pilot’s primary tasks involved flying and supervising the workstation, not 
communicating with outside agencies.  After takeoff, he or she used the stick and the aircraft’s 
airspeed and altitude autopilot to turn the plane toward the initial target area and then 
programmed the aircraft to fly from point to point autonomously.  While talking to other 
Predator crewmembers over an intercom, pilots occasionally flew the aircraft “manually” with 
the stick to put the sensor ball in a better position to observe an object.  Like U-2 pilots, Predator 
pilots also altered the aircraft’s flight path in response to ad hoc requests from commanders and 
intelligence organizations, but once at altitude,         
             
           
          .102
While the Predator pilot’s mission tasks focused on the aircraft’s flight path and the 
recognition and mitigation of system errors, finding and tracking a target was the sensor 
operator’s responsibility.  Like the U-2, manipulating the system’s sensors and analyzing the 
results was the responsibility of trained imagery analysts, but the two sensor operators on a 
Predator crew worked at workstations immediately adjacent to and behind the Predator pilot.  
Until Predator received a new sensor ball in 2002, the duty of the sensor operator to the right of 
the pilot was to control the Versatron Corporation’s model 14 “skyball,” the same sensor ball 
Karem used for Amber in the 1980s.           
             .
  Other than 
takeoff and landing, most of the pilot’s tasks involved the supervision of the Predator’s 
workstation and the manipulation of the console’s tools and displays to correct system anomalies 
and to direct the aircraft’s route of flight.  
103
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While Predator pilots supervised the finicky ground control station and sensor operators 
wrestled with the skyball, a second sensor operator ensured the crew obtained the desired views 
of the target and satisfied the intelligence needs of “the customer.”
    
105  The second sensor 
operator, also known as the “DEMPC,” was also a trained imagery analyst and enlisted 
intelligence specialist.  Like the ground personnel who directed the sensors and route of the U-2 
on a mission, the DEMPC “ran the mission” for Predator, and on rare occasions, he or she used a 
third workstation and the Predator aircraft’s synthetic aperture radar to capture images from the 
all-weather sensor.106  DEMPC stands for “data exploitation, mission planning, and 
communication,” which was the name of the workstation the DEMPC used to run the radar, to 
program the aircraft’s initial route of flight, and to type in the coordinates for the fifty to three 
hundred targets on a typical mission.107
                                               
104 Unattributed interviews with Predator sensor operators. 
  Once the DEMPC programmed the aircraft’s flight path 
for a segment of the mission, he or she sent the route to the pilot, who modified the plan as 
105 Before     took command of the 15th Reconnaissance Squadron in 2006, members of the 
Predator community called the ambiguous and sometimes unknown organizations requesting the intelligence 
support “the customer.”     led the initiative to call the organizations “the supported unit.”   
               
               
    
106 Unattributed interviews with Predator DEMPC and sensor operators. 
107 General Atomics nomenclature for the workstation was more of an intention than a demonstrated achievement.  
Despite the company’s assertions otherwise, Predator crews did not use the DEMPC workstation to exploit data, to 
plan a mission, or to communicate with systems outside the ground control station.     
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desired and sent it to the aircraft to execute as an automated flight at the desired airspeed, 
altitude, and aspect from each sequential target.  As the aircraft approached a target area, sensor 
operators selected the appropriate camera and tried to hold the skyball’s reticle steady in the 
scene from their HUD.  Using the crew’s knowledge of the area and printed pictures and maps of 
the target, DEMPCs helped sensor operators acquire and observe objects by looking over their 
shoulder and by discussing what they saw in the HUD over intercom.   For the remainder of the 
mission, DEMPCs fielded phone calls from customers and other intelligence personnel analyzing 
the Predator video.  Finding and tracking targets with Predator required fine motor skills and 
social interaction between the sensor operator and DEMPC to coordinate written, verbal, and 
pictorial representations of the target area and to resolve what they saw with their expectations.  
Like the U-2, these interactions took place on the ground, but they also occurred in the highly 
constrained environment of the ground control station, Predator’s version of the cockpit.    
Isolated in the ground control station, early Predator crews on a mission had what 
Hutchins might call a “strange relationship” with each other.108
                                               
108 Hutchins, Cognition in the Wild, 203. 
  The pilot, an officer and the 
highest-ranking individual in the group, provided only inputs to the process of finding a target, 
while the sensor operator and DEMPC, both enlisted intelligence personnel, integrated 
information from the pilot, aircraft, and others to find the target and decide whether the crew met 
mission requirements.  The point of intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance missions was 
to locate, identify, and characterize potential threats and targets, and Predator pilots did not 
participate in the identification of objects or in decision-making processes to define the 
objectives of a mission to the same extent as lower-ranking personnel in the ground control 
station.  The primary duty of Predator pilots was to monitor the flight path of the aircraft using 
the tracker’s moving map display and the aircraft’s nose camera.  Except for takeoff and landing, 
the autopilot flew the aircraft and the pilot monitored the systems needed to keep the aircraft 
airborne.  The sensor operator, DEMPC, and other intelligence personnel outside the ground 
control station integrated verbal, textual, pictorial, and geographical descriptions of objects and 
events; evaluated images from the skyball; created video descriptions of a target; and decided 
when to proceed to the next point on a route.  The lowest-ranking members of the Predator crew 
integrated information and defined mission objectives through their actions while the pilot 
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supported their efforts and monitored a machine.  The organization and structure of the tasks 
needed to find a target did not match the social hierarchy of the crew.   
The responsibilities and tasks of U-2 pilots and intelligence personnel were similar to 
those of Predator crewmembers, but U-2 pilots placed themselves at significant personal risk to 
fly in the stratosphere.109  Predator pilots flew from the ground and were never in physical 
danger.  Like landing Predator, landing the U-2 also required fine motor skills, but the 
manipulation of the U-2’s sensors did not involve the same level of physical skill and stamina as 
pointing and zooming Predator’s skyball.  Operating the skyball required skills similar to those 
needed to fly an aircraft, and Predator sensor operators touched the stick more than Predator 
pilots did.  Many pilots also considered reconnaissance and surveillance missions to be 
“peripheral” missions for the USAF, and prior to the Predator program, the USAF modified 
fighter aircraft or hung camera pods from them to collect images of mobile forces for theater 
military commanders.110  Strategic bombing and air superiority were the preeminent missions of 
the service, and the USAF often assigned the poorest performing pilots from pilot training 
classes to tactical reconnaissance squadrons, where they flew the unarmed RF-4C Phantom II 
before its retirement in 1994.111
The Mission Planning Cell and the Distribution of Predator Video 
  Given the stigma of surveillance and reconnaissance missions 
and the low status of Predator pilots among other members of the crew, it is understandable why 
some early Predator pilots felt as if the USAF treated them like lepers.  
The organization responsible for determining the overall objectives of a Predator mission 
and distributing Predator video was the “mission planning cell,” also known as the “MPC.”  
Predator squadrons created the MPC to distribute Predator video and to coordinate the efforts of 
the pilot and sensor operators inside the ground control station with commanders tasking the 
mission and the organizations and intelligence agencies receiving and analyzing Predator video.  
Not an official element of the Predator “weapon system,” the MPC was a tent connected to 
ground control stations deployed to Hungary, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kuwait, and Pakistan until 
Predator operators started to conduct combat missions from the United States in 2003 (see figure 
                                               
109 For a harrowing example of how depression sickness can incapacitate a Dragon Lady pilot, read Timothy 
Schultz, “Redefining Flight: How the Predecessors of the Modern United States Air Force Transformed the 
Relationship Between Airmen and Aircraft” (Dissertation, Duke University, 2007), 2-12. 
110 John H. Davis, “Theater Airborne Reconnaissance: A Peripheral Military Mission’s Innovation” (Dissertation, 
George Washington University, 2007), 61-65; Rosenwasser, “Governance Structure and Weapon Innovation,” 282. 
111 Unattributed interview with RF-4C Phantom II pilot. 
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3.5).112  In the tent were a few intelligence personnel and a weather forecaster who coordinated 
the objectives for the mission, planned the general route of the aircraft, and helped the crew in 
the ground control station respond to immediate requests during a sortie.113
 
  
Fig. 3.5. Ground control station and mission planning cell in Hungary in 1996.  (Adapted from 
briefing by members of the UAV Task Force Directorate, “ISR Innovations and UAV Task Force 
Directorate,” National Defense Intelligence Agency Conference, November 2008, slide 4) 
Predator squadrons created the MPC because the Department of Defense did not certify 
the Predator’s ground control station or aircraft to receive or transmit sensitive or classified 
information.  Predator was an untested and unsecure system, and intelligence personnel in the 
United States who used classified tools to analyze and distribute intelligence information could 
receive Predator video but could not communicate with Predator workstations directly or talk 
with Predator crews.  When conducting a mission, the sensor operator’s workstation converted 
video from the skyball into an NTSC video signal, embedded aircraft telemetry into the closed-
                                               
112 The MPC for the Predator ACTD’s initial deployment to the Balkans included a mobile “UAV exploitation 
segment,” or “UES.”  For subsequent deployments, a UES in the United States exploited video from the Predator.  
Air Combat Command’s “concept of operations” for Predator did not include a MPC or equivalent organization.  
                
            In late 2001 to early 2002, 
members of the Predator community started to call the MPC the “operations cell” or “ops cell.”  Unattributed 
interviews with Predator sensor operators. 
113 Deployed Predator crews tried to coordinate mission changes and requests with a secure telephone in the ground 
control station during the system’s first deployments to the Balkans but moved the phone and the responsibility to 
the MPC.               
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captioning portion of the signal, and sent it to the MPC on a coaxial cable.114
The MPC linked Predator operators, isolated in the Predator’s cockpit, to agencies 
outside the ground control station and the combat theater, and pilots and sensor operators used 
the people and tools in the cell to prepare for a mission and to gather the information necessary 
to collect video and find targets.  The day prior to a typical mission over Bosnia, Kosovo, or 
southern Iraq, intelligence personnel in the MPC obtained the target coordinates, priorities, and 
“essential elements of information” from the combined air operations center over a secure 
satellite communication network.  The MPC used the tasking from the air operations center and 
guidance from other intelligence agencies to create the “Predator target deck,” a prioritized and 
printed worksheet of fifty to three hundred intelligence targets for a mission.
  Communications 
equipment in the MPC then digitized, compressed, encrypted, and inserted the video signal into a 
secure network, which commanders and intelligence personnel could access through the Joint 
Broadcast System or with dedicated satellite terminals in Europe and the Middle East.  Other 
than the NTSC video, an “air gap” separated the Predator’s workstations and satellite 
communications equipment from external systems.  It was impossible for the MPC to pass target 
coordinates to a Predator workstation electronically, and the DEMPC needed a floppy disk to 
pass images from the aircraft’s synthetic aperture radar to the planning cell.  To respond to 
commanders’ ad hoc requests or to coordinate video analysis with intelligence personnel in the 
United States, personnel in the MPC either talked to the DEMPC over the phone or opened the 
stations’ rear door to converse face-to-face.  General Atomics’ design of the ground control 
station and military requirements for the secure transfer of information severely limited the 
ability of Predator crews to establish working relationships and social connections with the 
people using and exploiting Predator video.  
115
                                               
114 “NTSC” stands for “National Television System Committee,” which was the standard for analog television in 
North America.  Members of the Predator community called the telemetry embedded as closed captioning in the 
NTSC signal “exploitation support data.”           
                    
 
  Using 
, personnel in the MPC combined the worksheet, weather forecasts, expected threats, 
and airspace considerations to plan a general route for the aircraft and to print target area pictures 
for identification.  Immediately prior to the flight, planners in the MPC handed the printed 
worksheet, maps, and imagery to the DEMPC in the ground control station.  While flying the 
115              
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mission, intelligence personnel and backup sensor operators in the MPC watched the video from 
the day’s mission and listened to the crew’s intercom as they fielded orders and requests from 
commanders, liaison officers, and imagery analysts talking, emailing, and chatting with them 
over classified phone lines and TCP/IP networks.  The MPC coordinated, prioritized, and filtered 
the results of these conversations to the Predator crew over the phone or in person.      
Part of the discussion with the MPC over phone and chat was about where the crew 
should fly the Predator, what objects they should look for, and how they should position the 
aircraft to obtain the desired intelligence information from the aircraft’s sensors.  Similar to the 
U-2, interpreting Predator video and creating intelligence products from the data was not the 
intended responsibility of personnel inside the ground control station.  While the DEMPC could 
have cut and pasted images and edited video from his or her workstation, the DEMPC had no 
way of integrating the data with aircraft telemetry and other intelligence information.116  Instead, 
the MPC distributed the Predator video to a “UAV exploitation segment,” or “UES,” in the 
United States over various ground and satellite communication pathways.  The UES was a group 
of ten to twelve imagery analysts who created the verbal, textual, and imagery reports from the 
Predator video and passed them to intelligence customers using a technique they called 
“processing, exploitation, and dissemination.”117
Without the ability to communicate directly with the Predator crews or the aircraft’s 
sensors, analysts in the UES had difficulty producing intelligence products that were more 
informative than the raw Predator video distributed to decision-makers by the MPC.  Unlike the 
process used to create intelligence imagery and assessments with the U-2, the DGS in the United 
States did not completely control the dissemination portion of the intelligence process for 
  Depending on the intelligence needs of the 
customer, the UES analysts created 30-second clips and annotated still frames of the Predator’s 
video feed, wrote written reports for each target, and described events as they unfolded using a 
collaborative chat program or a secure telephone.  Once the mission was complete, the analysts 
posted their products on the UES’s classified web page and emailed the images and reports to the 
requesting organizations. 
                                               
116 The DEMPC could store and playback video from the sensor ball, but not while displaying the time, coordinates, 
and other exploitation support data from the video.  The DEMPC workstation also did not store or playback images 
from Predator’s synthetic aperture radar.  Predator crews had to copy desired radar images as the workstation 
received them.   
117 For a description of Predator’s video exploitation and product dissemination process with a DGS, see   
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Predator.  The MPC distributed Predator video through a combination of terrestrial and satellite 
communication nodes, and the quality of video the UES received in the United States was 
significantly less than what commanders and intelligence agencies in the theater could obtain.  
            
                
         .118  The UES in the DGS also did not 
control the “processing” portion of the intelligence process.  Predator crews positioned the 
aircraft, selected the camera, and manipulated the settings of the skyball, and the UES had to 
negotiate the desired camera angles, fields of view, and intelligence objectives of the mission 
with Predator crews through the MPC.119
Unlike other intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms, Predator and the 
MPC created a structure where commanders, imagery analysts, and others with access to secure 
networks could observe and assess video from Predator simultaneously.  The “processing, 
exploitation, and dissemination” of Predator video occurred in parallel with each other.  Predator 
and the MPC distributed the exploitation and dissemination of sensor video and transformed 
intelligence collection from a sequentially constrained process employed by the U-2 to an 
unconstrained one.  Theater commanders lauded Predator’s ability to provide full motion video 
of intelligence targets in near real time, but the delays to receive pictures and intelligence 
products from DGS were “unacceptable” given the details they could see immediately on their 
own video feeds.
  UES personnel had to coordinate the actions of 
Predator crews through the MPC and DEMPC, and the quality and responsiveness of the 
intelligence products the UES produced suffered as a result.   
120
The Integration of Predator into Air Operations 
   
Another frustration for commanders, imagery analysts, and Predator crews was that once 
they saw threatening events unfold in the Predator video, they were often powerless to do 
anything about them.  They could not link their knowledge of a situation and the information 
                                               
118                
                 
             
119 Imagery analysts in the UES called the “telephone game” they played to influence the actions of Predator crews 
“cumbersome.”                 
                
           
120 Ibid., 13-15. 
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gained from Predator video with the war fighter, someone who, with Predator’s perspective, 
could presumably respond to and eliminate a threat quickly.  From the beginning of the Predator 
program, Air Combat Command and Big Safari led initiatives to connect Predator with friendly 
combatants, specifically aircraft crews and ground forces, and to arm Predator with its own 
weapons.  More than validated checklists and detailed technical descriptions of the aircraft, the 
ability of the system to employ weapons and communicate with combatants transformed the 
tasks of Predator crews and hastened the integration of the system into USAF operations. 
Air Combat Command’s first attempt to link Predator crews with air and ground forces 
was with an aircraft radio.  In 2000, the first baseline Predator supplemented the ground control 
station’s line-of-sight radios and phones with a remotely operated radio to talk with other aircraft 
and ground controllers over the horizon.           
             
            
121  Predator squadrons obtained portable satellite-communication radios for the 
ground control station as a substitute for an aircraft radio, but the vast majority of strike aircraft 
and ground forces in the US military at the time did not have satellite-communication radios.  
During Operation Allied Force, Predator pilots tried to talk the eyes of fighter pilots onto targets 
through controllers in command and control aircraft, but Serbia’s dispersed and concealed forces 
were difficult to describe with inaccurate coordinates and words alone.  The commander of the 
United States Air Forces Europe called the relayed conversations between Predator crews and 
fighter pilots the “dialog of the deaf” and initiated a program for Predator to highlight targets by 
another method—point at them with a laser.122
Three weeks after the start of Operation Allied Force, the commander of United States 
Air Forces Europe initiated an urgent request to equip Predator with a laser to illuminate targets 
for laser-guided weapons and laser-spot trackers on strike aircraft.  Throughout the Kosovo War, 
Predator crews had the most success finding Serbian tanks and mobile artillery pieces, and 
engineers from Big Safari worked quickly to find a suitable laser for the aircraft.  In less than 
three weeks, engineers and operators from Big Safari, General Atomics, and Raytheon replaced 
the skyball with the larger AN/AAS-44, a sensor ball under development for a Navy helicopter.  
      
                                               
121 Unattributed interviews with Predator pilots and sensor operators. 
122 Cantwell, “Beyond Butterflies: Predator and the Evolution of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle in Air Force Culture,” 
25. 
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Shortly after its arrival over Kosovo, however, the war ended and the system returned to the 
United States without having supported a combat strike, but Big Safari worked closely with 
General Atomics, Raytheon, and Redstone Armory to upgrade Predator with the improved 
AN/AAS-52 sensor ball and one of the Army’s preeminent anti-tank weapons, the Hellfire 
missile.123
The initiative to arm Predator with lasers and weapons turned the RPA into a strike 
aircraft, which radically altered the tasks and social organization of the Predator crew and their 
relationship with ground forces and other aircraft operators.  Unlike Versatron’s skyball, 
Raytheon’s sensor balls were geo-stabilized, which drastically reduced the physical and mental 
stamina needed to point the camera.  Working in      
 , gimbals in the AN/AAS-44 and AN/AAS-52      
    , and the AN/AAS-52’s four cameras had video-tracking modes to 
help sensor operators keep the sensor ball’s reticle and lasers pointed at a target (see figure 3.6).  
Compared to the skyball, freezing the sensor ball’s cursors in a ground scene to search for 
objects in the HUD was easy, and most sensor operators could fly the sensor ball for an 8-hour 
shift without cramping the muscles in their hands.  The iris settings of the sensor ball’s cameras 
were also             
                   
             
  
 
Fig. 3.6. Succession of sensor balls for Predator.  (Adapted from a briefing by the Aeronautical 
Systems Center, “MQ-1/MQ-9 System Overview,” October 2003, slide 16) 
Arming Predator also altered the tasks of the Predator pilot, and the need to point Hellfire 
missiles and guide the weapons to targets with a laser elevated the tasks and social status of 
Predator crewmembers and transformed them into war fighters.        
                                               
123 Frisbee, “Weaponizing the Predator UAV: Toward a New Theory of Weapon System Innovation.” 
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            Predator pilots became 
decision-makers, and Predator’s weapons transformed Predator pilots and sensor operators into 
war fighters—Predator crews could create effects on the battlefield they could observe, evaluate, 
and adjust.  Although Predator pilots and sensor operators employed the system safely from the 
ground from what looked like a desk, weapons distinguished the tasks Predator crewmembers 
accomplished from the tasks of an office worker or a staff member.  Predator crews could kill 
people and break things, and although they were not physically at risk in the ground control 
station, they were hardly less vulnerable than F-16 pilots flying well over Iraq and Afghanistan’s 
negligible air threats.      
Tools the pilot and sensor operator used to employ weapons also altered the Predator’s 
relationship with other aircraft and facilitated its integration into USAF operations.  To guide 
weapons and point at targets, Raytheon’s sensor ball had two lasers: one to illuminate targets for 
laser-guided weapons and laser-spot trackers and the other to mark targets for pilots and soldiers 
with augmented night vision.  In Afghanistan, Predator crews could use the marker to highlight 
the positions of al Queda and the Taliban fighters for special operations forces and fighter pilots 
with night-vision goggles.   In southern Iraq, Predator crews used the designator to illuminate 
Iraq’s mobile air-defense systems for strike aircraft enforcing the no-fly zone.  Lasers 
restructured how Predator could represent and propagate the position of a target from a verbal 
description over the radio or phone to the act of pointing, which put the information in a form 
independent of Predator’s inertial navigation system.  Predator operators no longer needed to 
convert the position of the target into a coordinate system.  The sensor operator needed only to 
hold the image of the target steady under the sensor ball’s cursors and turn on the appropriate 
laser. 
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Improved accuracy and the same technology used to control Predator remotely enabled 
the system to extend the transmission of video from the sensor ball to ground forces and other 
aircraft, which distributed the collective process they used to find objects, define a threat, and 
destroy targets.  Lasers simplified the tasks Predator operators accomplished to distribute the 
position of targets to other systems.  Instead of triangulating the distance from the target to the 
aircraft, the ability of the laser to measure the range improved the performance of the aircraft’s 
inertial navigation system and doubled the accuracy of Predator’s target coordinates.  In 2002, 
Big Safari developed a quick reaction capability for Predators to pass the improved coordinates 
and video from the sensor ball directly to an AC-130 Spectre gunship.  Predators passed video to 
the Spectre using its C-band transmitters and the gunship displayed the video and coordinates on 
an LCD monitor bolted to the rear of its cabin.  Spectre crews used the coordinates and images to 
update their targeting systems and to calibrate their guns, and with a Predator leading the way, 
gunships could attack enemy compounds in Afghanistan on their first pass and not lose the 
element of surprise.  That same year, Big Safari built a portable version of the Spectre’s video 
terminal after a Warrant Officer on leave from Afghanistan asked if individual soldiers could 
receive video from Predator as well.  In two weeks, engineers in Big Safari created the first 
hand-held version of a remote video terminal for Predator, which they called ROVER II.124
The arming of the Predator with lasers for Operation Allied Force in Kosovo and Hellfire 
missiles for Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan were watershed moments in the history 
of the program, and not just because Predator crews had the ability to eliminate threats as well as 
see them.  Wartime imperatives created an environment where system components, engineers, 
ground forces, and other aircraft crewmembers demanded and expected responsive connections 
with each other to accomplish their tasks effectively.  The arming of the Predator was 
  With 
ROVER II, ground forces and terminal attack controllers could see targets from the same 
perspective as Predator crews and could discuss the images on their screens with Predator pilots 
over satellite-communications channels.  The ability of Predator crews to distribute pictorial 
representations of potential targets and discuss them with the individuals in physical danger 
improved the responsiveness of the weapon system, and Predator crews used the improved 
interactions with ground forces to build supporting relationships and feel closer to the machine.  
                                               
124 “ROVER” stands for “receive only video enhance receiver.”  Rosenwasser, “Governance Structure and Weapon 
Innovation,” 376. 
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synonymous with the integration of the system—the people, tools, and practices of the Predator 
community—into military operations.   
Remote Split Operations and Extending the Predator Network 
Ironically, the return of ground control stations from combat zones overseas to protected 
facilities in the United States also facilitated the integration of Predator into military campaigns.  
In early 2000, several talented pilots and sensor operators in Air Combat Command 
“disappeared” to work with other governmental agencies flying the Predator.125  When they 
returned a couple of years later, they led efforts in Air Combat Command to conduct “remote 
split operations.”126
Prior to 2003, the command’s concept of operations for Predator was to deploy and 
operate the system’s aircraft, ground control station, and satellite communications equipment 
from airfields as close to the combat theater as practical (see figure 3.7).
  By flying the bulk of a mission in the United States, remote split operations 
extended Predator crews’ access to intelligence networks and planning tools, expanded the role 
and capability of Predator and the MPC, and reduced the size and vulnerability of deployed 
Predator units.  
127    
               
                
            .  Ethernet 
connections to satellite-communications equipment and the remote control of the aircraft over 
Ku-Band frequencies allowed crews in a ground control station to fly Predator over the horizon, 
but the aircraft, communications equipment, and ground control station needed to be in the same 
satellite-transponder footprint.128            f 
             .129
                                               
125 Unattributed interviews with intelligence officers. 
    
                 
  The Predator’s communications equipment and launch point had to be close enough to the 
intended observation area to maintain the connection between the crew and the aircraft and to 
keep the aircraft’s time in transit from eclipsing its time over a target.  
126 Unattributed interviews with Predator operators. 
127                 
              
128             
129 Unattributed interviews with Predator pilots. 
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Fig. 3.7. Concept of operations for deployed Predator.  (Adapted from a briefing by  
, “Predator Program Overview,”Aeronautical Systems Center, 14 June 2002, slide 4) 
For Operation Southern Watch and Operation Enduring Freedom, Air Combat 
Command’s Predator squadrons consolidated operations into one Predator system for each 
theater, but the forward location of both systems in Iraq and Pakistan restricted the ability of 
Predator crews and intelligence personnel in the MPC to interact with other agencies and to 
obtain sensitive information.  Officially, a Predator system included one ground control station 
with C-band antennae, a “Predator primary satellite link” with Ku-band transmitters and 
receivers, four aircraft, and fifty-five operations and support personnel.   For southern Iraq, 
military personnel flew and maintained Predator from the flight line at Ali Al Salem Air Base, 
Kuwait, only thirty miles south and east of the Iraq border.  For Afghanistan, Pilots and sensor 
operators from Air Combat Command flew Predator missions from Jacobabad, Pakistan.  Both 
locations were austere by USAF standards, and the planning cells attached to the ground control 
stations had limited access to secure Department of Defense networks, phone lines, and 
databases.             
                
         .  Security concerns and 
the protection of classified information limited the ability of the MPC to provide pilots and 
sensor operators with intelligence updates, threat warnings, and cueing information necessary for 
the impending invasion of Iraq and for Predator’s expanding role in the Global War on 
249 
 
Terrorism.  Expecting to penetrate Iraq’s air defenses for Operation Iraqi Freedom, Predator 
squadrons endeavored to provide crews with the information through other means.130
When one of the sensor operators “kidnapped” by other governmental agencies returned 
to Nevada in 2002 as the commander of a local intelligence squadron, he argued the MPC 
underperformed as a planning and administrative organization and should support Predator crews 
from protected facilities in the United States.
      
131
                                               
130 Unattributed interviews with intelligence officers. 
  He and other returning pilots and sensor 
operators started to call a MPC an “operations cell,” and they helped the Predator squadrons in 
Las Vegas obtain the contacts, expertise, and equipment needed to fly missions from the United 
States.            
             
           
            Predator squadrons 
obtained the necessary equipment for remote split operations just prior to the invasion of Iraq 
and consolidated the intelligence support of missions behind the 10-foot walls of gated facilities 
on Nellis Air Force Base and Indian Springs Air Force Auxiliary Air Field.  To conduct remote 
split operations, a “launch and recovery element” maintained, taxied, and launched an aircraft 
from a forward base, put it on an automated flight plan, and “handed off” the aircraft to a 
“mission control element” in Nevada (see figure 3.8).  The mission control element conducted 
the surveillance, reconnaissance, and attack portions of a sortie, and with a slightly longer but 
consistent delay compared to line-of-sight control, Predator pilots and sensor operators flew 
missions over Iraq and Afghanistan from protected compounds on USAF bases.  Freed from the 
logistical constraints of a foreign and potentially hostile country, a “Predator operations cell” 
managed a squadron’s Predator missions and distributed intelligence information to and from 
pilots and sensor operators as they          
           .  By the 
end of 2004, mission qualified pilots and sensor operators no longer needed to know how to take 
off and land the aircraft.  Predator squadrons deployed proficient and specialized crews to the 
combat theater to launch and recover the aircraft with smaller ground control stations tailored for 
deployments and harsh environments.  In the United States, the size and complexity of Predator 
131 Unattributed interviews with intelligence officers, pilots, and sensor operators. 
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workstations grew as Predator crews infused the ground control station and operations cell with 
intelligence networks and collaboration tools necessary to protect the aircraft and support the 
invasion.    
 
Fig. 3.8. Remote split operations for Predator and Reaper.  (Adapted from a briefing by the 
Aeronautical Systems Center, “MQ-1/MQ-9 System Overview,” October 2003, slide 15) 
From 2003 to 2005, the configuration of the ground control station and operations cell 
changed almost daily as Predator crews and intelligence personnel adapted to the insurgency in 
Iraq and extended secure networks, mapping tools, and instant messaging programs from the 
operations cell to the pilot and sensor operator.          f 
     most of the alterations involved personnel changes 
and the incorporation of           
high-end personal computers and displays remotely operated from the pilot and sensor operator’s 
workstations.132
One of the first and most significant changes to Predator after splitting operations was the 
elimination of the DEMPC position.  Coalition forces leading the counter-insurgency in 
Afghanistan and the invasion of Iraq valued Predator for its full motion video     
  , not for the DEMPC’s ability to produce stale radar images of vehicles 
and buildings.  The number of objects on the “Predator target list” also dwindled as crews spent 
   
                                               
132 Unattributed interviews with Predator intelligence personnel. 
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more time supporting a single ground unit and orbiting over one area than flying from target to 
target.  Power constraints also prevented Predator from using the aircraft’s radar and carrying 
Hellfire missile at the same time.  Without radar and a long list of coordinates to enter in the 
workstation, the most time-consuming chores of the DEMPC went away, and Predator squadrons 
moved the remaining tasks of the position to the operations cell.   
After splitting operations, Predator squadrons eliminated the DEMPC position in the 
ground control station but added a “mission intelligence coordinator” and other duty positions in 
the operations cell to provide Predator crews intelligence information and threat warning.  The 
mission intelligence coordinator or “MIC” contacted unit duty officers, controllers, and imagery 
analysts to obtain the intelligence objectives, update the collection deck, and obtain reference 
imagery prior to and during missions.  They also followed the aircraft’s route of flight; acted as 
another set of eyes on the Predator video; and responded to ad hoc requests from ground units, 
command and control agencies, and distributed ground stations     .  The 
MIC had many of the same responsibilities as the old MPC.  Unlike the MPC, however, the MIC 
had 2-way communication with the pilot and sensor operator over an intercom and headset;  
              
                
       
 
Fig. 3.9. Mission intelligence coordinators (MIC) in a Predator operations cell.     
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Predator squadrons also supplemented the intelligence coordinators with three other 
intelligence personnel in preparation for the Iraq invasion.  Prior to the start of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, each Predator crew had an “offensive duty officer” to coordinate close-air-support 
strikes with terminal attack controllers, a “defensive duty officer” to interpret and consolidate 
electronics and signal intelligence of Iraq’s air defenses, and a “targeting analyst” to construct 
target coordinates from Predator video for GPS-guided weapons.  Each of these enlisted 
intelligence personnel sat at a computer terminal in the operations cell next to the MIC,  
              
        By 2005, however, only the dedicated intelligence 
coordinators, two supervisors, a weather forecaster, and a “multi-source analyst” remained in the 
operations cell.   
One by one, Predator squadrons eliminated duty positions in the operations cell as the 
threat in Iraq evolved from major combat operations to counter-insurgencies and as the number 
of Predator missions grew from two a day to eight.  The first position eliminated was the 
targeting analyst.  The air operations center in the Middle East and Central Command’s 
headquarters in Florida refused to use coordinates from the operations cell and made their own as 
they fought for control over the targeting process.133  Next was the defensive duty officer, who 
was underemployed after the fall of Baghdad and after the destruction of Iraq’s air defenses.  
Predator squadrons consolidated the tasks of interpreting and merging intelligence from other 
sources into a single position per operations cell—the multi-source analyst.  Finally, the 
offensive duty officer faded away when Predator crews determined it was best for the pilots to 
maintain the requisite information to strike a target.  Intelligence personnel were unfamiliar with 
the procedures for close air support, and unlike the personnel in the operations cell, Predator 
pilots could talk on the radio to terminal attack controllers.134
                                               
133 Unattributed interviews with intelligence officers. 
  People in the operations cell could 
hear radio conversations from the aircraft’s radio but could not transmit radio messages 
themselves.  All coordination for close air support passed through the pilot, which negated the 
need for someone else to manage the task.   
134                    
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Remote split operations and the growth and subsequent reduction in personnel in the 
operations cell was indicative of the history of the RPA program.  Wartime imperatives and the 
expanding role of Predator as an intelligence and attack asset led Predator operators to modify 
the tools and practices of the U-2 to connect Predator crews to a wider network of combatants, 
weapon systems, and support personnel.  Within the ground control station and operations cell, 
Predator squadrons also expanded and contracted the human components of Predator in concert 
with the evolving security environment; the evolution of Predator’s mission; and the growing 
network of collaborative organizations, people, and tools employed to search for threats and 
destroy them. 
Infusing the Network into the Ground Control Station 
When Air Combat Command started to conduct remote split operations from Nevada in 
2003, Predator squadrons transformed the MPC from a mission planning organization 
responsible for the distribution of Predator video to an operations cell with intelligence 
personnel, secure networks, and communication tools to interact with Predator crews, imagery 
analysts, and action officers during a mission.  When Predator squadrons started to conduct 
remote split operations, Predator squadrons also overcame inhibitions to modify General 
Atomics’ design of Predator’s workstation and infused the ground control station with displays, 
tools, and processors from the operations cell.  The infusion of intelligence and operations 
networks within the ground control station distributed the tasks necessary to accomplish 
reconnaissance, surveillance, and strike missions among members of the Predator crew and 
allowed the pilot, sensor operator, and mission coordinator to analyze typed, verbal, and video 
representations of a target in parallel.  Typed representations of a target included discussions 
with imagery analysts, supported ground forces, and other     
            f 
 , led to frequent “disruptions” during a mission, and altered how crews 
investigated and defined objects in the HUD. 
Physically, the operators’ first modification of Predator’s ground control station was a 
modest one, but the ability of pilots and sensor operators to observe and participate   
 significantly altered the tasks and organization of work for Predator crews.  
Shortly after Air Combat Command started to conduct remote split operations from Nevada, one 
of the Predator squadrons         with intelligence analysts in 
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distributed ground stations and staff officers in the air operations center (see figure 3.10).  
Months later, Predator squadrons bolted LCD monitors to the equipment rack between the pilot 
and sensor operator              
By 2005, Predator squadrons bolted six additional LCD displays to the Predator’s workstations 
(see figure 3.13).  Every squadron configured the ground control station differently,   
             
           135
 
    
             
                 
               
               
              
               
                 f 
               
               
Fig. 3.10. Predator workstations in 1996 before modification by the operators.  (Adapted from a 
briefing by the Aeronautical Systems Center, “MQ-1/MQ-9 System Overview,” October 2003, 
slide 11) 
                                               
135 The compromise of top-secret information had the potential to threaten American forces, military operations, and 
national security to a greater extent than secret information, and the US military used distinct networks and 
protocols to protect each level of security classification. 
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Fig. 3.11. Predator workstations in early 2004 with two additional displays.     
            
 
Fig. 3.12. Predator workstations in Late 2004 with three additional displays.     
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Fig. 3.13. Predator and Reaper workstations after 2005 with six additional displays.   
f               
The ability of Predator crews to observe and participate    with 
anyone with access to secure Department of Defense networks created redundancy, reduced 
errors in transmission, and improved the responsiveness of Predator to ad hoc requests, but the 
displays also introduced Predator crews to a new mode of communication with demands and 
limitations they learned on the job.          
             
               
              
                  
             
              
                
                   
              
            
       136
                                               
136 Unattributed interviews with Predator pilots and sensor operators. 
       
              f 
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The anonymity of writers and increased sensitivity of readers caused confusion and could 
grind Predator operations to a halt.  Perplexing but relatively innocuous    
             
              
                 
   In most cases, these disruptions were unwarranted.  In others, they saved 
innocent lives and compelled crews to monitor the       scenes 
from the sensor ball and the Predator’s other subsystems.       
              
          the supervision and control of 
Predator crewmembers, the aircraft, and its sensors and weapons.  
The second and most significant alteration to the ground control station after moving 
them to the United States was the addition of  displays for the pilot and sensor 
operator.  When Predator squadrons moved the task of “running the mission” from the ground 
control station to the operations cell, intelligence personnel need a moving map display like 
General Atomics’ tracker to show them where the aircraft was and what it was looking at in 
relation to maps, satellite images, and other geographical representations.  The air operations 
center developed a solution to the same problem in 2002 when it created an application for 
   .137
                                               
137 Paul Hastert, “Spiral Development in Wartime” (National Defense Industrial Association, October 2005); For 
more on the development of , see J. R Lindsay, “‘War upon the Map’: User Innovation in American 
Military Software,” Technology and Culture 51, no. 3 (2010): 619–651. 
           
                
         .  Beginning in 2003, intelligence 
personnel in the operations cell used the tool to track the route of the aircraft in relationship to 
airspace control measures and to compare the video from the sensor ball with satellite imagery of 
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the target area.  The ability to see graphical representations of the mission on top of pictures and 
maps was a significant improvement to General Atomics’ fragile and proprietary tracker display, 
and over the next two years, Predator pilots and sensor operators brought  into the 
ground control station.  At first, they shared a copy of the MIC’s  window on a LCD 
monitor bolted to the equipment rack between them.  Then they obtained the ability to 
manipulate  themselves with a keyboard and mouse.  Finally, both the pilot and 
sensor operator procured their own  displays and analyzed the maps and imagery 
with keyboards and trackballs they latched and glued to their consoles.     
              
              
              
  By 2005, Predator crews referenced the free and open source mapping application more 
than General Atomics’ tracker.   
Similar to the transformation of      
  from a mission-planning tool to a flight management tool.  In less time 
than it took for General Atomics to program and gain approval for a new HUD, Predator 
operators reprogrammed the aircraft’s mission management software by merging the Predator 
ground control station with a relatively intuitive and powerful application to analyze and display 
geographical data.  The addition of  reconfigured the organization of work in the 
ground control station and operations cell by giving Predator operators the power to share and 
create graphical representations of the flight environment in a familiar format and to coordinate 
multiple representations of the world below the aircraft quickly.  
Negotiations for a “Common Operating Picture” 
Like the diffusion of   throughout the combat theater,  enabled 
Predator crews to communicate in a new way with ground units, intelligence agencies, and 
command and control organizations receiving Predator video.    allowed members 
of an expanding network of operations and intelligence personnel to share written 
characterizations of the mission and objects in Predator video.   allowed them to 
propagate geographical and pictorial representations of the target area.  These tools and modes of 
communication formed what military personnel called a “common operating picture,” which the 
customer, imagery analysts, and Predator operators referenced to coordinate a mission.  The term 
259 
 
“common” was deceiving, however, because no two displays of     
       were the same.  Each operator, analyst, and staff 
officer had distinct notions of what abnormal and threatening behavior looked like in video from 
Predator’s sensor ball.  Each configured their computer and displays differently, and each had a 
discrete perspective on the purpose of Predator and the role they played in the accomplishment 
of a mission, in the definition of a target, and in the destruction of threats to ground forces.  The 
humans in this network of people, machines, and practices sought to influence the integration of 
Predator into military operations and negotiated Predator’s contributions to bring the different 
perspectives of the battlefield in coordination with each other.   
Predator operators actively sought to influence the conflicting perspectives of the 
Predator community and to shape the responsibilities and tasks of the Predator crew.  One 
example of this phenomenon was the efforts of    , a former A-10 
Thunderbolt pilot.  As commander of a Predator squadron,   campaigned to change 
the relationship between Predator crews and “the customer” from a social relationship based on 
directives and skepticism to a supporting relationship based on mutual interaction, trust, and 
expertise.138  When   took command of the 15th Reconnaissance Squadron in 2006, 
Predator squadrons were a “depressing place” and morale in the community was low.  The 
number of Predator sorties had more than doubled since 2004, and exhausted crews routinely 
flew one of three 8-hour shifts without a break for six days in a row.139  During most of their 
shifts, Predator crews also did not know the objectives and intent of the missions they were 
flying—a condition   called a “morale dump.”140
                                               
138                     
                 
               
          
  Despite access to top-secret 
networks and the potential to exchange information through a smorgasbord of communication 
modes, the ground forces using Predator did not tell the crews what they were looking for or 
why.                
                  
139 The summer prior to   taking command, the USAF’s 311th Performance Enhancement Directorate 
studied the effects of shift work on Predator crews and found that crews experienced “emotional exhaustion” and 
“moderate to high levels of task-related burnout” on a mission.            
           
     
140              
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             and there was 
little motivation to improve the skills and effectiveness of Predator crewmembers when they did 
not know “the big why.”142
Shortly after taking command,   traveled to Iraq to talk with ground 
commanders and their subordinates face-to-face in the customers’ tactical operations centers, the 
places where the commanders’ staff directed the tasks of Predator crews.  On the trip,  
 made three points.
   
143
When   traveled the combat theater to talk with the consumers of Predator 
video, he established a more dynamic social relationship with “the customer” and transformed 
Predator crews from the producers of video to the providers of intelligence and ground support 
  His first point was that Predator pilots, sensor operators, and 
intelligence personnel also had military expertise.  The organizations using Predator video may 
have been experts on the employment of ground forces, but Predator crews were experts on how 
to employ and gather intelligence with Predator.  His second point was that even though Predator 
crews operated from Las Vegas, they had almost every classified network and communication 
capability imaginable            
 .  Dialog through these networks was possible and expected, even though the customer 
and Predator crews did not share the same physical environment.  Finally,   argued 
his squadron could provide higher quality support with additional information and improved 
interaction with Predator crews.  Increased crew awareness of the mission translated to increased 
attentiveness, and Predator crews could focus on video from the sensor ball more if they knew 
who they were looking for and why the target was a threat.        
                
               
    pleaded with ground commanders and their staffs to trust Predator 
crews and to give them the information they needed to do their jobs well. 
                                               
141 Unattributed interviews with Predator operators. 
142 Unattributed interviews with Predator operators;         
    
143                  
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based on the context of the situation and the needs of “the supported unit.”  Before his trip to 
Iraq,   said his squadron had to “fight for context” and to “force the units to tell us 
why we were there.”144  After his trip, soldiers returning from and deploying to Iraq regularly 
visited Predator squadrons to talk with crews and to observe Predator operations in person.  By 
the end of 2006, Predator crews also received an “ISR target brief” or “ISR 7-line” prior to a 
surveillance mission.145  Intelligence personnel modeled the standard brief after the “9-line 
brief,” which command and control organizations used to task and describe the details of strike 
requests.146              
              
               
147  Colonel Plamp’s personal campaign for information from supported units was 
successful.  His efforts resulted in the distribution of tasks and decision-making back into the 
ground control station, and several former operators in his squadron credit him with significantly 
improving the morale of the 15th Reconnaissance squadron and the rest of the Predator 
community.148
   , the first commander of the first Reaper-only squadron in Air Combat 
Command, also campaigned to shape the relationships RPA operators had with other agencies 
and endeavored to dictate the goals, tasks, and organization of Reaper.  As mentioned earlier, 
Reaper started as an independent research and development program from General Atomics.  
Shortly after the September 11 attacks, however, Big Safari procured three of the systems to fly 
over the mountains of Afghanistan with enough munitions to destroy a residential compound.
 
149  
In 2002, Air Combat Command developed a “concept of operations” for Reaper, and Big Safari 
completed prototype testing of the aircraft in 2003.150
                                               
144 Ibid., 172. 
  With the ability of Reaper to reach an area 
relatively quickly and to find, destroy, and assess a wide-range of targets, Air Combat Command 
145 Unattributed interviews with Predator operators. 
146         
147                    
               
               
  
148 Unattributed interviews with Predator operators. 
149 Unattributed interview with program manager. 
150                 
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classified Reaper as a “hunter-killer” aircraft in 2003.151  Air Combat Command did not expect to 
grant production approval for the aircraft until 2007, but the Secretary of the Air Force and the 
Secretary of Defense pushed for the accelerated development of Reaper in 2004 because of the 
expanding Global War on Terrorism.152  Later the same year, the Air Force Chief of Staff 
predicted the migration of RPA missions in Iraq and Afghanistan from surveillance and the 
exploitation of video to what he considered ideal missions for Reaper—the close air support of 
ground forces and elimination of “time sensitive” and “perishable” targets.153  Two years later, 
  took command of the 42nd Attack Squadron at Creech Air Force Base.  Under 
the direction of the Air Force Chief of Staff and the Commander of Air Combat Command, his 
vision for the squadron was to employ Reaper as a strike asset with a secondary mission of 
reconnaissance and surveillance.154
When   took command in 2006, the USAF’s vision for Reaper missions 
emphasized and valued the aircraft’s ability to employ heavier weapons quickly from a higher 
altitude than Predator.  Unlike Predator, the USAF developed Reaper as an attack aircraft, and 
under orders from Air Combat Command to accelerate the combat fielding of the system, 
  and a handpicked cadre of instructors worked quickly to build a squadron and 
deploy the system to Afghanistan in minimum time.    wanted to construct “a 
fighter squadron in MQ-9 clothing,” and in the summer of 2006, he selected ten of the most 
experienced and skilled instructor pilots and sensor operators from the Predator community to 
create a curriculum for the first class of Reaper crews starting in January 2007.
   
155
                                               
151              
            
  The timeline 
to create proficient Reaper crews was aggressive, and  selected student pilots with “type 
A personalities” and backgrounds in weapons employment to facilitate their transition to remote 
air warfare.  All but one of the squadron’s student pilots were former fighter or bomber pilots, 
152              
       
153 Ibid. 
154                
                   
               
155                 
             
       An elite officer and pilot,   was a graduate of the USAF 
Fighter Weapons School, a former Thunderbird pilot, and graduate of the School of Advanced Air and Space 
Studies.  Like many pilots in the Predator and Reaper communities,   became ineligible to fly 
occupied aircraft for medical reasons; Unattributed interviews with Reaper pilots and sensor operators. 
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and they considered themselves to be more proactive and “tactical” than the typical Predator 
operator, who in the past were predominantly “heavy” or transport pilots.156
I spent a great deal of effort in interviews with Predator and Reaper operators to define 
and characterize the “tactical” operator, which included more than the ability to employ 
weapons.  Tactical operators were more proactive, aggressive, and had a higher standard of 
individual performance.  Tactical operators were not exclusive to fighter, bomber, or transport 
communities, but sensor operators and mission coordinators said fighter pilots were generally 
more tactical than other pilots were.  Of the dozens of Predator and Reaper crewmembers I 
interviewed regarding the topic, the vast majority of them were male, and it was surprising to me 
that none of the respondents defined tactical operators in terms of gender, sexuality, or sexual 
potency.  Most initial characterizations of tactical operators referenced what they ate.  Tactical 
operators were “carnivores” and “meat eaters.”  Non-tactical operators were “herbivores.”  
Tactical operators fought for the information they needed to sustain themselves and accomplish a 
mission.  Non-tactical operators only gathered readily available information and avoided 
confrontations.   
   
In March, the 42nd Attack Squadron received its first aircraft and qualified a handful of 
students for combat missions in June.  Three months later, the squadron deployed a launch and 
recovery element to Afghanistan and began to fly combat missions from workstations built into 
the squadron’s secure facilities at Creech Air Force Base.  Before the deployment,  
 met with members of the air operations center in the Middle East to ensure the center’s 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance division tasked Reaper as a strike aircraft.  Mission 
planners in the division translated all the requests for Reaper video into a “joint tactical air 
request,” a standardized form to request and coordinate air strikes.157
                                               
156 Unattributed interviews with Reaper operators. 
  On the form, planners in 
the air operations center described the target, provided contact information for USAF controllers 
embedded with the supported unit, and furnished other contextual information for surveillance, 
reconnaissance, or strike missions.  Like  ,   established personal 
ties with members of the command and control network that Reaper crews used to coordinate 
and execute a mission.  In   case, he enlisted the help of the air operations center 
157 Unattributed interviews with Reaper pilots. 
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to obtain the information Reaper crews needed to perform the mission in a format they 
understood.  
Under the guidance of   and the squadron’s initial cadre of instructors, the 
operators in the 42nd Attack Squadron endeavored to take the best practices of Predator 
squadrons and fashion a new community of RPA operators based on a “tactical mindset,” a 
closer working relationship among crewmembers, and a greater attention to the effective 
employment of weapons in combat.  To members of the Reaper squadron, Predator operators 
were “on autopilot.”158  The expectations for performance in Predator squadrons were too low, 
and when students and inexperienced operators asked how the system worked, acceptable replies 
were often “I think it works like this” or “I do not know.”  Too often Predator pilots and sensor 
operators took “no” for an answer and did not assert themselves as warriors and an integral 
component of air operations.  To separate themselves from the Predator community and to 
reinforce the power and responsibility of Reaper crews, members of the 42nd Attack Squadron 
changed the language of their work.159  Sensor operators did not operate a sensor ball; they flew a 
“targeting pod” like fighter pilots and weapon system officers.  Reaper pilots and sensor 
operators did not have a “mission intelligence coordinator”; they coordinated strike missions 
with the support of an “intelligence crewmember.”160  Reaper crews did not conduct 
“intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance” missions; they flew “non-traditional” 
intelligence missions like fighter and bomber crews.161
In addition to using the language of the fighter pilot, members of the 42nd Attack 
Squadron also incorporated some of the practices of fighter squadrons to reduce the social and 
technical barriers to effective team performance and to strengthen the relationship among Reaper 
  Members of the 42nd Attack Squadron 
used the rhetoric of the fighter community to highlight the strike capabilities of Reaper; to 
influence the perceptions of Reaper operators; and to shape the priorities, attention, and 
assertiveness of Reaper crews during a mission.  
                                               
158 Unattributed interviews with Reaper operators and intelligence personnel. 
159 Unattributed interviews with Reaper operators. 
160 In 2007, the commander of the 432nd Operations Group consolidated the name for the “mission intelligence 
coordinator” and “intelligence crewmember” for all RPA squadrons at Creech Air Force Base into the “mission 
coordinator” or “MC.”  Unattributed interviews with Reaper intelligence personnel. 
161 In interviews with Reaper pilots, they often made comparisons between the RPA and fighter aircraft.  One of the 
most interesting assertions of Reaper pilots was that “the Reaper carries as much or more weapons than the F-16.”  
With an external stores limit of 3000 pounds and the ability to carry only laser-guided bombs and Hellfire missiles, 
the proclamation was clearly not true, yet former Viper pilots who knew I was a former Viper pilot made the 
assertion without qualification anyway. 
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pilots, sensor operators, and intelligence personnel.  In 2005, the first contact Predator sensor 
operators had with pilots on a mission was when they sat at their workstations, and sometimes 
pilots listened to music, read a book, or took a nap until there was a potential to employ 
weapons.  Automation facilitated the disengagement of Predator pilots, and the Reaper squadron 
discouraged the use of fully automated modes of flight or image optimization to push pilots and 
sensor operators to practice their skills and to demonstrate their proficiency.  Prior to a mission, 
Reaper operators in the 42nd Attack Squadron briefed each other on how they planned to share 
responsibilities and tasks, debriefed their performance after a flight, and published a nominal 
division of labor in the squadron’s standards.  While on a mission, Reaper pilots, sensor 
operators, and intelligence personnel practiced team performance and fostered closer social ties 
amongst crewmembers by conducting reconnaissance exercises in transit to a target area and by 
searching for objects during long surveillance missions.  By briefing and practicing team events 
during the lulls of a mission and by managing the use of automated modes, members of the 42nd 
Attack Squadron developed overlapping knowledge among crewmembers, enabled the 
simultaneous execution of element and group tasks, and increased the ability of the crew to 
respond and adapt to unforeseen events.    
The language and practices   used to instill a “tactical mindset” in Reaper 
pilots and sensor operators and   campaign to forge mutually supporting 
relationships among Predator crews and ground forces influenced the role of Predator in 
contemporary conflicts and shaped how crews worked together to accomplish a mission.  Both 
  and   fostered social relationships with organizations and 
negotiated the nominal responsibilities and tasks of RPA crews through dialog and conflict.  
Each lauded the technical skills of RPA operators but asserted they were legitimate war fighters, 
not just technicians.  Each supported the development of performance standards and tools RPA 
operators could use to identify threats, and each shaped the organization of work among the crew 
to bring operators closer to events on the ground.   ,  , and other 
RPA operators actively sought and negotiated the distribution of tasks among organizations and 
RPA crewmembers and embedded the RPA operators’ roles and mission performances in social 
relationships.  
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Analysis 
Although   and   were RPA operators in the generic sense, 
they were also officers, squadron commanders, and former fighter pilots.  They had the authority, 
status, and power to influence social relationships and to bring about change, and many of the 
tools, ideas, and practices they employed had roots in the fighter community.162  When  
 took command of the 42nd Attack Squadron in 2006, sixteen of the eighteen officers who 
had led a Predator or Reaper squadron were former fighter pilots or weapon system officers.163
Before 2001, when Predator pilots and sensor operators enclosed themselves in a metal 
cockpit, the duties of Predator pilots and sensor operators were constrained and relatively simple: 
launch and recover the aircraft safely and capture images of fifty to three hundred preplanned 
targets.  Data and images Predator collected for commanders and imagery analysts flowed in one 
direction, away from the ground control station, and Predator crews gathered and provided 
information for others to make informed decisions, not to make decisions themselves.  Over the 
next decade, however, Big Safari and General Atomics’ modifications to the aircraft in response 
to wartime requirements and the imperatives of the attacks of 11 September empowered Predator 
and Reaper crews to build a network of people and tools they used to support the counter 
insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Early in the Predator program, Air Combat Command and 
RPA squadrons used systems and concepts typical of attack aircraft to integrate Predator and 
Reaper into air operations and to give RPA operators the potential to discover and eliminate 
hidden and dispersed targets and to assess the destruction from one platform.  Later in the 
program, as the role and importance of Predator and Reaper in support of the Global War on 
Terrorism grew, RPA operators overcame tendencies to treat ground control stations as enclosed 
cockpits.  Predator and Reaper squadrons split operations to fly missions from the United States, 
  
The actions of   to instill pride and confidence in the Reaper community were the 
latest in a progression of initiatives by other squadron commanders and RPA operators to 
influence the perceptions and status of Predator and Reaper crews and to transform them into 
teams organized like fighter crews connected to intelligence networks and empowered with 
collaborative tools.   
                                               
162 Some examples already mentioned include periodicals on weapons and tactics, , sortie briefs and 
debriefs, squadron standards, squadron buildings and facilities, lineup and 9-line cards, the color of the HUD, and 
personal call signs.  
163 Cantwell, “Beyond Butterflies: Predator and the Evolution of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle in Air Force Culture,” 
80. 
267 
 
connected crews to ground forces and intelligence agencies over secure networks, and distributed 
the organization of work among crewmembers with tools that extended beyond the confines of 
the ground control station.  Through negotiation and conflict, RPA operators transformed 
Predator and Reaper crews from a group physically and professionally disconnected from the 
battlefield to war fighters who participated in decision-making processes, in the support of 
ground forces, and in the analysis of sensor video.  
The transformation of Predator and Reaper from 1995 to 2010 was dramatic both in the 
capabilities of the systems and in the tasks of RPA crews, yet the changes to the humans, 
machines, and practices of the system did not occur as a result of a master plan or conscious 
reflection about the role of humans and RPA in war.  Initially, General Atomics designed 
Predator for the autopilot to fly the aircraft on a mission, and Predator pilots struggled against 
aircraft control limitations intended to maximize endurance, maintain communication links, and 
minimize development costs.  Air Combat Command adapted procedures and processes of 
occupied aircraft to employ the system, and subsequent changes to the aircraft and sensor ball 
occurred incrementally in concert with the evolving security environment, the actions of the 
enemy, and the needs of policymakers and combatant commanders.  In many cases, alterations to 
the ground control station and tasks of Predator and Reaper crews occurred in response to 
changes to the aircraft, sensor ball, or placement of the ground control station.  These changes, 
however, also influenced the behavior of friendly and enemy forces, the perceptions of RPA 
operators as war fighters, and a seemingly insatiable demand for more surveillance and 
reconnaissance assets.  RPA operators in the Predator and Reaper communities both reflected 
and shaped the work environment and the tasks they accomplished to accomplish a mission. 
Some readers will not find it surprising that the ethnographer, an USAF officer and 
fighter pilot, found that the leadership of other fighter pilots helped improve the performance of 
RPA crews and facilitated the transformation of the RPA community.  Bias is a legitimate 
concern.  Almost all of the official histories examined and interviews conducted with Predator 
and Reaper operators supported these themes to some extent, and it is important to acknowledge 
the tendency for official histories to tell success stories and for ethnographers to speak with 
willing subjects who are not interested in incriminating themselves.  The USAF official histories 
used for the study are progressive in tone, and USAF historians would not have written the 
“special studies” of Predator and Reaper if not for the successful performances of the systems in 
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combat and the relatively positive perceptions of the programs.164
   Acknowledging a limitation of the study’s sources, Predator and Reaper operators were 
able to transform themselves from “stick monkeys” to empowered decision-makers and 
contributors to military operations because of successful combat performances.  Predator and 
Reaper operators were able to enhance their status in ground control stations and in the USAF 
because the systems could do things in contemporary conflicts that occupied aircraft and other 
weapons systems could not.           
                   
              
          Flying the weapons systems from 
secure ground facilities, Predator and Reaper squadrons could also distribute aerial perspectives 
of targets to anyone with access to a video receiver or military TCP/IP networks, and 
commanders and their staffs could use these networks to direct the actions of Predator and 
Reaper crews and to tailor RPA missions to events as they unfolded.  The capabilities and 
responsiveness of Predator and Reaper in the Global War on Terrorism fed commanders’ 
demands for more assets, provided operators with human and budgetary resources, and gave 
members of the community opportunities to effect change.   
  Although I interviewed 76 
RPA pilots and sensor operators for this study, very few of my subjects were “lepers” or 
embarrassments to other RPA operators.  A vast majority of marginalized Predator pilots and 
sensor operators were no longer in the USAF, and most of the people I observed were good 
students or elites in the community.  Instructors did not volunteer access to students who were 
failing their training programs, nor did representatives of combat squadrons introduce me to 
pariahs in the Predator community.  Additional observations and interactions with marginal 
performers and outcasts could reveal insights this study fails to address.    
It is important to note, however, that certain environmental and security conditions made 
the successful performances of Predator and Reaper possible       
             
            
                                               
164                    
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        Military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan also benefitted from 
almost complete air superiority, and the United States’ dominance of conventional air and 
ground forces in the region compelled enemy combatants to hide and disperse their forces among 
the civilian population, giving Predator and Reaper almost uninhibited access to the sky and 
terrain.  Like many of the people, tools, and procedures incorporated into Predator and Reaper, 
many of the conditions contributing to the successful performance of RPA are inseparable from 
the environment of military conflict and the performance and technologies of occupied aircraft. 
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Conclusion 
In 2010, a growing number of unoccupied vehicles crawled, rolled, and flew over 
battlefields in the Middle East and Central Asia, and for a public conditioned by science fiction 
movies depicting autonomous machines wiping out the human race, the weapon systems were 
causes of concern.  When the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, the Department of Defense had 
no remotely operated ground vehicles and only few unmanned aircraft in its inventory.  Just 
seven years later, the US military had tens of thousands of the systems, which prompted the 
editors of Scientific American to declare, “Robots are pouring onto battlefields as if a new 
species of mechanotronic alien had just landed on our planet.”1  For many, the terms “remotely 
operated” and “unmanned” are synonymous with increased intelligence and autonomy, and they 
view the humans monitoring the semiautonomous systems in Iraq and Afghanistan as faceless 
and uniform operators that are easily replaceable—some of the weapon systems are “only a 
software upgrade away from fully self-sufficient operation.”2
The public, policymakers, engineers, and other operators should form their perceptions, 
designs, policies, and procedures from actual practice, and the objective of this ethnographic and 
historical study is to present an alternative view of RPA operations based on observations of 
Reaper crewmembers in action.  The fundamental question of the study is, “How do operators 
employ RPA to find and kill targets and why do they operate them the way that they do?”  
Research and analysis of the humans, machines, and practices of the system combined concepts 
and methods developed in the fields of cognitive anthropology, history of technology, and 
sociology of technology.  The result is an illustrated description of RPA operations that is 
  Remote operations do not 
predispose how the US military employs weapons like Predator and Reaper, however, and 
popular views of RPA operators as indifferent supervisors of automated machines is largely 
conjecture.  Few scholars have had the time, access, or inclination to observe remote air 
operations from an operator’s perspective, to describe the nature of the work in detail, or to 
explain how social and technical constraints and contingencies influence the work practices of 
RPA crewmembers.  RPA pilots and sensor operators search for insurgents and launch missiles 
at terrorists from black boxes where the public never learns what they do, only that they should 
be able to do what they do faster and easier because of automation.   
                                                 
1 “Terminate the Terminators,” Scientific American 303, no. 1 (July 2010): 30. 
2 Ibid., 31. 
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technically detailed and historically grounded, and developers can use the results to inform and 
update their working models of RPA operators, to generate concepts and solutions for RPA 
operators’ problems, and to provide a framework for evaluation and prioritization of alternative 
ideas and material solutions addressing those problems.3
An Ethnographic and Historical Study of Remote Air Operations 
  The observation of RPA operators in 
action reveals human-machine interactions that are difficult to understand from a distance, and 
this rich description of Reaper operations should help improve the design and development of 
unoccupied aircraft and foster an appreciation for how human and machine elements of a system 
can reflect and shape each other as they evolve and transform.  
In many respects, walking into an RPA squadron in 2010 was like stepping into a fighter 
squadron, and the members of a RPA crew—a pilot, sensor operator, and mission coordinator—
prepared for a mission in ways similar to operators of occupied aircraft.  Before a sortie, 
members of the crew gathered intelligence and operational information about the enemy and the 
supported ground unit and briefed each other on the roles, responsibilities, and tasks of each 
crewmember and the team prior to entering the ground control station.  Not unlike crewmembers 
of other strike aircraft, RPA crews also created maps, guides, cards, and other paper products to 
organize mission tasks and to simplify the reception, transformation, and distribution of 
information among the operators, ground forces, and automated tools in the ground control 
station.   
One of the things that separated Air Force RPA from occupied aircraft at the time, 
however, was the wide array of communication modes and tools available to update the crew as 
a mission progressed.              
             
        .  USAF crews could converse 
with virtually anyone in the US military at almost any classification level, but making sense of 
conversations with the people and machines connected to the system and translating information 
from one mode to another was challenging for inexperienced RPA operators, even if they had 
prior experience in occupied aircraft.  All of the above communication modes and tools used to 
                                                 
3 For a perspective from human factors engineers on the contributions of ethnography to system design processes, 
see Committee on Human-System Design Support for Changing Technology, Human-System Integration in the 
System Development Process: A New Look, ed. Richard W. Pew and Anne S. Mavor (Washington DC: National 
Academies Press, 2007), 154-155. 
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interact with the aircraft and coalition forces halfway around the world merged at the RPA 
operators’ workstations in a patchwork of displays and input devices.  In order to fly the aircraft 
and control the sensor ball, Reaper and Predator crews had to coordinate the meaning, 
movement, and presentation of a myriad of menus, windows, and tables on 16 displays and 4 
touch screens with 4 keyboards, 2 trackballs, 2 joysticks, and 8 levers.  A novice RPA pilot said 
flying the aircraft from a computer console while interpreting morphing numbers and symbols 
was like “flying the matrix,” and to keep from getting lost in the system, inexperienced pilots and 
sensor operators spent as much as a third of a mission to configure the workstation and 
automated tools to display information in a predictable manner.  RPA crewmembers prepared the 
workstations and organized crew tasks differently for each phase of a flight and structured 
computer applications and paper tools to transform verbal, written, and typed representations of a 
target area into pictorial, graphical, and geographical forms the operators could more easily 
interpret, manipulate, and share during busy portions of a mission.  
              
   , and far from getting lost in the system, expert RPA pilots and sensor 
operators created a virtual environment in which the crew developed feelings of remote presence 
above the battlefield.  When protecting and avenging ground forces, RPA operators exercised 
impressive technical and social skills and “became the camera.”      
    , RPA operators learned to correct for the delay unconsciously with 
experience and proficiency.  Pilots learned how to sound good on a remotely operated radio and 
how to bank the aircraft above the limits of the autopilot to observe a target covertly and to keep 
the scene from the sensor ball stable.           
                  f 
             .  Fine motor skills 
were important aspects of RPA operations, especially for the sensor operator, but the critical role 
of RPA crews in the system was to coordinate their actions among each other, among a 
constellation of automated tools in the ground control station, and among a network of other 
operators and intelligence personnel.  RPA operators coordinated the activity of a variety of 
collaboration tools and a network of people in the United States, Iraq, and Afghanistan to obtain 
the context the crew needed to position the aircraft, to configure its sensors, and to interpret the 
objects in video from the RPA.  Together, RPA crews integrated the local guidance of deployed 
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personnel, the unwavering attention and analysis of imagery analysts in the United States, and 
images from the sensor ball to build a picture of events on the ground and to eliminate threats in 
accordance with the demands of the mission. 
 Ubiquitous companions of RPA crews on a mission were automated tools the operators 
used to distribute information and tasks among the crew and a wider network of war fighters and 
imagery analysts.  Reaper crews used automated tools to develop and maintain motor skills, to 
focus attention, to evaluate performance, to organize crew tasks, and to structure the environment 
of the ground control station.  For example, Reaper pilots use the HUD to overlay the view in 
front and below the aircraft to transition from controlling the attitude of the plane to interpreting 
video from the aircraft’s sensors quickly in concert with the rest of the crew.  RPA pilots, sensor 
operators, and mission coordinators also used automated tools to make complex calculations, to 
structure interactions with other members of the crew and network, and to create a virtual world 
in which the operators could accomplish tasks humans do well: recognize patterns, model simple 
dynamics of the world, and manipulate objects in a virtual world they helped create.  For 
example, mapping applications displayed from the operations cell coordinated the geographical 
position of the sensor ball’s reticle with digital maps and imagery of the target area, and RPA 
operators used the display to make          
              
                 
                
                 
             
           
               
        
 In the course of a mission to find and kill targets, RPA operators   
    distribute tasks among other operators, intelligence analysts, and 
ground personnel, but the employment of RPA as a collaborative network of people and 
machines was not a logical result of the Predator and Reaper’s initial design.  RPA operators 
“built the network,” and they negotiated the RPA’s interactive role in the defense of ground 
forces from a position of physical separation and professional isolation from the development of 
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the system.  Prior to 2001, sensor operators were imagery analysts who slewed the sensor ball 
from target to target without analyzing the results and with little feedback from commanders and 
other intelligence personnel about a mission.  Enclosed in the ground control station, a Predator 
crew’s only interaction with other people on a flight was through four telephone lines.  RPA 
pilots were experienced operators of occupied aircraft, but they did not call or think of 
themselves as pilots.  They spent the bulk of a mission monitoring the autopilot and 
troubleshooting failures of the workstation, which was often difficult because aspects of the 
system’s design intended to minimize weight, maximize endurance, and extend remote flight 
added layers of hidden computations and complexity to RPA operations.  USAF policies that 
restricted crews’ access to expert operators and the latest versions of the system also hampered 
training, and social and professional barriers between civilian and military operators hindered the 
efforts of the RPA community to create nominal procedures for inexperienced pilots and sensor 
operators.  The isolation of Predator operators limited pilots and sensor operators’ knowledge of 
the system, impeded their ability to recognize when components of the RPA were not working 
optimally, and stunted efforts to reconfigure the system and crew tasks in response to anomalies, 
ad hoc requests, and system modifications.   
 The September 11 attacks and the importance of RPA in the Global War on Terrorism 
spurred a closer relationship among engineers and operators in the Predator community when 
combatant commanders and the USAF endeavored to transform the RPA from a reconnaissance 
and surveillance aircraft to a strike aircraft.  System engineers added lasers, missiles, and an 
improved sensor ball to pass targeting information to other weapons, which accelerated 
Predator’s integration into air operations and transformed Predator operators into combatants 
who could create destructive effects they could see on the battlefield.  Ironically, removing the 
ground control station from the theater of battle also helped integrate Predator and Reaper into 
military campaigns.  “Remote split operations” from secure facilities in the United states enabled 
RPA pilots and sensor operators to access secret and top secret networks, and over a period of 
several years, they infused the ground control station with collaborative tools and mapping 
applications that radically transformed the system and altered how RPA crews searched for and 
destroyed targets.  Access to secure networks did not guarantee ground forces in the combat zone 
shared information about the objectives and intent of a mission, however.  Leaders in the 
Predator and Reaper community had to conduct personal campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan to 
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coordinate ground and air operations by establishing social relationships with ground units based 
on trust, expertise, and constructive interactions and not rigid directives and skepticism of a 
crew’s knowledge and skill.  Over a period of fourteen years, RPA operators transformed their 
profession and the RPA crew from a group physically and professionally disconnected from the 
battlefield to war fighters who could participate in ground commanders’ decision-making 
processes and create effects immediately visible to ground forces, the crew, and a network of 
operations and intelligence personnel. 
Remote Air Operators in the USAF 
 In many ways, the humans and machines of Predator and Reaper functioned in roles and 
performed tasks similar to the operators and tools of occupied aircraft.4  The machines in the 
system accomplished single and well-defined tasks with greater speed, accuracy, and consistency 
than human operators of the system.  In many cases, automated tools decomposed tasks, which 
enabled human operators to distribute and share the elements of a mission involving numerical 
calculations and physical actions that humans could not perform reliably or quickly.  In other 
cases, automated tools integrated control inputs and data, which allowed human operators to 
condense elements of a task and the results of complex calculations in one event or location.  The 
humans in the system orchestrated the actions of machines with other humans and adapted the 
system to the evolving demands of a mission.  Humans were the “malleable and connecting 
tissue” linking the automated tools, the crew, and other members of the network with one 
another.5
Machines also helped Predator pilots elevate their status and transform the profession of 
RPA operator.  The combination of flight endurance, powerful sensors, and precision weapons 
  Crewmembers helped interpret the output of machines and other crewmembers and 
translated the results into formats that other machines and operators could interpret and evaluate.  
Crewmembers also integrated context into their behavior and restructured tasks and the 
organization of the system in response to events that machines deemed statistically insignificant 
or could not recognize.  Together, humans and machines helped each other accomplish tasks they 
could not do individually—define, find, and kill targets remotely from the air.   
                                                 
4 For a the description of the specific tasks and roles performed by the operators and tools in a B-17 bomber during 
the combined bomber offensive, see Raymond P. O’Mara, “The Socio-Technical Construction of Precision 
Bombing: A Study of Shared Control and Cognition by Humans, Machines, and Doctrine During World War II” 
(Dissertation, Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2011). 
5 E. Hutchins, Cognition in the Wild (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), 219. 
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on a single aircraft provided Predator operators the opportunity to transform Predator pilots from 
an ostracized core of technicians to a relatively respected group of military professionals.  Sensor 
operators, much lower in military rank than pilots, were responsible for creating Predator and 
Reaper’s most valuable product:  full motion video from the aircraft’s sensor balls.  To create 
informative images, however, experienced sensor operators had to demonstrate an impressive 
array of technical and social skills to explore scenes from the systems’ multiple cameras and to 
correlate virtual objects in the HUD with “real” objects and behavior on the ground.  Conversely, 
early Predator pilots flew the aircraft like a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft.  They just monitored an 
autopilot and hardly contributed to the results of the system’s intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance missions.  With the integration of weapons on Predator and Reaper, however, the 
RPA community reconfigured the systems and modified procedures to give the pilot access to 
images from the sensor ball and more control of the flight path of the aircraft.  In some ways, the 
second and third generations of the Predator system were not as automated as the first, and like 
the crews of fighter and bomber aircraft, pilots became the social and computational leaders of 
RPA crews and transformed themselves from “lepers” and “stick monkeys” to relevant 
contributors to Predator and Reaper missions.6
Despite the efforts of the Predator and Reaper communities to fashion the roles and 
functions of RPA crewmembers in ways similar to fighter and bomber crewmembers, significant 
differences remained between occupied and unoccupied aircraft.  The physical separation, 
filtration, and scale of available information from crewmembers and collaborative tools are 
significantly greater in a ground control station than in a cockpit.  Separated from the battlefield 
and the air domain, RPA crews depended completely upon a virtual world to accomplish a 
mission, and RPA operators could not compare the characteristics of the virtual world in the 
ground control station directly with views of the “real” world visible from a cockpit.  
Crewmembers of occupied aircraft also use canopies, windscreens, visors, HUDs, and helmet-
mounted displays to alter their view of the “real” world, but the virtual world RPA operators 
constructed and manipulated relied upon filtered information from other people, cameras, and 
automated tools separated in space, time, and function.  Layers of computations, algorithms, and 
 
                                                 
6 During the Combined Bomber Offensive in World War II, the bombardier and autopilot flew the B-17 and dropped 
its weapons during the most critical phase of a mission, but bomber pilots positioned themselves as the 
“commanders” and “system controllers” of the aircraft, often at the expense of bombardiers.  O’Mara, “The Socio-
Technical Construction of Precision Bombing: A Study of Shared Control and Cognition by Humans, Machines, and 
Doctrine During World War II,” 334. 
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organizations of people and machines connected RPA operators with the battlefield, which 
created lengthy control delays, feedback discontinuities, and inexplicable behavior of the system 
that RPA operators had to reconcile and coordinate.  Operators of occupied aircraft also have to 
contend with system anomalies and conflicting perspectives, and they incorporate tools in the 
cockpit to negotiate solutions to problems, but not to the scale and extent of contemporary RPA 
pilots and sensor operators.  Freed from constraints of working in a cockpit, RPA operators 
infused the ground control station with collaborative tools and networks unavailable to occupied 
aircraft, and each collaborative tool and mode of communication entailed learning a different 
language and protocol to structure their interactions with the system.  RPA pilots, sensor 
operators, and intelligence personnel coordinated the actions of automated tools to share tasks 
among each other and a network of socio-technical systems, but RPA operators also surrounded 
themselves with an unparalleled array of collaborative tools to provide meaning and depth to a 
virtual world they constructed in the ground control station. 
Many of the mapping tools, communication protocols, and techniques Predator and 
Reaper operators use in the ground control station have roots in the fighter community, and the 
familiar products and computer applications reflect the unbroken line of fighter pilots and 
weapon system officers who have commanded Predator and Reaper squadrons.  Much of the 
power and influence that Predator and Reaper crews exercise over military operations, however, 
were due to the initiative and unofficial leadership of intelligence officers.  “Remote split 
operations,” the transition of planning cells to operations cells, and the infusion of intelligence 
networks and collaborative tools in the ground control station were due to a small core of 
intelligence officers in Predator and Reaper squadrons.  Some of the intelligence officers were 
also sensor operators, and from positions of mid-management, they markedly improved the 
ability of Predator and Reaper crews to define and find threats collaboratively with ground forces 
and other intelligence agencies.  Ironically, intelligence officers were instrumental in the 
transformation of Predator “air vehicle operators” into pilots and war fighters. 
One of the most influential people in the Predator community when Air Combat 
Command began to split operations in 2002 was a former director of operations of a Predator 
squadron, a qualified sensor operator, and a commander of an intelligence squadron at Nellis Air 
Force Base.  Two years prior, his performance and the performance of other intelligence officers 
had compelled the wing commander at the base to lobby Air Combat Command for select 
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intelligence officers to command Predator squadrons.  The wing commander wanted to give 
promising intelligence officers the ability to compete for command of a flying squadron, which 
was a unique request in the USAF.  The director of operations for Air Combat Command denied 
the wing commander’s request, however, because Predator was a relatively new aircraft with a 
high accident rate and weapons.  Air Combat Command’s staff thought “rated leadership” by 
pilots and weapon system officers was required to overcome inevitable challenges with weapons 
employment and basic flight of the aircraft.7
Over a decade has passed since the ruling of Air Combat Command’s director of 
operations, however, and conditions have changed.  The command should reverse its policy of 
not letting intelligence officers command RPA squadrons.  The Predator and Reaper 
communities have greatly improved the safety record of RPA, and the accident rates for Predator 
and Reaper are on par with other occupied aircraft.
   
8  Early in the Predator program, the 
commander of Air Combat Command was worried that a string of accidents could threaten 
funding for the program, but that threat has since dissipated because of the system’s consistent 
performance and essential role in the Global War on Terrorism.9
The leadership and expertise of the intelligence community is invaluable to the RPA 
community because intelligence personnel are adept at creating products and tools that influence 
the actions of commanders and war fighters, and the RPA community has spent the last decade 
  In addition, some intelligence 
officers are more experienced and knowledgeable of weapons employment than some of the 
transport pilots flying Predator and Reaper are today.  Several intelligence officers in the 
community are qualified sensor operators and learned to operate Predator’s sensor ball after they 
graduated from the USAF Weapons School.  Predator and Reaper missions are also primarily 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions, yet pilots and weapon system officers 
from the strike community have dominated the leadership and practices of RPA squadrons.  The 
injection of intelligence personnel as official leaders will infuse the RPA community with fresh 
perspectives tailored to intelligence missions, and their leadership will foster innovative 
approaches to combat practices that could be as revolutionary as remote split operations.  
                                                 
7                  
             
        
8 Robert P. Herz, “Assessing the Influence of Human Factors and Experience on Predator Mishaps” (Dissertation, 
Northcentral University, 2008), 91-92. 
9                
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trying to increase the influence of RPA crews in ground commanders’ decision-making 
processes.  How ground commanders and their staffs use RPA and collaborative tools to inform 
decisions is an area ripe for further research.  How do ground forces interpret and use 
intelligence information from RPA and how do their interactions with RPA crews differ from 
those with aircrew in occupied aircraft?  Conventional wisdom seems to indicate that ground 
forces “prefer working with an actual crew overhead,” but no one has explained how or why 
ground forces perform differently with occupied aircraft compared to RPA.10
An Evaluation of the “Advanced Cockpit” 
  Ethnographic and 
historical studies of how ground forces use information from surveillance, reconnaissance, and 
strike aircraft to conduct the counterinsurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan have the potential to 
improve the design of systems, the effectiveness of air campaigns, and our understanding of the 
roles of remote presence and automation in decision-making.  
One of the significant findings of this study is that experienced Reaper operators on a 
mission could feel so in tune with the virtual world in front of them that they entered into scenes 
and felt as if they were the sensor ball floating above the ground.  Sensor operators, and to a 
lesser extent, pilots, became the camera.  Reaper pilots and sensor operators configured the 
ground control station’s lighting, displays, applications, and communication protocols to foster 
feelings of remote presence, and they taught and practiced techniques to feel a part of the 
machine because the distinctions between a threat and a civilian in Iraq and Afghanistan were 
miniscule.  There were no battle lines, uniforms, or unique weapons to separate combatants and 
non-combatants, and RPA operators transported themselves conceptually above a battlefield to 
focus their attention, to explore and sense minute physical and behavioral characteristics of 
objects and individuals, and to develop a closer social relationship with supported ground forces.  
For the Reaper crew, supported unit, customer, and imagery analysts, video from the sensor ball 
was the most important tool and product of the system.  The manipulation of sensor video to 
observe the threatening behavior of an individual, to track a moving target, and to guide a 
weapon onto a precise point were the most challenging and critical tasks of a mission, and 
Reaper crewmembers needed to develop extensive technical and social skills to do them well.  
The next generation of ground control station for Predator and Reaper should incorporate the 
                                                 
10 John A. Tirpak, “Lifesaving Liberty,” Air Force Magazine, April 2011, 52, http://www.airforce-
magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2011/April%202011/0411liberty.aspx. 
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above factors in its design, but it appears General Atomics engineers were oblivious to how RPA 
operators, intelligence personnel, and ground forces accomplished a mission when they initially 
designed and built the “advanced cockpit.” 
General Atomics’ advanced cockpit started as an “independent research and development 
program” for the company in 2005 after several government studies cited “human system 
interface issues” as the causal factor in over forty percent of all Predator accidents.11  A year 
later, General Atomics hired engineers from the National Institute for Aviation Research at 
Wichita State, Kansas, to perform a task analysis of Predator operators and to provide the 
company with human factors expertise and modeling tools.12  To understand what Predator 
operators did and how they did it, the researchers from Wichita State interviewed about a dozen 
Predator pilots and sensor operators and referenced two recent studies of Predator operators 
sponsored by the USAF.13  The researchers used the studies, interviews, and several computer 
visualization tools to create a graphical map of Predator mission tasks, which General Atomics 
engineers referenced to build the advanced cockpit for the control of a Predator, its sensor ball, 
or both simultaneously.  General Atomics flew Predator with the advanced cockpit for the first 
time in 2007, and the USAF started funding the program in 2008 to develop improved interfaces 
for Predator and Reaper squadrons’ problematic and highly modified workstations and to test 
concepts for the control of multiple aircraft from one workstation (see figure 4.1).14
                                                 
11 Kevin W. Williams, A Summary of Unmanned Aircraft Accident/Incident Data: Human Factors Implications 
(Oklahoma City, OK: Civil Aerospace Medical Institute, Federal Aviation Administration, December 2004), 10. 
 
12 Unattributed interviews with General Atomics engineers. 
13            
              
           
              
             
14 Unattributed interviews with government program managers and Predator pilots. 
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Fig. 4.1. General Atomics’ advanced cockpit.  (Adapted from General Atomics, “Advanced 
Cockpit GCS,” http://www.ga-asi.com/products/ground_control/advanced_cockpit.php, 
accessed 29 July 2011) 
By 2010, the USAF had not adopted the advanced cockpit, but several aspects of the 
workstation improved the functionality of the Predator system.  All of the hardware and software 
for the advanced cockpit supported digital video products with touch screens and high definition 
displays.              
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Fig. 4.2. System status screen for General Atomics’ advanced cockpit.     
           
Other aspects of the advanced cockpit’s design reflect General Atomics’ intention to 
demonstrate it could launch and recover aircraft before it could conduct intelligence and ground 
attack missions, and the priority dominated elements of the system’s design.15  When configured 
for landing, a synthetic view of the terrain in front of the aircraft occupied over half of the 
advanced cockpit’s display space.16  General Atomics’ engineers intended the synthetic terrain to 
give Predator pilots a better sense of sink rate on landing and to address many of the factors that 
led to critical evaluations of Predator’s ground control station in 2004.17
                                                 
15 Unattributed interviews with Predator and Reaper pilots.  During observations in 2010 of Operations Location-
Detachment 3, 703rd Aeronautical Systems Group, I flew and observed portions of a test flight for General Atomics’ 
advanced cockpit simulator.   
  In 2003, however, the 
USAF had split the combat portion of a mission from launch and recovery, and Predator 
squadrons trained dedicated crews specifically for takeoff and landing.  By 2008, Predator’s 
safety record had improved, yet the USAF and General Atomics evaluated the performance of 
the advanced cockpit and its operator by timing the completion of the “C-Band Link Test” 
16 For the remainder of a mission, operators could use the upper side monitors to display other computer 
applications. 
17 Unattributed interviews with Predator pilots. 
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checklist, which applied only to launch and recovery crews.18  Before 2008, all of General 
Atomics’ workflow analyses of Predator operations examined checklist procedures, and a vast 
majority of the engineers who designed the advanced cockpit had not seen how Predator crews 
had employed the system on a combat mission or how they had modified work procedures and 
the old workstation in Predator squadrons.19
After the USAF started funding the advanced cockpit in 2008, USAF pilots and sensor 
operators were concerned that the program did not address the needs of operators flying combat 
missions.
   
20  General Atomics and the USAF did not evaluate the performance and comfort of 
operators in the advanced cockpit for shifts more than a couple of hours long, and when sitting in 
the workstation, operators could not write on a physical white board, take notes on 9-line cards 
or other paper products, or adjust or focus the workstation’s lighting.     
             
             
             
       21
Aspects of the advanced cockpit’s construction did not seem to support capabilities for 
surveillance, reconnaissance, and strike missions, and like the old workstation, its design forced 
sensor operators to adapt to conventional aircraft controls to manipulate the sensor ball.  At the 
behest of prominent pilots in the Predator community, General Atomics incorporated the throttle 
and control stick from the F-16 into the advanced cockpit’s design.
  The USAF and General 
Atomics’ emphasis of basic flight and scripted human tasks and not on how pilots and sensor 
operators interpreted, manipulated, and coordinated information on combat missions constrained 
the ability of the advanced cockpit to connect with other agencies, to help operators evaluate and 
integrate data, and to conduct missions relevant to the Global War on Terrorism.   
22
                                                 
18 Minutes of the enhanced ground control station operations suite and cockpit working group meeting, February 27, 
2008. 
  On a mission, Predator 
pilots did not deviate from an assigned altitude, bank the aircraft   , or feel 
more than one “G,” but sensor operators in the advanced cockpit had to grab a handful of rubber 
19 Unattributed interviews with Predator program managers and pilots. 
20 Unattributed interviews with Predator and Reaper pilots. 
21 For years, Predator squadrons bolted flat screens to the old workstations, but General Atomics engineers did not 
use the technology for the advanced cockpit because they said the technology was “too risky.”     
         
22 Unattributed interviews with Predator and Reaper pilots. 
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for them to hold the sensor ball’s reticle on vehicles        
  Adopting the stick from the F-16 put the pickle button for missiles and bombs naturally 
under the pilot’s thumb and gave pilots a “coolie hat” to change the aircraft’s trim settings, but 
controlling Predator with the fighter’s stick was comparatively awkward.  Unlike the F-16, the 
advanced cockpit measured the angle of the stick to determine the pilot’s input, not stick 
pressure.  The F-16’s stick only moved and eighth of an inch and rested flush with the cockpit’s 
console.                
              
                 
                      
                
          
                                                 
23 F-16 pilots rarely touched the trim in an F-16 because the aircraft’s flight control system automatically trimmed 
the aircraft for a constant bank angle at one “G” regardless of attitude.   
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Fig. 4.3. General Atomics’ advanced cockpit with F-16 stick and throttle.  (Adapted from 
General Atomics, “Advanced Cockpit GCS: The Next Generation Ground Control Station,” 
http://www.ga-asi.com/products/ground_control/pdf/AdvCockpit.pdf, accessed 29 July 2011) 
Since 1997, the USAF has paid General Atomics $3.9 million for every ground control 
station it purchased for Predator and Reaper, yet the service and the company designed and 
developed the advanced cockpit without observations and understanding of how sensor operators 
used the system to accomplish a mission.24
                                                 
24 Each ground control station included two or three workstations.           
      ;  As of 2010, the USAF had approximately  operational 
ground control stations.  Unattributed interviews with Predator and Reaper operators. 
  When General Atomics engineers designed the first 
and second generations of Predator and Reaper’s ground control station, their priority was to 
demonstrate the system could fly an endurance aircraft, not to employ the system as a weapon.  
A Predator pilot and engineer from General Atomics explained that the design of Predator’s 
ground control station was a classic “chicken and egg” dilemma.  Sensor operators could not 
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capture images of a target if the pilot could not fly the aircraft safely, but pilots could not 
accomplish a mission if the sensor operator could not see the target clearly.25
This study reveals how people who obtained their livelihood and status from aircraft 
could shape Predator and Reaper in ways that incorporate their own agendas, but the design of 
the next generation of RPA should make the surveillance, reconnaissance, and strike capability 
of the aircraft a priority at least on par with flight endurance and multiple aircraft control.  Full-
motion video from RPA were both products and tools the systems used to accomplish 
intelligence and ground attack missions.  The aircraft, weapons, maps, images,  
      were just tools human operators 
manipulated to define and find virtual objects they could correlate with threatening individuals 
and other targets.  Video from the system’s sensors and the creation of a virtual environment 
should be a focal point of the ground control station and the aircraft’s design, and engineers 
should consider the limitations of the aircraft’s sensor ball and displays when they construct the 
system.  Operators should be able to trace how improvements to the RPA will help them to 
manipulate scenes from the aircraft’s video cameras and to correlate objects in those scenes with 
other data sources.  For example, while precise control of the RPA was critical to obtaining a 
specific view of a target and to employing weapons accurately in space and time, control of the 
aircraft should not come at the expense of control and stability of the RPA’s sensor ball, 
cameras, and lasers.  Former F-16 pilots should be able to bank an RPA’s augmented flight 
control system with their fingers just as well or better than with their whole hand.  There also 
was no need for aircraft engineers to align the rotational axis of the sensor ball with the yaw axis 
of the aircraft.               
               
       .  Elements of the next RPA’s design should 
  The violation of 
sovereign airspace on combat missions was politically, militarily, and monetarily costly, 
however, and failing to identify a target while flying overhead was more detrimental than not 
flying at all.  The purpose of Predator and Reaper was to observe and occasionally kill 
individuals trying to evade detection, and elements of the next generation of RPA should reflect 
that purpose, the tasks of sensor operators, and their interactions with pilots.   
                                                 
25 Unattributed interview with General Atomics engineer and pilot. 
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contribute to the creation of more meaningful sensor video and the timely and precise destruction 
of threats in addition to aircraft endurance and basic flight. 
When judging the next generation of RPA, the USAF should not evaluate the 
performance of the systems by measuring how quickly operators can accomplish mechanized 
procedures and items on a checklist.  An operator’s unique contribution to the employment of 
RPA was not his or her ability to perform as an automaton.  RPA operators manipulated, 
coordinated, and integrated information from a constellation of people and automated tools in a 
variety of formats to create virtual worlds, and operators used the virtual worlds to identify 
patterns and to discover discontinuities they could correlate with friendly and enemy behavior.  
The design of the next generation of RPA should help operators create work environments that 
are meaningful by integrating information from various data sources and by combining the 
functions of automated tools and people to accomplish complex tasks.  For example, a 
requirement for the next generation of ground control station may be for a single operator to 
monitor and direct several aircraft at the same time, but USAF organizations should also be able 
to link workstations together electronically and physically for crews to accomplish dynamic 
missions with multiple operators and more than one aircraft simultaneously.  Future ground 
control stations will need to look more like open work environments than enclosed cockpits.  
              
             
               
               
               
                
                
        
RPA operators attached meaning to objects in their work environments by incorporating 
context into their observations and actions, and the next generation of RPA should enable 
operators to decompose the functions and products of automated tools and other operators to 
examine the details of their environment more intently and to perform tasks more appropriately 
than rigid machines.  For example, one of the most important tasks of RPA operators was to 
interpret images from the sensor ball, but they could only look at one portion of a scene and one 
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display at a time.  Unfortunately, the direction operators were looking was invisible to the rest of 
the system.            
               
                
                    
                
              
              
                
             The USAF should not judge the next 
generation of RPA by how well the systems transform operators into precision machines.  The 
performance of future RPA on surveillance, reconnaissance, and strike missions will rest on how 
well the human components of the systems can create and interpret a virtual world that 
represents objects and events in the “real” world.   
This ethnographic and historical study of Reaper demonstrates how participant 
observation and historical analysis of the operators, tools, and practices of a socio-technical 
system in real-time operations and in a life-critical profession can reveal insights that are difficult 
to achieve with physiological measurements, subject surveys, and workgroups.  Understanding 
how Reaper worked and why it worked the way it did was not possible without observations and 
interactions with operators and their tools in action and without placing their activities in social 
and historical context.  When designing the components of a socio-technical system, 
contemporary human-factors engineers and task analysts implore researchers to regard humans 
as “one aspect of a larger and dynamic context, including the workers’ team, the organization, 
and the organization’s clients and sponsors.”26
                                                 
26 Robert R. Hoffman and Laura G. Militello, Perspectives on Cognitive Task Analysis: Historical Origins and 
Modern Communities of Practice, 1st ed. (Psychology Press, 2009), 305. 
  Rarely, however, do they examine where the 
humans and machines came from or how operators alter the context of work over the course of 
activity and across the history of practice, especially in the aviation domain.  By observing and 
interacting with RPA operators with diverse backgrounds in various contexts, this study 
examined how operators of RPA negotiated the distribution of tasks among organizations of 
humans and automated tools to increase the operators’ relevance and status—at times to the 
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detriment of others in the system.  The evolving structure of the system did not just depend upon 
the designs of aircraft engineers and the requirements of policymakers, who could regard RPA 
operators as uniform technicians playing a glorified video game.  RPA operators reflected and 
shaped the design of Predator and Reaper, and they expanded, contracted, and coordinated 
human and machine components of the system to accomplish missions in ways that preserved 
their dignity and humanity. 
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